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As head of the first democratic government of Germany in more than two decades,
Konrad Adenauer’s attempts at peace with the French after World War II was more
than successful. The main reason for the German ratification of the Paris Peace
Agreement was the Saar referendum of October 1955. The Bundestag resistance led
by the opposition Socialist Ollenhauer had to be convinced to vote for the agreement.1
Adenauer used the Saar Statute attached to the Paris Accords of 1954 as a way of
gaining the opposition support for the full agreement. The French Prime Minister
Mendes-France, himself trying to obtain the support of his Socialist opposition in the
French National Assembly, agreed to the referendum confident of a result in favor of
the French. Contrary to his expectations, the ‘no’ result of the referendum meant
the Saar would be returned to Western Germany by January 1, 1957.
The referendum brought a result in favor of Germany at 67.7 % to 32.3 %, with
a 95.6 % turnout rate. The question mostly asked about the referendum is the mo-
tivations of the leaders in initiating the referendum and what Adenauer thought the
referendum could contribute to his political standing. Considered to be a reformist
statesman, Adenauer publicly supported the Saar Statute and its requirements. The
Statute had been Adenauer’s idea. On the other hand, the French premier Mendes-
1— ‘The Third Man,’ Time Magazine, January 21, 1957.
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France who had to bribe the opposition in the National Assembly in the the earlier
London Agreement (by passing emergency relief for French workers), was once again
forced to face the Socialist Opposition leader Guy Mollet and his 105 strong MPs.
Mendes-France is said to have offered the Socialist leader six positions in his cabinet
to gain Mollet’s party support for the Paris Treaty. The leaders of both states had
to convince their legislatures to ratify the agreement.
There is also a belief that Adenauer obtained a more conciliatory position from
the French premiers, Pierre Mendes-France and Edgar Faure, on the Saar in return
for support in France’s decolonization conflicts in Indochina, Vietnam, and Algeria.
This meant the French who had agreed to the referendum confident of a different
result, had to put away their plans to have Saar fall under the control of the Western
European Union. The concerns of both the Germans and French for Soviet influ-
ence in Europe and the economic strength of Germany had made the French Prime
Minister Mendes-France more willing to find common ground with the Germans. In
exchange for this, the French would be assured of future protection by the British
and the Americans from the rest of Europe. The international reasons for wanting
to rearm Germany and integrate them into the democratic states of Western Europe
were important to the French reasons for signing the Treaty of Paris.2 The German
Chancellor was likewise eager to have his half of the country join the West once
again. The British and the Americans had been pressuring the French government
to make up with the Germans.
The theory presented here gives a domestic explanation for the referendum, also
accounting for the international politics explanations. I argue that even though
the Allies had won the war, the French and Germans were forced to unite for the
2— ‘Yes or No,’ Time Magazine, October 17, 1955.
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future of Europe. The wars in the colonies had just begun for the victors of the
Second World War. In the face of an avalanche of requests for self-determination
abroad, supported domestically by the Communist and Socialist opposition within
France, Mendes-France knew he would have to agree to the referendum. As it turned
out, Mendes-France then used as a hook to get the Germans to agree to the treaty.
The Saar had been a highly contentious issue between the two states prior to a
territorial dispute over land that exchanged ownership between them many times
before. The Chancellor thought the treaty gave back the Germans more than they
had anticipated after a brutal defeat in war, but the legislative resistance of the leftist
parties in Germany claimed the treaty served the French more than the Germans.
The domestic political processes behind the signing of the treaty reveal more of
the reasons for acceptance of the Paris Accords by either side. The leaders who
both faced the choice between legislative ratification and the use of a referendum
had to select the right method of ratification or they risked jeopardizing the whole
agreement.
1.1 Principal-Agent Theory as it Applies to Negotiations
The direct consultation of electorates on territorial negotiations has yielded ben-
efits for leaders for both their domestic reelection prospects and the course of their
international negotiations. The first of these benefits is the consultation of people in
disputed territories, giving them an option for self-determination. A second benefit is
that for controversial decisions such as territorial dispute settlement, leaders need to
have a way to satisfy their domestic oppositions when agreeing to certain concessions
in territory. Thirdly, the resolution of territorial disputes in a certain agreement is
justified, if confirmed by electorates at the end of negotiations (with another state)
4
as it satisfies the demands of both sides in a dispute.3 The referendum is a way of
incorporating the both sides’ publics into these negotiations.
The challenge for the leaders is to agree on a mutual resolution that can get
the domestic endorsement of the regular mechanisms of approval of the leader when
he proposes a new law.4 For democracies this means ratification by the legislature
and for autocracies it means approval by the group of military or religious leaders
that support the government.5 The electorate will not be directly consulted until an
election on this and other general issues, since the leader and/or the legislature is
thought to represent their views on foreign policy, in addition to domestic policies.
For the electorate to have a say on the agreement in its negotiated form, the leader
may choose to carry out a referendum. So, what are the conditions under which a
leader may choose to consult the public through a referendum?
According to principal-agent theory, the electorate knows what motivates the
leader and uses that knowledge to get the leader to do what they want. Ferejohn
(1986) explains the switch in the roles of principal and agent in his theory, by as-
suming voters evaluate past performances of leaders (what is also called retrospec-
tive voting), instead of assuming voters motivate the leader to get what they want
(prospective voting). His study, like this one, is based on Fiorina (1981) who says
this about reversal of roles of electorates and leaders:
“...[I]n formulating policies they [leaders] don’t feel tightly bound by citizen
preferences (except on occasional highly salient issues). Rather, they feel
constrained to have those policies appear successful by the time of the next
3Cronin, Thomas E., Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1999: pp. 5.
4Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35, 1991: pp.245; Tarar, Ahmer, ‘Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining,’ Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49 (3), 2005: pp. 384; Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,’ International
Organization, Vol. 42 (3), (Summer 1988): pp. 429.
5Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith, The Logic of Political
Survival, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 2002: pp. 341-347.
5
election. Politicians need not discern the precise policy preferences of their
constituents. They need only anticipate the reactions of their constituents
to the conditions brought about by the policy instruments they adopt. And
the latter is not so difficult.”6
The principal (electorate) uses this delegation mechanism to keep the leader in
line, especially, because the electorate doesn’t have as much information about the
state of affairs as the leader.7 The agent, or leader, on the other hand, knows that
he has to demonstrate his political competence to get reelected. The electorate is
aware that electoral promises will not be kept and are aware of the constraints facing
leaders. Therefore, both sides know there are only a few ways the leader can impress
with foreign policy success.8
In return, political leaders will develop strategies of their own: including negoti-
ating international agreements the electorate wants in order to boost their chances
of reelection. The leader will also recognize that international success can make up
for domestic problems in the eyes of the electorate. The concerns of political leaders
for their electoral prospects hinge on proving their competence to voters. Political
leaders believe that if they are able to demonstrate competence to lead the country,
then they will survive their political term and also have the chance to get reelected.
One way of showing competence is to perform during the time that the leader has
6Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50 (5), (Jul 1986): pp. 4-5;
Fiorina, Morris P., Retrospective Voting in American National Elections, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1981: pp. 11; pp. 199 supports the Downsian belief in voter rationality.
7Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol 35, 1991: pp. 246-248; Stasavage, David, ‘Open-Door or Closed-Door? Causes and Consequences of Transparency
in Domestic and International Bargaining,’ International Organization, Vol. 58 (4), (Autumn 2004): pp. 668-669,
assumes the bargainer as an agent of the principal or the public where there is asymmetric information in terms of
the minimal offers that the public will accept.
8Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50 (5), (Jul 1986): pp. 6-7;
Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol
35, 1991: pp. 248-249, dubs this the electoral constraint on arms control bargaining ; Smith, Alastair, ‘International
Crises and Domestic Politics,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92 (3); (Sep 1998): pp. 626-627,
emphasizes that the relationships between domestic and international politics is ruled by a series of complicated
relationship agreeing that leaders are interested in the domestic consequences of their foreign policy choices – though
his paper has a difference from my assumptions, in that he models crises situations where in equilibrium, false
promises regarding foreign policy commitments are punished electorally.
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been in office.9 The logic is that the electorate is satisfied with the performance of
the leader, voting retrospectively, the electorate will vote him/her back into office.
This makes sense in conflict theory sense of accountability. Those that underper-
form will not get reelected. The domestic institutional arguments for the democratic
peace have emphasized that institutional accountability matters directly (Rousseau,
Gelpi, Reiter and Huth, 1996) and indirectly (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siver-
son and Smith, 1999).10 Both analyses link political survival to peace and say the
relationship varies via institutional constraints on leader actions.
Democratic leaders are just as concerned for their political survival as autocratic
leaders but they have different ways of attaining it. This explains their reluctance to
take action that will jeopardize their political survival. Smith (1998) shows that this
partly comes from the leaders’ concerns with demonstrating competency in dealing
with international, as well as, domestic affairs. How much competence matters for
peace is reiterated in Guisinger and Smith (2002) where the leader’s own credibil-
ity depends on the level of accountability that democracies subject them to.11 The
motivations of leaders for political survival are true for both democratic and au-
tocratic leaders. The differences in domestic institutional arrangements explain the
differences in accountability. I argue that signing successful international agreements
is one way the leader can demonstrate satisfactory performance in international af-
fairs.12
In democracies the signing of successful international agreements can be a way
9Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50(5), (Jul 1986): pp.
16-17.
10Rousseau, David, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter and Paul Huth, ‘Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic
Peace,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (3), (Sept 1996): pp. 512-533; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce,
James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘An Institutional Explanation for the Democratic
Peace,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 (4), (Dec 1999): pp. 791-808.
11Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith, ‘Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institu-
tions in International Crises,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46 (2), (Apr 2002): pp. 177.
12Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35 (2), (Jun 1991): pp. 253, says the signing of an agreement demonstrates effort on the part of the leader for
reelection prospects, which can be substituted for serious domestic economic failure on the part of the leader.
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for the leader to do what pleases the electorate in preparation for the next elec-
tion. The electorate may be for settlement, but not be happy with the results of the
particular agreement. Such reasons have been given in the past for why electorates
have rejected agreements in referendums for settlement of territorial disputes. The
principal-agent framework outlined above requires a modification in the cases where
the leader seeks referendums for international negotiations.13 I argue that the po-
litical leader may choose to switch positions with the electorate from principal to
agent via a referendum, in order to find out if they are in favor of the negotiated
agreement. As a result, the leader will know before elections whether the agreement
negotiated was deemed favorable enough for reelection.14
This agency of the electorate is the first reason for focusing on the particularities of
the agreements negotiated. The features of the agreements looked at are concerns the
voters would have with an internationally negotiated treaty of territorial disputes.15
As agents of the leader, the electorate will then be in a position to reject aspects of
the agreement they have issues with.16 The territory of Saar which has rich steel
mines and coal deposits was a key reason for legislative resistance to turning it over
by the legislatures of both sides.17
A second reason for looking at the agreements more directly, is the different con-
cerns that exist across international negotiations when they might be up for ref-
erendum voting: information availability about the treaty, understanding of the
13Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50 (5), (Jul 1986): pp.
14-15.
14— ‘Solved at Last,’ Time Magazine, June 18, 1956.
15Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50 (5), (Jul 1986): pp.
15-16.
16Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35 (2), (Jun 1991): pp. 254, explains that the higher the opposition (r) to arms control, the less the leader is
likely to negotiate an arms control agreement, producing an ‘electoral incentive’ regarding priorities to internationally
negotiated agreements.
17— ‘Solved at Last,’ Time Magazine, June 18, 1956; notes the terms of the agreement finally signed between PM
Guy Mollet and Konrad Adenauer, which notes the terms of agreement with France being given economic rights in
the Saar coals until 1960.
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conditions of the treaty, and the individual opinions of the costs of the treaty by
voters. Moreover, the electorate is going to be more or less subject to the informa-
tion revealed to them by their leaders and the public/media campaigns regarding
the referendums. Features of the agreement which lead to loss of jobs, or strategic
insecurity in terms of exposure to foreign companies are the two of the most impor-
tant reasons for rejection of treaties. By placing the electorate in the decision seat,
the leader is (1) finding out what the electorate thinks about the treaty, (2) gaining
support before going to the legislature, and/or (3) using the referendum to make
more extensive offers to the other negotiating party. This confirms the sense of the
electorate as an agent of the leader in the case of such referendums.18
1.2 Legislative Control and Electoral Promises
The theoretical focus of this dissertation will be to demonstrate how referen-
dum use varies across international negotiations and over time, establishing a causal
relationship between ratification methods, domestic institutions (regimes, electoral
institutions) and features of the international agreements themselves (complexity of
issues, demands made upon the two signatory states). I argue that if legislative
blocks against agreements occur out of domestic regime differences then this implies
variance in the costs of obtaining legislative majorities and referendums.19 However,
if legislative blocks occur out of electoral system differences then costs of reaching
legislative majorities and referendums.20 The alternative to a referendum is legisla-
tive logrolling or finding other ways of convincing the individual legislators to pass
18Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol. 50 (5), (Jul 1986): pp. 10-
12, summarizes the performance criteria for a leader in retrospective voting models, according to which the incumbent
will determine a level of effort that is required to demonstrate that performance to the electorate.
19Huth, Paul and Todd Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in Twentieth Century, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002: pp. 72 - 75, characterize this notion as the domestic political vulnerability of the
political leader in power.
20Huth, Paul and Todd Allee, ‘Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International
Disputes,’Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46 (6), (Dec 2002): pp. 754.
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the agreement. Legislative support, if lacking, could be obtained by bribery in the
legislature or consulting of the public to obtain majorities in the legislature.
Explaining the use of direct consultation of the electorate before legislative ap-
proval presents two competing views which place the electorate in the various roles
of principal and agent. The hypotheses that flow from the two views will then be
the basis of the empirical study. Prior studies have emphasized the importance of
majority control over the legislature in territorial disputes settlements. The use of
referendums and snap elections for international negotiations does not replace the
importance of having a majority in the legislature. However, what it does do is re-
veal the conditions under which the political leader cannot obtain the majority and
would rather use the electorate to gain legislative backing.21 The referendum game
of Chapter 2 will show what options are available to the leader for domestic ratifica-
tion. The empirical chapters will demonstrate what factors have most explanatory
power when making this choice.
Adenauer’s main challenge in the debate in the Bundestag over the Paris Agree-
ment came in two parts, opposition against the agreement and opposition to the
Saar Statute. The Socialists led by Erich Ollenhauer were against both negotiation
points and were publicly critical of Adenauer. Adenauer dealt with voting on the
agreements by accusing the socialists of having the same criticisms of the treaty as
the Soviets. In effect, Adenauer said he would call them out as Communists if they
voted against the treaty. As a result, he won out on all six counts of the vote and
21Putnam, Robert, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,’ International Organization, Vol. 42 (3), (Summer 1988):
pp. 436, analyzes the impact of domestic politics on bargaining in his Level I - II framework where he also differentiates
between the negotiation phase and the ratification phase as a reminder that negotiations could be continuous/iterative
only consulting public opinion when ready to ratify – he mentions Alfonsin as lacking legislative support; Schelling,
Thomas and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961: pp.
80 - 81, 86, discusses how the content and complexity of an agreement will play themselves out in the legislature.
He also points out that the separate branches of government affects the communications of the government with the
other Negotiating Party (the Soviets). Morrow (1991) theorizes on arms negotiations, such as this.
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took the Saar Statute to referendum.22
However, Adenauer is said to be less in control of his legislature than Mendes-
France was of the French National Assembly. The German leader faced constant
criticism from other MPs for being unpatriotic, while the French Premier kept his
legislature in line with bargains and legal bribery and whatever else was needed to
obtain support for his foreign policy choices. As the target of a territorial chal-
lenge on the Saar, the French agreed to the referendum, because of the domestic
criticisms Mendes-France faced for his colonial attitude (on the war in Algeria and
the agreements on Indochina). The Socialists and Communists within the National
Assembly had made it necessary to project a more balanced attitude on territorial
claims, though they were aware of Mendes-France’s relative success in dealing with
the clean-up of the war.
Both Adenauer and Mendes-France had to negotiate an international agreement
they could take to the legislature at the completion of negotiations. Both sides
had come out of a grueling war and the opinions on the agreement from legislators
promised serious criticisms in legislative debates. The challenges in the legislature
prompted the Germans to ask for referendum over the Saar. Adenauer and Mendes-
France had different reasons for choosing the referendum option over legislative ap-
proval.23 I attribute these to:
• the electoral systems of these two democracies. France’s electoral system is a
majority system and West Germany’s is proportional representation;
• the complexity of the whole of the Paris Accords, because there were so many
issues that were negotiated within that same agreement. The complexity of an
22— ‘The Third Man,’ Time Magazine, January 21, 1957.
23Bariety, Jacques, ‘France and the Politics of Steel: From the Treaty of Versailles to the International Steel
Entente, 1919-1926,’ Boyce, Robert W.D., ed., French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The Decline and
Fall of a Great Power, Routledge, 1998: pp. 42.
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agreement raises the resistance at the legislature, which increases the need to
convince the legislators to pass the agreement.
With regards to this case, I assume Mendes-France had less trouble getting votes in
the legislature (for electoral systems reasons) and agreed to the referendum to make
it easier for Adenauer to pass the Paris Agreement through the Bundestag. The
game-theoretic model will discuss the effect of increasing legislative resistance on the
leader’s actions. While the empirical study will extend this idea and investigate what
domestic conditions make use of referendums a part of negotiations in international
agreements.
1.3 Incomplete Information, Electoral Institutions and International Agree-
ments
This dissertation explains what types of domestic institutional variations of ne-
gotiating parties and qualities of the agreement are most favorable to approval by
a referendum. It does this by examining the behavior of leaders under domestic
and international constraints. The study looks at two different models and the five
hypotheses that have been drawn from these domestic and international agreement
conditions. The motivations for wanting a referendum of the French and German
sides is easier to comprehend once we have accounted for several factors. These in-
clude (1) the domestic oppositions the leaders faced during the negotiations, (2) the
type of legislative dynamics they met with when they went to have their agreement
ratified, and (3) the public concerns or reservations with the agreements about to be
finalized. For instance, the French were quite unhappy with the security aspects of
the Paris Accords since the buffer regions between the two states were being tied to
the Germans.24 Moreover, these areas such as Rhineland, Alsace-Lorraine and the
24Boyce, Robert W.D., ’Business as usual: the limits of French economic diplomacy, 1926-1933,’French Foreign
and Defence Policy, 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power, Routledge, 1998: pp. 106-108.
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Saar were a source of income for many unemployed miners and laborers in France,
not to mention a major contribution to the national productivity.25 Similarly, the
complexity of the agreement with its many statutes and conditionalities meant there
was many compromises that had to be made. The French allowed the Germans to
have the option of the referendum on the Saar and made it easier for the whole agree-
ment to go through.26 I divide the institutional factors that affected the referendum
into two parts: domestic institutions and features of the agreement. The direction
of the coefficients will determine how much the two groups of explanatory variables
contribute to the leader’s decision to consult the electorate.
In addition to the preferences of the leader for ratification, domestic institutions
can make a difference in the method used by the leader to ratify the negotiated
agreement. As the second explanatory group of variables, regimes and electoral
institutions influence the type of method used for ratification because they influence
the costs of referendum vs. costs of ratification via the legislature. The third group
of variables are control variables of international politics, economics and institutional
features of the agreements. The reason for including international politics variables
is to account for the security considerations involved in the signing of the bilateral
agreements.
The game theoretic model and the empirical tests of the model will reveal a
focus on domestic negotiation strategies employed by the political leader in his/her
efforts to gain public acceptance for settlement of the territorial dispute. Problems
involved with this are the consequences of letting voters who are not as informed
about international affairs decide issues crucial to security of the state.27 However,
25— ‘Yes or No’, Time Magazine, October 17, 1955.
26— ‘Yes or No’, Time Magazine, October 17, 1955.
27Riker, William H., Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the
Theory of Social Choice, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1982: pp. 242.
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for domestic political concerns leaders may be wanting to more directly find out
what the electorate may be thinking about a territorial agreement. According to
prior empirical tests the factors leading to settlements in territorial disputes are as
follows: (1) changes in the international security and existing alliances that will
result, (2) domestic economic costs of settlement, (3) talks being on hold for at
least two years, (4) getting enough concessions after having challenged a border
or continued a dispute, and (4) existence of ethnic co-nationals.28 I argue that
territorial dispute agreements will go to referendums if: (1) there are no serious
security concerns associated with the agreement, (2) no economic costs (such as loss
of significant resource-rich territory), (3) stalemated talks (of five years or more),
(4) more complex an agreement, and (5) ethnic co-nationals with ties. This study
builds on prior work in its choice of control variables and several determinants of
settlement.
It is difficult to attribute motivations to leaders and distinguish among their rea-
sons for going to referendum. As explained above, Adenauer and Mendes-France had
several different reasons for agreeing to a referendum on the Saar. We can however
identify two types of motivations: the domestic politics motivation and international
politics motivation. For example, Mendes-France had trouble convincing his Socialist
opponents in the legislature that the agreement was strong enough to stop the Ger-
mans. The second is the international motivation: Mendes-France had to convince
the Germans to take part in the Western European Union and to be there armed
and ready in case of a Soviet attack. The problem for Adenauer was that the rest of
the world did not agree that the people of the Saar wanted to be a part of Germany.
By agreeing to the referendum, the French were satisfied with the German uncon-
28Huth 1996, Huth and Allee 2002.
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ditional acceptance of the Paris Agreement and the security guarantees to France
that came with it.29 The Germans were satisfied that they got back the Saar and
some rearmament rights against the Soviets. Thus both of these domestic explana-
tions come with the international security guarantees to the signatories which came
with the Paris Accords. The Saar referendum reveals that there are both domestic
and international motivations the leader may have for calling a referendum on an
international treaty. These can be generalized as follows:
• Domestic Politics Motivations
1. referendums are a part of partisan aspect of politics since all disagreements
are between political parties
2. referendums are used to convince other groups in the legislature in the face
of indecision
3. referendums allow the electorate to have a voice in foreign policy making
4. referendums show the legislators what the electorate wants
• International Politics Motivations
1. referendums determine what is in the national interest as an expression of
sovereignty
2. referendums express the majority opinion in a democracy
3. referendums force opponents to consider self-determination as an option
4. referendums act as a final arbiter in international negotiations
By looking at what explains the domestic ratification mechanism of a bilateral
negotiated accord, we can get at the concerns of the leaders when they are legislating
29— ‘Yes or No,’, Time Magazine, October 17, 1955.
15
an international agreement. What makes this easier is that by accounting for the
ratification of one side, we are able to explain the domestic ratification mechanism of a
bilateral agreement, since both sides have to successfully ratify the agreement for it to
exist.30 The choice of bribery, referendum or doing nothing (for domestic ratification)
by the leader is made depending on the likelihood of getting a negotiated agreement
passed through the legislature. In order to get at what explains this choice, I look at
two types of variations: (1) domestic institutions (regimes and electoral institutions)
and (2) issue types (territorial disputes vs. foreign investment vs. sovereign debt).
The variation in issue types imply two other types of variation: (1) complexity of
the agreements (how much do the agreements look like each other; how standardized
they are) and (2) international/domestic economic and security control variables.
1.4 Referendums in Political Economy Issues
The concern with international security in referendum decisions as part of proving
leader performance also permeates into international political economy (IPE) ques-
tions. International negotiations on privatization with multinational corporations
and negotiations for rescheduling with sovereign debt lenders such as the Paris Club
also fit into the above model of electoral incentives for leader performance. The
theory explains differences in referendum use in territorial disputes and several IPE
issues subject to referendum use. The commonalities between the three issue areas
are: (1) both security concerns and opposition to economic costs are involved in
ratification and referendum decisions; (2) electorates are not more informed about
international negotiations in these two areas than they are with the territorial dis-
30Simmons, Beth, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994: pp. 151, 160, 252 emphasize the importance of legislative ratification on
bilateral economic agreements; Martin, Lisa, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000: pp. 156, emphasizes that increased uncertainty in ratification by states in the
E[U] has led to increases in bargaining power and on pp. 169 she points out that transparent legislative approval
processes lead to credible commitments.
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putes; and (3) political leaders can use approval or rejection of the agreement to win
elections if the electorate’s views are in line with the contributions of the negotiated
agreement. The differences across the issue chapters are: (1) the challenger’s bar-
gaining position vis-a-vis the other negotiating party, (2) the dominance of domestic
economic concerns over security and vice-versa; and (3) complexity of the agreement
being negotiated (sovereign debt agreements are more focused than privatization
agreements which are less complex than territorial agreements, especially in terms
of number of issues varying across agreements among different countries).
Political leaders, in their efforts to bring about privatization in corrupt and inef-
ficient state enterprises, have to sometimes stand up to legislatures that block their
chances at reform. Although globalization advocates have pointed out the benefits of
foreign direct investment (FDI) for economic growth, employment, productivity and
technological diffusion; there has also been considerable domestic opposition to what
has been overwhelmingly characterized as the sweeping momentum of globalization.
The common concern of anti-globalization movements has been about the welfare ef-
fects of increased competition brought on by movement of capital, goods and labor.
These concerns may be to blame for legislative oppositions, but the empirical test
will reveal how much regime politics accounts for use of referendums.31
Sovereign Debt repayments also bring domestic and international interests at odds
with one another, just as with territorial conflicts and privatization decisions. In this
case, within democracies, the median voter will almost always vote to reschedule the
payment due to the resulting lower domestic interest rate. The tradeoff there is that
the rescheduling increases interest payments on future loans and extends time to
repayment. The third empirical analysis will relate regimes, electoral institutions and
31Hays, Jude, ‘Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies,’ World Politics,
2003: pp. 86-90, finds PR democracies are more likely to look after the interests of labor.
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agreement features to the political leader’s choice in the face of legislative opposition
to the rescheduling of loans.
What unites the three empirical chapters are firstly, the influence of domestic
regime structures and electoral systems within democracies on the leader’s ability to
gain support in the legislature and the electoral motivations that follow. Secondly,
the populist aspects of territorial dispute negotiations, privatization offers and debt
control decisions which tend to permeate regular elections. Thirdly, the security as-
pects of foreign direct investment deals and debt repayments, which have a similar
effect as economic aspects of territorial agreements on electoral votes. Fourth, the
similarity in actions of political leaders in passing all three types of internationally
negotiated agreements evident in the game and empirical results. Fifth, the empiri-
cal sections allows the testing of the same variables of regime, electoral systems and
features of the agreements and show how the electoral motivations of leaders work in
the same way across these issues. Sixth, the direction of influence of domestic insti-
tutions in domestic ratification choices of leaders, is the same in various international
political economy and international security questions.
Table 1.1 summarizes the percentage of negotiation cases across the three issue
areas, and for the domestic outcomes of referendum, legislative approval or continuing
negotiations.32 The number of foreign investment cases are greater than the other
two, because there were often more than one privatization case in a strategic industry
qualifying to enter the dataset. The source for the Territorial Disputes dataset is
the updated version of Huth and Allee (2002) dataset. The cases of the FDI section
are based on news reports of privatization progress in each state. The cases of the
Sovereign Debt section are listed as borrowers in the records of the Paris Club.
32Continuing negotiation cases are those that have not been ratified by year end 2007.
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The common aspects of the empirical models that run the three chapters are (1)
the dependent variable is the result in the current round of negotiations, which is
denoted by y, (2) two major groups of explanatory variables that are denoted by
the vector x. With regards to the dependent variable, I define the three possible
outcomes of the empirical study (categories for y) as follows:
A = the outcome where the legislature accepts terms of
the negotiated agreement, (or accept legalized dispute
resolution, or accept military defeat),
B = the outcome where the legislature accepts the terms
agreed upon by referendums,
C = the outcome to continue negotiations (because nego-
tiations are ongoing, no domestic ratification being
sought).
Let Pr{y = j} be the probability that the outcome falls in the j-th category;
e.g., Pr{y = A} is the probability that outcome A is observed. Assuming that the
response categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the probabilities add up
to one,
Pr{y = A}+ Pr{y = B}+ Pr{y = C} = 1.
I consider models for determining probabilities Pr{y = j}, j = A,B,C, where each
probability depends on a vector x of K explanatory variables. Following the main
line of thought in multinomial logit modeling, in each empirical chapter, I set one of
the response categories (A, B or C) as a baseline, calculate the log-odds for all other
categories relative to this baseline, and then let the log-odds be a linear function of
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the explanatory variables. For example, if C is chosen to be the baseline
YA|C = ln
Pr{y = A}





where YA|C is defined as the log-odd for outcome A versus C with βA|C,0 being a
constant and βA|C,k for k = 1, ..., K being the regression coefficients. Similarly,
YB|C = ln
Pr{y = B}
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The parameters of the model, βj|C,k for j = A,B and k = 0, 1, ..., K, are estimated
by maximum likelihood.
The empirical results will present binary comparisons of A versus B, C versus
A, and C versus B. These comparisons emphasize the relative likelihoods of leaders
choices when presented with two domestic ratification options or continuing negoti-
ations. The decision entails making two choices: (1) to continue negotiations or take
the agreement as it is in for domestic approval, and (2) once having decided to take
it in for domestic approval, whether he/she wants to take it to the legislature right
away or go for a referendum before going to the legislature. The baseline will either
be domestic approval via legislative ratification [outcome C] or legislative approval
via referendum [outcome B]. The rest of the binary logits will be derived using the
above three results.
The definition of a case is any challenger action across months in a particular
territorial dispute (e.g. the dispute between China and Pakistan that began in 1947
and ended in 1963 for the disagreement over the border between Kashmir and Xin-
jiang), host state action across months in the privatization of a state entity (e.g. the
privatization of British Steel in the U.K. between October 1984 and February 2006),
and borrower action across months of Paris Club lending to a member (e.g. Club
lending to Albania between December 1993 and January 2000). Cases are identi-
fied by the country-months in which an action is taken to negotiate a disagreement
with another state, investor or Paris Club joint lending action.33 There will at times
be multiple cases of disputes for each country, for example China is the challenger
in ten of its disputes, including that with Nepal, Pakistan, Portugal, USSR among
others. The unit of analysis is country-month as defined by each row of the dataset,
33See Appendix A for a complete list of cases for the three empirical chapters.
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and unit of observation is round of negotiations (across country-months) for each
case that enters the dataset. The unit of analysis is defined as the underlying data
structure of the analysis. The unit of observation is defined as any composites of
the unit of analysis, which statistical attributes are attached to. For the Territorial
Disputes dataset has a total of 171 cases. The Foreign Direct Investment dataset
has 203 cases, and the Sovereign Debt dataset has a total of 77 cases.34 Territo-
rial negotiations last an average of 9 months per round (usually having one major
meeting within a year), foreign direct investment deals last 5 months per round,
and sovereign debt negotiations last an average of 5 months per round (but tend to
meet twice per year). The institutional outcomes of the cases have been coded using
newspaper articles, and books on the dispute/privatization case or sovereign debt
negotiations announcements. The percentage of each domestic approval outcome
can be summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Datasets and Percentage of Cases of Domestic Institutional Outcomes, 1948-2006.
Issue Area Legislative Referendum Continue TotalApproval Negotiations
Territorial Disputes 91 27 53 171
Percentage of Cases 53.2% 15.8% 31% 100%
FDI 107 30 66 203
Percentage of Cases 52.7% 14.8% 32.5% 100%
Sovereign Debt 54 15 8 77
Percentage of Cases 70.1% 19.5% 10.4% 100%
The empirical chapters will test the same five hypotheses. These will be outlined at
the end of Chapter 2, after I have presented the game of their origin. The hypotheses
make claims about the affects domestic institutions and features of the agreements
will have on the leader’s probabilities of choosing any of the domestic ratification
choices to each other and to continuing of negotiations and vice versa. The first two
34See individual chapters for more detailed information on number of country-months and rounds of negotiations
per dataset, on pp. 61 for Chapter 3, pp. 97 for Chapter 4, and pp. 77 for Chapter 5.
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hypotheses relate to the domestic institutional questions posed as part of the model
relating to regime and electoral system differences. The other three refer to features
of the international agreements in terms of their complexity, or opposition to the
agreement resulting from economic costs and security concerns. As the three main
aspects of differentiating across agreements and their difficulties of getting domestic
ratification, I test these in both Models 1 and 2. The reason for testing them in
the same equations as the domestic institutional factors are they are not the main
determinants of domestic ratification choices of leaders. They are also not a major
feature of the game theoretic model of Chapter 2. However, features of the agreement
are important because they give us clues as to the type of opposition that exists in the
legislature, when there is opposition to domestic ratification. The characterization
of legislative opposition using features of the agreements to characterize potential
domestic oppositions.
Another important aspect of the empirical chapters are the features of the agree-
ments variables (complexity, economic costs, security concerns) that can potentially
arise from each agreement included in the three datasets used for this study. Figure
1.1 summarizes the distribution of the ratings per agreement of these features. These
features of the agreements make it possible to test the reaction of political leaders
to legislative oppositions that are sourced in one or more of them. There are three
graphs per agreement, designated as complexity, economic and security costs. The
reader should examine them to look for similarities in different features across the
issue areas.
Figure 1.1 also presents some limitations of the data. Firstly, foreign direct in-
vestment/privatization deal cases only contain strategically (in the national security
sense) important industries (such as telecommunications and transportation). This
23
Figure 1.1: Percent of Cases across Levels of (Legislative Opposition to) Features of the Agreee-
ments: Complexity, Economic Costs and Security Concerns
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was the preferred criteria because the controversial nature of the such deals and their
potency for creating problems when seeking legislative ratification. The prominence
of security concerns explains why the investment data have relatively high levels of
complexity than would be expected. Second, the data for Chapter 5, relating to
sovereign debt, are derived from Paris Club debt only. This means there is a slight
attribution of the results to that international organization’s lending practices. This
is also not a major issue, since the behavior is not that specific. Finally, the terri-
torial disputes data, from the yet unpublished version of the Huth and Allee (2002)
dataset, do not contain cases where agreements have not become a source of dispute.
All three chapters use methods of random selection, where the negotiation does not
enter the dataset until one side (identified as the challenger) makes a claim that
challenges the status quo. The statistical models then identify when negotiations are
occurring, and when the case has gone to domestic approval by the challenger. This
two step method of selection makes the data fit to analyze statistically. Chapters 4
and 5 emulate this method of selection, introduced by Huth and Allee (2002). 35
1.5 Overview
Chapter 2 will lay out the game theoretical model for the argument. The next
three chapters will test this theory of referendums using Multinomial Logit mod-
els.36 Chapter 3 will show what institutional factors prompt the leader to undertake
referendums in territorial disputes. Chapter 4 and 5 will test the argument for pri-
vatizations and sovereign debt reschedulings to the Paris Club, respectively. The
results of the data analyses are presented in the respective chapters along with the
implications and analysis. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions. The cases used in
35Also see Appendix A of Huth, Paul and Todd Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in Twentieth
Century, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002: pp. 298-304.
36Hanushek, Erik A. and John E. Jackson, ‘Statistical Methods for Social Scientists,’ New York: Academic Press,
1977: pp. 206-218.
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the study are listed in Appendix A. The technical details of the referendum game
(derivations of utility functions and the equilibrium of the game) are omitted in
the main text and given in Appendix B. Finally, Appendix C is dedicated to the
codebook for the empirical studies.
CHAPTER II
Theoretical Framework
2.1 When the Agent becomes the Principal
The model assumes retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981), where elections are seen
as a way to force political leaders to keep their campaign promises (Ferejohn 1986)
in a one-period asymmetric information model which builds on Morrow (1991).1 The
incumbent is judged on retrospective achievements in elections, where the electorate’s
utility function is different from that of the incumbent’s. The asymmetry is brought
out by the reversal of principal-agent roles among the leader and the electorate in
a referendum. The actors once again assume their respective roles of principal and
agent when regular elections come around.
2.2 The Model
Consider a single round game with three players: a leader (L), an electorate (E),
and a negotiating party (NP). L believes that signing an international agreement
with the counterpart (who is referred to as NP) brings him utility; hence, he/she
has an incentive to make a deal with NP. L and NP negotiate over the division of
1Fiorina, Morris P., ‘Retrospective Voting in American National Elections,’ New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1981: pp. 9 notes agent-principal based voting demands less of the electorate than other models, but given
that leaders are office-seeking, the electorate manages to maintain an ex ante and effective accountability; Ferejohn,
John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, Vol 50(5), 1986: pp. 9-11; Morrow, James




one unit. L offers x ∈ [0, 1] to NP where x is the share of L and 1-x is NP’s share
from the agreement. Thus, while L prefers higher values of x, NP is in favor of lower
offers. The utility function of NP from the agreement is
uNP (x) = u0 − x, (2.1)
in which u0 is the threshold for not signing an agreement. The value of u0 is private
information to NP. Before the offer of L, NP knows the value of u0. On the other
hand, u0 is unknown to L, and it is believed to be distributed uniformly over [0,1]
by L.
Although L wants the agreement to be signed, the legislature’s reaction to the
agreement (especially the level of the concessions given to NP) may be different from
L’s. Let r denote the resistance of the legislature to an agreement with NP. Any
agreement that is less than r cannot pass the legislature. In some sense, r is the
minimum share from the agreement that is domestically acceptable, below which the
legislature would not ratify. L knows the exact value of the legislature resistance
before offering an agreement to NP.
The leader is unsure about the stance of E with respect to the agreement, and
the utility he/she gets from it (τ(x)). E is either type FE (Friendly Electorate which
Favors the Agreement) or UFE (Unfriendly Electorate which Disfavors the Agree-
ment) depending on whether he/she supports an agreement or not. The probability
distribution of the type of E is




pL if Y = FE
1− pL if Y = UFE
(2.2)







τ+(x) = x if E is type FE
τ−(x) = x− 1 if E is type UFE.
(2.3)
L knows that with probability pL, E is in favor of the agreement and obtains a utility
of x once the agreement is ratified, i.e., τ(x) = τ+(x) = x. With probability 1−pL, E
prefers no agreement; hence, in case the agreement passes the legislature, E’s payoff
from the agreement would be τ(x) = τ−(x) = x − 1. Note that if E does not favor
the agreement, then her utility decreases as more is offered by L to NP (i.e., as x
decreases).
The agreement can also have an impact on the reelection of L. Let p be the
probability of L being reelected at the end of his/her term just before the agreement
negotiations had begun. The value of keeping office to L is ω, hence his/her expected
utility from the elections just before the negotiations is pω. If E is type FE and the
agreement passes the legislature, then this may boost his/her popularity and increase
his/her probability of reelection to (1+ θ1)p with 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ (1− p)/p.2 Similarly, if E
is type UFE and the agreement is ratified, then this may damage his/her popularity
and decrease the probability of reelection down to (1− θ2)p with 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1, which
would be reflected in the payoffs obtained by L.3
If L’s offer (x) is accepted by NP, then the resistance at the legislature (r) forms,
and L has three options to undertake:
2Note that the increased probability (1+θ1)p cannot exceed 1 due to the definition of probability, so (1+θ1)p ≤ 1
leads to θ1 ≤ (1− p)/p.
3Note that the new probability (1− θ2)p cannot be less than 0, so (1− θ2)p ≥ 0 leads to θ2 ≤ 1.
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(i) take the agreement to the legislature as it is,
(ii) bribe all or some portion of the legislature in order to decrease
the resistance,
(iii) go to a referendum and use the power of electorate to convince
the legislature.
In case (i), L obtains different payoffs under different realizations of r. If x ≥
r, then L would be able to get the agreement to pass the legislature and obtain
x+(1+θ1)pω or x+(1−θ2)pω, depending whether E is type FE or UFE, respectively.
L may choose the bribery option (case(ii)) for getting the agreement passed the
legislature. This requires the use of the resources in an inefficient way, which causes
L and E respective costs of c and B, where c is the cost of bribery to ensure x be
ratified. The cost of bribery depends both on the level of resistance of the legislature
(r) and the type of the state: authoritarian or democracy.
The last option (case (iii)) is to hold a referendum and use the power of E to
convince the legislature about the agreement. This would decrease R units of utility
from L and E where R denotes the public cost of holding a referendum.4 If the
outcome of the referendum turns out to be no, depending on whether x ≥ r or x < r,
additional reputational costs may arise: m1 and m2, m2 ≥ m1. The logic behind
the selection of the reputation costs are as follows. When L holds a referendum for
an agreement that has no legislative support, if the result turns out to be no then
this has more reputation-wise consequences (m2) than an agreement with legislative
support (m1).
In the remainder of this section I define the actions of the players formerly, present
the flow of the game (the time line for the game) and discuss the explicit assumptions
4When L holds a referendum, many activities should be organized as campaigns have to be conducted to bring
people to the polls, ballots have to be prepared, observers have to be placed, etc. These activities use the resources
of the public, so R is a proxy representing all such costs related to holding a referendum.
30
and private/public information known to the players.
2.2.1 Decisions
As discussed previously, there are three players making four decisions:
• L decides on what to offer to NP (x), whether to hold a referendum (k = 1)
or not (k = 0) and whether to bribe the legislature (b = 1) or not (b = 0).
Holding a referendum and bribing are mutually exclusive5, so L chooses from
the action set
{
(k = 1),(k = 0, b = 0),(k = 0, b = 1)
}
. I refer to action (k = 1)
as referendum, (k = 0, b = 0) as do nothing and (k = 0, b = 1) as bribery.
• NP accepts or rejects L’s proposal x,
• E decides on whether to vote yes or no in case of a referendum.
2.2.2 The Flow of the Game
The sequence of events in the game is depicted in Figure 2.1 and the decision
tree is given in Figure 2.2 with payoff vectors for L and E. The game starts with
the leader choosing an x to offer. Next, NP decides on whether to accept or reject
the offer. If rejected, L and E obtains he respective payoffs pω and 0 (see Figure
2.2) and the game ends. Otherwise, L decides on how to proceed for ratification of
the agreement. Here L has three options to choose from: referendum, do nothing
or bribery. Next, the nature (N) chooses a type for the electorate, FE or UFE, by
a Bernoulli trial. E is assigned to type FE with probability pL and to UFE with
probability 1− pL. Only E knows the type assigned by N, i.e., E’s type is a private
information and only known by E. L knows the probability distribution of E being
FE or UFE. 6 If L has selected do nothing or bribery actions, then L and E get their
5There is no such action as (k = 1, b = 1).
6Note that in Figure 2.2 the dotted lines are showing the information set of L. Since L is not aware of the type
of E, he/she can be at one of the two points in the decision tree.
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respective payoffs depending on the relationship between x and r (whether x ≥ r
or x < r) and the type of E, see Figure 2.2. Otherwise, referendum is held and E
votes yes or no based on the type assigned by N. Similarly, the equality relationship
between x and r and the vote of E determines the payoffs L and E obtain as shown
in Figure 2.2.
2.2.3 Assumptions
In this subsection, the important assumptions of the model are listed explicitly.
Although they all have been introduced previously, I also add some discussion on
issues concerning these assumptions.
• The leader is in favor of getting the agreement accepted by NP and ratified by
the legislature. In other words, any agreement x > 0 increases the utility of L.
• The resistance of the legislature (r) is known by L before he/she makes an offer
(x) to NP. L can estimate the level of resistance at the legislature, the sources
of the resistance would generally be known by L in advance. However, one can
also argue that although L has a vague idea of the legislative resistance, the
extent of the resistance becomes clearer once the agreement is negotiated and
the details are made public. This can easily be incorporated into the model in
the expense of explicit derivation of x at the equilibrium. This issue is further
discussed in §2.4.
• No matter how high the resistance of the legislature or how persistent the leg-
islature about its stance regarding the issue, if the offer of L is accepted by NP
and the outcome of a (possible) referendum is yes, then the legislature ratifies
the agreement.
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Figure 2.1: The flow of the referendum game.
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Figure 2.2: Decision tree for the referendum game. The first and the second elements of the payoff
vectors are for L and E, respectively.
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2.2.4 Private vs. Public Information
It is highly important to distinguish between the private and public information
available to the players in the game before proceeding with the analysis. First, I
discuss the information NP knows about. NP does not have a priori knowledge of
any parameters of the game except u0, which is the threshold for not signing an
agreement. This is a private information and only known to NP. Hence, L does
not know the exact value of u0 before he/she makes an offer, but knows that u0 is
uniformly distributed over [0,1].
R, B and r are the three parameters of the game that are known to E. What
is private information to E is his/her type assigned by the nature. Thus, L does
not know the exact type of E before he/she makes his/her decisions, but knows the
probabilities of E being assigned type FE or UFE (pL and 1− pL).
Finally, I discuss the leader. The following parameters of the game are private
information of L: c, θ1, θ2, p, ω, m1 and m2. Although not private, L has the
information of r, R and B, too.
In terms of actions, both E and NP are aware of what L plays as x. The decision
of NP is visible to all players in the game. The ratification decision of L (referendum,
do nothing or bribe) is known by E because he/she has access to the information of
r and x, and is aware of the three possible actions that L can play for the ratification
of the agreement if the agreement is accepted by NP.
2.3 The Analysis
This section is dedicated to the analysis for determining the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game introduced in §2.2. Backward induction is the method
employed. I start at the end of the game tree and work sequentially backward
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through each decision. As such, the analysis of each stage is done with the knowledge
of players’ anticipated responses in subsequent decisions.
Before the decisions of L are analyzed, the actions of E and NP at the equilibrium
are derived in the next two subsections. Let a∗E and a
∗
NP be the respective actions of
E and NP at the equilibrium.
2.3.1 E’s Action at the Equilibrium
The actions of E are the possible outcomes of the referendum: aE ∈ {yes, no}. As
shown it Figure 2.2, depending on the type, whether FE or UFE, the actions and the
corresponding payoffs for E differ. On the one hand, if E is FE (τ(x) = τ+(x) = x),
then E chooses action yes, no matter what the resistance turns out to be at the
legislature. Note that when L goes to a referendum and E is type FE, the utility E
gets by voting yes is x − R, while saying no gives a payoff −R whether x < r or
x ≥ r. On the other hand, if E is type UFE (τ(x) = τ−(x) = x− 1), then the action
E selects is no. While yes brings x− 1−R, voting no gets E a payoff of −R, again,






yes if E is type FE
no if E is type UFE.
(2.4)
2.3.2 NP’s Action at the Equilibrium
Recall from §2.2 that the utility of NP is u0−x if x < u0 and 0 otherwise, see (2.1).
NP has two action he/she can play: accept or reject. It is clear from uNP (x) that
any offer that is equal or above the minimum acceptance level u0 brings nonpositive
utility, so NP plays reject for such offers and obtains zero utility. Any offer that is
smaller than u0 brings positive utility to NP. Since rejecting such an offer leads to
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zero utility and rational behavior dictates preferring an action with positive utility





accept if x < u0
reject if x ≥ u0.
(2.5)
L knows that u0 is distributed uniformly over [0,1], the probability of NP accepting
an offer x can be derived as follows:
Pr{NP accepts x} = Pr{x < u0}
= 1− Pr{u0 ≤ x}
= 1− x. (2.6)
Similarly,
Pr{NP rejects x} = Pr{u0 ≤ x}
= x. (2.7)
Having E’s and NP’s actions at the equilibrium determined, I focus next on the
decisions of L.
2.3.3 L’s Actions at the Equilibrium
There are two decisions that L makes. The first is to determine his/her share from
the agreement, x ∈ [0, 1]. The second is to select a strategy to get the agreement
ratified, denoted by aL, if the offer is accepted by NP. In the latter, L has three
actions to select from:
aL ∈
{
(k = 0, b = 0), (k = 0, b = 1), (k = 1)
}
,
7Morrow, James D., Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994; see
Chapter 5 for explanation of how to solve games of type differentiation.
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where (k = 1) is holding a referendum, (k = 0, b = 1) is bribing the legislature and
(k = 0, b = 0) is doing nothing (simply neither bribery nor referendum). Although
these actions come after the decision of NP in the flow of the game, NP’s decision
only depends on x not the decision of L for ratification. Therefore, L’s decisions can
be analyzed as if they are made simultaneously at the beginning of the game without
effecting the equilibrium of the game.
It is apparent from the payoff vectors in Figure 2.2 that the utility of L depends
on the type of E and the value of x relative to r (whether x ≥ r or x < r). The type
of E is not affected by L’s decisions, so in the following two subsections, I analyze
the decisions of L based on whether he/she sets x less than r or not. Before that I
introduce new notation. Let x∗ be the value of the offer at an equilibrium, a∗L be the







pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)





m2 − θ1pω for i = 2
c−R
1−pL + θ2pω −m2 for i = 3.
(2.8)
The definitions of A1, A2 and A3 follow from the dominance relationship between
the three actions (k = 0, b = 0), (k = 0, b = 1), (k = 1), which is discussed in detail
in §B.2.
2.3.4 Case (i): L Sets x ≥ r
In this section, I analyze the case if L decides to offer an x that is no less than
r. Depending on his/her type, the response of E to a possible referendum would
be different. As discussed in §2.3.1, if E is type FE (UFE), then the outcome of a
referendum would be yes (no). Compare the payoffs of L when x ≥ r and E is type
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FE in Figure 2.2. If L plays (k = 0, b = 0), (k = 0, b = 1) or (k = 1), then he/she
obtains x+(1+ θ1)pω, x− c+(1+ θ1)pω and x−R +(1+ θ1)pω, respectively. Since
the payoff of (k = 0, b = 0) is greater than or equal to the others, L plays do nothing.
The same holds when x ≥ r and E is type UFE. The payoff of (k = 0, b = 0),
x + (1 − θ2)pω, is greater than or equal to any other action’s payoff, so L plays do
nothing again. No matter what action E chooses, if x ≥ r then action (k = 0, b = 0)
dominates the other actions. In other words, given x ≥ r, the best response of L to
E’s action at the equilibrium (yes if E is type FE and no if E is type UFE, see (2.4))
is (k = 0, b = 0), which is denoted by
BL(yes|τ+(x), x ≥ r) = BL(no|τ−(x), x ≥ r) = (k = 0, b = 0). (2.9)
Having determined what L plays for ratification if he/she sets x ≥ r, I continue
with how x is set. L offers x that maximizes his/her expected utility, E[uL(x)]. Define
gr(x) as the expected utility function of L if x ≥ r. From (2.9), it is known that L
chooses action (k = 0, b = 0), so
gr(x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x ≥ r
]
+Pr{NP rejects x}(pω), (2.10)
where
E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x ≥ r]
= E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x ≥ r, E is type FE]Pr{E is type FE}
+E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x ≥ r, E is type UFE]Pr{E is type UFE}
= (x + (1 + θ1)pω))(pL) + (x + (1− θ2)pω))(1− pL)
= x + pω + pLθ1pω − (1− pL)θ2pω
= x + pω + pω
(




First adding and subtracting c to the right-hand-side of (2.11), and then substituting
A1 (see (2.8)) leads to
E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x ≥ r]
= x + pω + c− c + pω
(
pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)
= x + pω + c−
(
c− pω(pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2)
)
= x + pω + c− A1. (2.12)
Substituting (2.6), (2.7) and (2.12) into (2.10) gives
gr(x) =
(
1− x)(x + pω + c− A1
)
+ x(pω)
= x + pω + c− A1 − x2 − xpω − xc(r) + xA1 + xpω
= −x2 + x(1− c + A1
)
+ pω + c− A1. (2.13)
As shown in §B.1, gr(x) is a concave function of x reaching its maximum at
xr =
1− c + A1
2
.
The expected utility L obtains by offering xr is
gr(xr) =
(




A plot of gr(x) can be found in Figure 2.3.
The results so far suggest that if L decides to offer an agreement that satisfies the
legislature (x ≥ r), then provided that NP accepts the offer, L sends the agreement
directly to the legislature for ratification (action (k = 0, b = 0)). In order to maximize





xr if xr ≥ r
r if xr < r.
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As can be seen from Figure 2.3, gr(x) increases in region [0, xr), so if r < xr then
offering xr, an offer that is more than the legislative resistance, brings more expected
utility. However, gr(x) decreases in the region [xr, 1]. If r > xr then making any offer
larger than r would decrease L’s expected utility, so L just offers r. In plain words,
if L decides to make an offer that has support in the legislature (x ≥ r), then under
a particular criterion (xr ≥ r), L makes an offer that is more than the minimum
acceptable offer (xr). In other words, L gives an offer that gives less concessions to
NP even though the legislature is ready to accept more concessions. If the criterion
is not satisfied, i.e., xr < r, then L makes an offer that is equal to the minimum
acceptable offer that the legislature demands (r).
2.3.5 Case (ii): L Sets x < r
If L decides to make an offer that is less than the resistance, it is not straight-
forward (unlike in case (i)) to determine which action L chooses by just comparing
the payoffs in Figure 2.2. For example, under the conditions x < r and E is type
UFE, the payoffs of the actions (k = 0, b = 0), (k = 0, b = 1) and (k = 1) are
pω, x − c + (1 + θ1)pω and x − R + (1 + θ1)pω, respectively. It is not possible to
determine the highest payoff without knowing the values of x, c, R and θ1pω. Hence,
I restore to deriving the expected utility functions for each action. The details for
the derivations are omitted in the main text and can be found in Appendix B.
Define gdn(x) as the expected utility function of L if x < r and L decides to do
nothing, i.e., (k = 0, b = 0). Then8,
8See §B.1 for the details of the derivation of gdn(x).
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Figure 2.3: An Illustration of Functions (a) gr(x), (b) gbri(x), (c) gref (x), (d) gdn(x).
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gdn(x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
]
+Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
= (1− x)(pω) + x(pω)
= pω,
The expression simply says that if L offers an x that is less than r and decides to
do nothing to get it passed the legislature, then L obtains an expected utility of
pω, which is independent of x. This is intuitive because offering x < r and doing
nothing to get the legislature ratification (neither bribing the legislature nor holding
a referendum) simply means L is left with the expected utility obtained from the
next elections: pω.
Let gbri(x) be the expected utility function of L if x < r and L decides to bribe,
i.e., (k = 0, b = 1). In this case9,
gbri(x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
]
+Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
= (1− x)(x− A1 + pω) + x(pω)
= −x2 + x(1 + A1)− A1 + pω,












9See §B.1 for the details of the derivation of gbri(x).
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Similarly, let gref (x) be the expected utility function of L if x < r and L decides
to hold a referendum. Then10,
gref (x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 1))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
= (1− x)(pL(x− A2) + pω) + x(pω)
= −pLx2 + pLx(1 + A2)− pLA2 + pω.





Substituting xref into gref (x) gives the maximum utility L obtains by offering xref :






See Figure 2.3 for a sketch of function gref (x) and §B.1 for the detailed derivations.
The results derived up to this point are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Expected utility functions conditioned on x.
Condition Action optimal x optimal expected utility







(k = 0, b = 0) x ∈ [0,1] gdn(x) = pω












A1 = c− pω
(
pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)
, A2 = RpL +
1−pL
pL
m2 − θ1pω, A3 = c−R1−pL + θ2pω −m2
Pairwise comparisons of the functions gdn(x), gbri(x) and gref (x) give the domi-
nance relationships between the corresponding actions when x < r. Before discussing
this further, I introduce the following assumption, which keeps the presentation com-
pact.11 If the expected utility of any two or more actions of L are equal then it is
10See §B.1 for the details of the derivation of gref (x).
11When the payoffs of two actions are the same, then the player would be indifferent between selecting any of the
actions. This gives rise to multiple equilibria, which complicates the notation without bringing in any additional
insight.
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assumed that L prefers x ≥ r and (k = 0, b = 0) over x < r and (k = 0, b = 0); x < r
and (k = 0, b = 0) over x < r and (k = 0, b = 1); x < r and (k = 0, b = 1) over x < r
and (k = 1), i.e.,
(












x < r, (k = 1)
)
. (2.14)
The details of the dominance relationships between the actions can be found in
§B.2. The findings are summarized in Table 2.3.5. The definitions of A1, A2 and A3
in (2.8) follow from the conditions on x in the table. If x is above A1 then action
(k = 0, b = 1) dominates (k = 0, b = 0); below A1 action (k = 0, b = 1) is dominated
by (k = 0, b = 0). Similarly, A2 and A3 are the points that determine the dominance
relationship between actions (k = 0, b = 0) and (k = 1), and (k = 0, b = 1) and
(k = 1), respectively.
Table 2.2: The conditions for pairwise dominance (Â) relationships between the actions (k = 0, b =
0), (k = 0, b = 1) and (k = 1) given that x < r.
(k = 0, b = 0) Â (k = 0, b = 1) if x ≤ A1 = c− pω
(
pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)




(k = 1) Â (k = 0, b = 1) if x < A3 = c−R1−pL + θ2pω −m2
(k = 0, b = 1) Â (k = 1) if x ≥ A3 = c−R1−pL + θ2pω −m2
(k = 0, b = 1) Â (k = 0, b = 0) if x > A1 = c− pω
(
pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)




Although Table 2.3.5 shows when an action dominates another, one needs to know
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which action is chosen by L under which condition. There are six different cases arise
from the equality relationship between A1, A2 and A3:
1. A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3
2. A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2
3. A2 ≤ A3 ≤ A1
4. A1 ≤ A2 ≤ A3
5. A1 ≤ A3 ≤ A2
6. A3 ≤ A2 ≤ A1.
In §B.3, it is shown that cases 3-6 are not possible. Thus, only two cases have to be
considered. Table 2.3.5 shows which ratification action L chooses if he/she decides
to make an offer that is less than the resistance (x < r). This table is another way
of presenting the results in Table 2.3.5. In order to demonstrate how Table 2.3.5
is constructed, consider the condition A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3. If x ≤ A2 then due to the
relationship between Ai, i = 1, 2, 3, x ≤ A1 and x ≤ A3 are also true. These three
conditions correspond to the first three dominance relationships in Table 2.3.5, which
allows one to conclude that L plays (k = 0, b = 0). Next, consider A2 < x ≤ A1,
which leads to the conditions A2 < x, x ≤ A1 and x ≤ A3. These three conditions
correspond to the first, third and sixth dominance relationships in Table 2.3.5, from
which it is concluded that (k = 1) dominates the other two actions. Continuing in
this manner completes Table 2.3.5.
Table 2.3.5 is read as follows. If L decides to make an offer that is less than
the resistance at the legislature (x < r), then he/she substitutes the values of the
parameters of the game (p, ω, R, c, pL, θ1, θ2, m2) into (2.8) and computes the values
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of A1, A2 and A3. Depending on the individual values, condition A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3 or
condition A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2 is satisfied. As an example, let condition A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3
holds. The table simply says that if L makes an offer that is no more than A2,
i.e., x ≤ A2, then the ratification action that he/she should choose is do nothing,
(k = 0, b = 0). If the offer is between A2 and A1, i.e., A2 < x < A1, then he/she
selects the referendum option for ratification, (k = 1), and so on.
Table 2.3: The conditions when an action is selected by L for x < r.
Condition for A1, A2, A3 Condition for x Action chosen by L
A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3
x ≤ A2 (k = 0, b = 0)
A2 < x ≤ A1 (k = 1)
A1 < x < A3 (k = 1)
A3 ≤ x (k = 0, b = 1)
A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2
x < A3 (k = 0, b = 0)
A3 ≤ x ≤ A1 (k = 0, b = 0)
A1 < x ≤ A2 (k = 0, b = 1)
A2 < x (k = 0, b = 1)
I analyzed the actions of L based on the equality relationship between x and r
(whether x ≥ r or x < r) in the previous two subsections. It is shown in §2.3.4
that (k = 0, b = 0) is the dominant action for ratification if x ≥ r. In §2.3.5, the
conditions under which a ratification action dominates another are explicitly derived
for x < r. These results simply tell that the following actions should be considered
further to characterize the equilibrium:
(












x < r, (k = 1)
)
.
Hence, the equality relationships between the expected utility functions gr(x), gdn(x),
gbri(x) and gref (x) need to be analyzed in order to determine the conditions under
which one of the four actions above is preferred by L over the others. This is done
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in §B.4.
2.3.6 Characterization of (x∗, a∗L)
In this subsection, I analyze (x∗, a∗L) , i.e., the offer and the ratification action at
the equilibrium. Depending on the values of A1, A2 and A3, what L offers at the
equilibrium changes. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze the case where
0 < Ai < 1 for i = 1, 2, 3. (2.15)
The reason for this selection is two-fold. First, if 0 < Ai for i = 1, 2, 3, then it is
always possible to normalize the parameters such that 0 < Ai < 1 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Second, in comparison to the settings like A2 ≤ A1 ≤ 0 ≤ A3 or A3 ≤ 0 ≤ A1 ≤ A3,
this case is more general. As will be apparent in the remainder of the analysis, the
same approach can be used to derive the equilibria for other cases, too.
Next, I introduce two assumptions. In the remainder of this chapter, it is assumed
that
A3 − c
1− pL ≤ 0, (2.16)
where the left hand side of the inequality is a point that gr(x) and gref (x) intersect.
Also, it is assumed that
1 + A1 > c. (2.17)




1 + A1 > c
1 + A1 − c > 0
1 + A1 − c
2
> 0
xr > 0. (2.18)
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The actions at the equilibrium, (x∗, a∗L), are derived in detail in §B.5. There are
two equilibria of the game and the specific conditions for each are discussed next.
Bribery Equilibrium
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if x̄ < r ≤ 1,
(2.19)
where








The name refers to the property of the equilibrium that there is no referendum option
being utilized by the leader. This equilibrium corresponds to picture (a) in Figure
2.4. The figure depicts the offer (x∗) as a function of the legislature’s resistance r
and shows which action L chooses for ratification for different intervals of r. While
the x-axis shows r, the y-axis is for the equilibrium offer x∗. The interpretation of
the bribery equilibrium is as follows.
• If the legislative resistance is low (r ≤ xr), then the legislature is ready to
accept a lower-value agreement. However, in this condition, L gives an offer
that is higher than what the legislature is ready to accept (x∗ = xr > r) and
takes the agreement to the legislature if accepted by NP. In other words, L
chooses do nothing action, (k = 0, b = 0).
• If the legislative resistance is moderate (xr < r ≤ x̄), then L offers what the
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legislature asks for (x∗ = r) and if accepted by NP takes the agreement to the
legislature for ratification (do nothing option).
• If the legislative resistance is high (x̄ < r ≤ 1), then L exercises the bribery
option, (k = 0, b = 1). This allows L to make an offer that is less than the
resistance: x∗ = xbri. Unlike in the other cases, L does not satisfy the legislature
(by having an offer equal to at least r); instead he/she uses bribery to give more
concessions to NP.
If any of the conditions below holds, then the solution of the Referendum Game
is the bribery equilibrium:
A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2,
or
A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3 and xref = 1+A22 ≥ A3,
or
A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3, xref < A3 and gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ).
(2.21)
Referendum Equilibrium
The second equilibrium is coined as the referendum equilibrium. As the name sug-
gests, this equilibrium has no bribery option exercised by the leader. Figure 2.4 (b)
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Similar to the former equilibrium, there are two cut-off points xr and x̂ creating three
resistance intervals. The interpretation of the referendum equilibrium is as follows.
• If the legislative resistance is low (r ≤ xr), then L gives an offer that is higher
than what the legislature is ready to accept (x∗ = xr > r) and takes the
agreement to the legislature if accepted by NP ((k = 0, b = 0)).
• If the legislative resistance is moderate (xr < r ≤ x̂), then L equates his/her
offer to the legislature’s resistance (x∗ = r) and if accepted by NP, takes the
agreement to the legislature for ratification ((k = 0, b = 0)).
• If the legislative resistance is high (x̂ < r ≤ 1), then L goes for a referendum,
(k = 1). This allows L to make an offer that is less than the resistance: x∗ =
xref . This way, he/she can give more concessions to NP.
The condition for the referendum equilibrium is
A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3, xref < A3 and gbri(xbri) < gref (xref ). (2.24)
Note that both equilibria have a similar structure. The two differences are
• the cut-off points of legislative resistance beyond which L gives an offer less than
the legislature’s resistance (x∗ < r): the cut-off points are x̄ for the bribery
equilibrium and x̂ for the referendum equilibrium.
• the ratification actions chosen: bribery, a∗L = (k = 0, b = 1), in bribery equilib-
rium and holding a referendum, a∗L = (k = 1), in the referendum equilibrium.
51
Figure 2.4: An Illustration of (a) the bribery equilibrium, and (b) the referendum equilibrium.
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2.3.7 Sensitivity Analysis of the Equilibrium
In this subsection, I discuss how the bribery and the referendum equilibria are
affected by the changes in various parameters of the game. I start with the bribery
equilibrium.
Bribery Equilibrium
There are three offers by the leader: xr, r and xbri, see Figure 2.4. Both xr and xbri
depend on the parameters of the game. Substituting A1 given in (2.8) into (B.1)
leads to
xr =
1− c + A1
2
=
1− c + c− pω
(























1 + c− pω
(















I take the derivatives of xr and xbri given above with respect to the parameters p, ω,
pL, θ1, θ2 and c. The results are given in Table 2.4.
The effects of θ1 and θ2 on the offers is inverse. The derivatives of xr and xbri with
respect to θ1 are equal and negative suggesting that any increase in the probability
of reelection (because of E being in favor of the agreement) results in lower offers by
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L in two regions. The logic behind is that if the ratification of the agreement yields
a higher chance of reelection then L gives more concession to NP in order to increase
the probability of NP accepting the offer. However, ∂xr/∂θ2 = ∂xbri/∂θ2 ≥ 0 implies
that an increase in θ2 leads to higher offers. Recall from §2.2 that θ2 is the decrease
in the probability of L being reelected due to L getting an agreement not supported
by E ratified. Hence, if the possible damage on L’s reelection (due to an unpopular
agreement) increases then L proposes higher offers, i.e., asks for more concessions
from NP.
The effects of p and ω on the offers are similar, but more intricate. The net impact
of the ratification of the agreement on the probability of reelection is pLθ1−(1−pL)θ2.
If this term is positive then any increase in the probability of reelection (p) or the
value of keeping the office (ω) allows the leader to give more concessions to NP, i.e.,
lower offers. Otherwise, L offers higher xr and xbri.
The derivatives with respect to pL are negative. If the probability of E supporting
the agreement increases then L gives more concessions, i.e., lower offers. The effect
of c is different from the others: while ∂xr/∂θ2 = 0, ∂xbri/∂θ2 = 0.5. Hence, any
increase in the cost of bribery only increases the offer if L chooses to exercise the
bribery option. Note that xr is unchanged if c is perturbed. Bribing the legislature
consumes from the resources of the leader, so if L utilizes the bribery option then
any increase in c leads to a higher offer.
Referendum Equilibrium
The offers in the referendum equilibrium are xr, r and xref , see Figure 2.4. Substi-
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The derivatives of xr and xref with respect to various parameters is given in Table
2.5. On the contrary to the bribery case, the derivatives of the offers are different in
value, which implies the change in xr and xref would be different in magnitude.
The derivatives of xr and xref with respect to θ1 are both negative suggesting
that an increase in θ1 leads to more concessions given to NP. Although the derivative
of xr with respect to θ2 is nonnegative (∂xr/∂θ2 ≥ 0), note that ∂xref/∂θ2 = 0.
The interpretation is as follows. If the conditions for a referendum are satisfied, any
change in θ2 does not effect the value of the offer (xref ). However, if the conditions
for x∗ > r and do nothing hold, then an increase in θ2 results in less concessions
given to NP. (xr goes up as θ2 increases)
The impact of p and ω on xr has already been discussed for the bribery equilib-
rium. The effect on xref is such that any increase in p and/or ω leads to a lower offer
(meaning more concessions given to NP) provided that θ1 > 0. Both ∂xr/∂pL and
∂xref/∂pL are negative, which implies an increase in the probability of E being FE
leads to more concessions given to NP.
The cost of holding a referendum (R) has no effect on xr, but any increase in R
results in a higher xref . R consumes the resources of both L and E, so any increase in
the value requires compensation on the agreement side, which translates into higher
xref . Similarly, if the reputation-wise cost of a referendum (m2) increases, this does
not effect xr, see that ∂xr/∂m2 = 0. However, if the referendum conditions are
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satisfied, then any increase in m2, which can be interpreted as the risk of holding a
referendum, requires an increase in the expected utility from the agreement, simply
a higher offer. This implies less concessions made to NP.





















































































































2.4 Extensions of the Game
This section is dedicated to three possible extensions of the Referendum Game.
First, I discuss how the legislature’s resistance can be extended. In the current model,
resistance of the legislature r is known by the leader with certainty before he/she
plays any action. However, L might have a vague idea of the legislative resistance.
The extent of the resistance may become clearer once the agreement is negotiated
and the details are made public. In other words, the leader may not know the level
of r before he/she makes an offer to NP. This can be incorporated into the model by
assuming a distribution function for r rather than an exact value. As an example,
let r have three possible values: rl, rm and rh satisfying 0 ≤ rl < rm < rh ≤ 1. While
rh corresponds to a high resistance at the legislature, rm and rl are medium and low
resistance, respectively. The probability distribution function of r is




αl if s = rl
αm if s = rm
αh if s = rh,
where αl + αm + αh = 1. In other words, with probability αl, αm and αh the
resistance of the legislature is low, medium and high, respectively. Treating r as a
random variable would not change the analysis in principle, but would make it more
intricate. The explicit derivation of x∗ (offer at an equilibrium) and a∗L (ratification
action at an equilibrium) would not be as neat as it is in the current model.
The second extension is the incorporation of bargaining power for NP. Due to
his/her utility function, NP does not accept any offer greater than u0, which is a
private information to NP.12 The leader only knows the distribution of u0, which is
uniformly distributed over [0,1] in the current model. By playing with the range of
12Recall that the lower the offer x, the more preferable it is for NP.
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u0, it is possible to vary the stance of NP. For example, if it is assumed that u0 is
uniformly distributed over [0,0.5], then one can conclude that a tougher NP is in
the picture compared to the one in the current model. It is not possible that this
NP accepts an offer larger than half (x > 0.5) because the maximum value u0 may
obtain is 0.5. However, in the current model, u0 can take any value between 0 and
1.
Finally, I discuss how the assumption given in (2.15) can easily be relaxed. Recall
that A1, A2 and A3 follow from the dominance relationship between the actions of
the leader when x < r, see §B.2. Any of these variables being negative implies that
one ratification action dominates the other for any x ∈ [0, 1]. If A1, A2 and A3 are
positive and any of them is greater than 1 (possible two of them or even all of them),
then it is possible to normalize the parameters of the game such that all variables
are less than or equal to 1. Hence, I believe that the case with
0 < Ai < 1 for i = 1, 2, 3
is more complex and interesting. The other possible cases like A2 < A1 < 0 and
A3 > 1; A2 < A1 < 0 and A3 > 0; or A2 > A1 > A3 > 1 can be analyzed following
the approach presented in this chapter.
2.5 Implications
In the previous sections of this chapter, the actions of the players at the equilib-
rium are derived and analyzed in detail. I dedicate this section to the discussion of
the implications of the findings from the analysis of the referendum game. First, I
summarize the main results of the analysis in §2.5.1. Then, I continue with a discus-
sion on the differences across the issue areas, more specifically comparing territorial
disputes against international political economy (IPE) issues, in §2.5.2. An impor-
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tant factor that varies across and within issues is the complexity of an agreement.
The impact of this on the offers proposed by the leader is discussed in §2.5.3. Fi-
nally, I conclude with the explanation of how the referendum game is connected to
the empirical models in §2.6.
2.5.1 Summary of the Results for the Referendum Game
The referendum game is a single-period asymmetric information game theoretical
model. There are three players: the electorate (E), the leader (L) and the negotiating
party (NP).13 The interaction between the players leads to two distinct equilibria:
bribery and referendum. The names follow from the actions that the leader may use
in each equilibrium. Some of the parameters of the game14 determine the values of
A1, A2 and A3, which follow from the dominance relationships between the leader’s
actions. Depending on whether one or the other condition given in (2.21) or (2.24)
is satisfied (these are mutually exclusive conditions based on A1, A2 and A3), the
equilibrium of the game is identified. Even though the actions of the electorate and
the negotiating party are independent of the equilibrium that arises (whether bribery
or referendum equilibrium), in the end what the leader plays may differ.
Once the equilibrium is known, the only determinant of the leader’s actions is the
legislative resistance r. What the leader offers (x∗) and which action to choose for
the ratification of the agreement depends on how high r is, see Figure 2.4. If r is
low or medium,15 what the leader chooses to offer and the corresponding ratification
action do not change with the type of the equilibrium. It is when r is high that the
13Although nature (N) is another player in the game, her action is restricted to the assignment of electorate’s type
(FE or UFE). Hence, her action at an equilibrium can safely be ignored.
14p: probability of the leader being reelected in the coming election; ω: utility of holding office for the leader; R:
public cost of holding a referendum (in units of utility); c: cost of bribing the legislature (in units of utility), pL:
probability of electorate being in favor of the agreement, i.e., E being type FE; θ1: increase in the probability of the
leader being reelected after a referendum with an outcome yes; θ2: decrease in the probability of the leader being
reelected after a referendum with an outcome no; m2: reputational cost of no as an outcome of a referendum to the
leader (in units of utility).
15Referring r ≤ x̄ in the bribery equilibrium and r ≤ x̂ in the referendum equilibrium
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actions of the leader differ from one equilibrium to another. If r is low16 then the
leader proposes an offer that is higher than the legislative resistance (x∗ > r). Note
that even though the legislature is ready to accept an offer that is low, the leader
chooses to give less concessions to NP. In this case, since the offer is higher than what
the legislature asks for, the offer will be ratified by the legislature. If r is medium17
then the leader proposes an offer that is equal to r, x∗ = r. In this case, leader’s offer
is determined by the domestically accepted minimum. Similar to the case where r is
low, the legislature will be eager to ratify the agreement.
The leader resorts to actions that aim to convince the legislature in the case that
r is high.18 The logic behind this behavior is as follows. Recall that while the leader
prefers higher offers (x), the negotiating party favors lower valued offers. Hence, the
probability of NP accepting an offer is inversely proportional to the value of the offer.
If r is very high and the leader acts in a way to please the legislature, then the chance
that it is accepted by the negotiating party is very slim. Therefore, the leader seeks
for ways to convince the legislature to accept offers that are lower, i.e., making more
concessions. In the bribery equilibrium, as the name suggests, the leader bribes some
or all the legislature. This way, he/she can give more concessions to the negotiating
party, x∗ = xbri < r. In other words, through bribery, the leader lowers the resistance
at the legislature, which costs him/her valuable resources. Bribery is used here
in a broader sense, such as the leader’s buying of opposition legislator’s votes, ie.
logrolling, or the use of private goods in political bargains.19
The action for ratification in the referendum equilibrium is holding a referendum.
Having a yes as an outcome of the referendum makes the offer by the leader get
16Low corresponds to r ≤ xr.
17Medium corresponds to xr < r ≤ x̄ in the bribery equilibrium and xr < r ≤ x̂ in the referendum equilibrium.
18High corresponds to r > x̄ in the bribery equilibrium and r > x̂ in the referendum equilibrium.
19The idea is central to much of comparative politics work, as well as, Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and
Smith (2002) where private goods and public goods analogies were introduced to differentiate between regimes.
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ratified in the legislature. Similar to the other equilibrium, the leader may give
more concessions, x∗ = xref < r, by a referendum. However, unlike in the bribery
equilibrium, the outcome of the leader’s action is not certain. The electorate may
vote down an agreement.
The reader will note that using the referendum or the bribery option are extreme
actions in a democratic system. An important contribution of the referendum game
and its findings is that it provides an explanation of how, why and when these
options may be adopted. The regular course of action for the leader is to give the
offer corresponding to the level of resistance in the legislature. It is not until the
resistance in the legislature gets very high that the leader will need to resort to
bribery or referendum.
It is difficult to say, with many parameters entering into the dynamics of the
game, what the leader will do without interpreting each parameter of the game indi-
vidually. Given what we know from previous empirical studies looking at legislative
ratification, we need to make additional assumptions to the referendum game to be
able to test its implications:
• The cost of a referendum (R) varies across regime type,
• The cost of bribery (c) varies across regime type and electoral systems,
• As the complexity of an agreement increases, the legislative resistance rises
(increasing r) and the support of the electorate drops (decreasing pL).
When testing, I also consider the relevance of the agreement to the election following
the leader’s decision to make an agreement (how θ1 and θ2 influence whether bribery
or referendum will be employed), in addition to the three assumptions above. The
domestic institutional factors (regime type, electoral system) are all products of
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these costs and relevant election variables. In order to consider the aspects of the
agreements that matter for our empirical analysis, we need to first talk about the
differences across the three issue areas.
2.5.2 Territorial Disputes vs. IPE Chapters
What determines the variation in the leader’s choices across the three empirical
chapters are: (1) complexity of the agreement – number of points of disagreement
of the treaty being negotiated, and (2) differences in the levels of legislative resis-
tance in international negotiations with other parties. These two factors vary across
international security agreements and international economic agreements. Firstly,
complexity of an agreement will be less for the economic issues than for territorial
disputes because the former follow more standard formats. FDI deals follow existing
molds of agreements and specifications, whereas territorial dispute negotiations take
longer and are tailored to individual cases. For example, the UNCTAD FDI/TNC
database has all Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) signed between states and
most firm-level investment deals are then made taking these legal frameworks into
consideration when applicable.
FDI agreements are more specific than debt agreements. This is because Paris
Club has various terms of agreements already drawn up in previous debtor-lender
meetings which they use to reschedule or refer to when drawing up debt-relief agree-
ments in later negotiations.20 At the same time, it makes sense that the complexity
of the agreements also varies within the three issue areas. Complexity of the agree-
ment influences the leader’s choice by affecting: (1) the level of resistance in the
legislature (denoted by r in the referendum game), and (2) the understanding of the
20These are called the Standardized Terms of Treatment and range from the “Classic” terms to the “Cologne”
terms now replaced with the “Lyon” terms of treatment, each catering to the borrower state’s income brackets
ranging from Middle-Income Countries to Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries at the very bottom as determined by the
World Bank.
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electorate of the issues included in the agreement (denoted by pL in the referendum
game).
Secondly, the variance in bargaining power of a state when negotiating with a state
vs. an MNC vs. an international (lending) organization (IO) is also demonstrated
through the consistency of levels of resistance in the legislature.21 The resistance
will be more persistently high when the leader is negotiating with an MNC than an
international lending organization. This is because I assume MNCs have no sovereign
power and therefore less legal clout. A lending organization such as the Paris Club,
on the other hand, will have more power over a sovereign borrower than vice-versa.
This will be true to the extent that the MNC is weaker than the state and the IO is
a strong and capable one.
The referendum game captures this relationship through the distribution of u0.
The NP which the political leader is negotiating with will not accept any offer greater
than u0 – which is the offer threshold of not signing an agreement. If I had to
elaborate, as is, this threshold is assumed to be distributed uniformly between 0 and
1. In order to show that a party has more bargaining power, I would have to assume
it to be distributed uniformly between 0 and a, where a < 1. In that case, the
lower the a, the stronger would be the NP in terms of bargaining power. It is within
these theoretical boundaries that in two of the three empirical chapters I predict
the optimal conditions for use of referendums by leaders when privatizing for foreign
investors and when entering debt negotiations with the Paris Club.22
21The Paris Club is known as one of the most influential international financial organizations that helps to coor-
dinate the lenders and borrowers, removing the problems associated with independent lending by states.
22The IMF acts as a precursor to Paris Club agreements, where the IMF does the major negotiating with borrower
states and the Paris Club states then renew their agreements on a more standard format, meeting less frequently
and only when an IMF agreement has been successfully signed preceding that particular round of negotiations.
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2.5.3 The Impact of the Complexity of the Agreement on the Offers
The complexity of the agreement can mean the leader will make concessions on
many issues, which would mean the leader will see more resistance in the legislature.
Sovereign debt agreements will be pretty standard, FDI deals will be less so and
territorial disputes will be the most case-sensitive and one of a kind because of their
historic, legal and geographic specificity. The complexity of the agreement promotes
a willingness to go to the legislature over referendums in leaders, because of the
relatively uninformed nature of electorates. It also promotes a willingness to continue
negotiations as much as possible, (before or) over going to the legislature, because of
the difficulties of negotiating a more complex agreement. The first point is significant,
because referendums entail consulting the public, who are dependent on what they
are told by their leaders and rarely have time to devote to full understanding of
the details of a deal except in very crude terms.23 The second point is significant,
because it hints at why some agreements may in fact take longer to negotiate than
others.
The referendum game suggests that depending on the values of the parameters of
the game (R, c, pL, p, ω, m2, θ1 and θ2), the leader ends up in a bribery or referendum
equilibrium as in graphs (a) and (b) in Figure 2.4, respectively. Whichever the
equilibrium, the offer being made and the action for ratification depends on the
legislature’s resistance r. An increase in the complexity of the agreement raises r
further and lowers pL. Decreasing pL results in the condition A2 ≥ A3 which places
the leader in the bribery equilibrium. Once there, the effects of increasing r could
work to increase or decrease the offers made by the leader. On the one hand, if the
resulting resistance is low or medium (r ≤ x̄) then the offer x∗ increases, decreasing
23See how pL plays a role in the model.
64
the concessions made to NP. On the other hand, if r becomes too high (r > x̄)
then the leader chooses bribery for ratification and decreases his offer increasing the
concessions made to NP. This last point is in line with what Morrow (1991) has
already shown. Morrow (1991) notes that the offer made to the Soviet Union (or
negotiating party NP) will be giving more concessions in arms control negotiations as
the unemployment and inflation levels in the United States increases (as the economy
performs badly). This study captures that idea through increases in the resistance
of the legislature that rise with the domestic economic/security costs of the state
negotiating with the NP.24
2.6 The Referendum Game and the Empirical Models
The referendum game shows how the resistance in the legislature influences the
offers made. The economic and security concerns of the electorate will affect the level
of resistance faced in the legislature. This is important because the resistance in the
legislature and its persistence will imply whether the leader can take an agreement
to referendum. The empirical models make binary comparisons of the likelihood of
use of referendums and continuation of negotiations, or bribery and continuation of
negotiations. The reason for this is the base outcome of doing nothing for domes-
tic ratification or continuation of negotiations can more easily be compared to the
options of bribery and referendum in empirical terms. The models do not test inter-
action terms (i.e., combined effects of economic and security features of agreements
interacted with the effects of domestic institutions). This is due to the nature of the
referendum model, as it is first of its kind in terms of tradeoffs of referendum and
bribery. Taking the referendum game as its starting point, the empirical models will
24Morrow, James D., ‘Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 35 (2), 1991: pp. 249-250; his point is echoed in Martin (2000), where legislative control over budgets,
procedures, appointments and implementation influences foreign policy conducted internationally by leaders.
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compare across the issue areas the likelihood of continuing to negotiate over using
referendum or bribery. These results should provide some guidance as to what types
of legislative resistance (economic or security related) will be more likely to lead to
referendums. Future research on referendums will be analyzing these relationships
in more depth.
2.6.1 Hypotheses
The empirical study builds on the game theoretic model and seeks to test three
different aspects of the game and the hypotheses derived from the game. The first
is the cost of referendums (R, m2), the second is the cost of bribery (c), and the
third is the importance of the agreement for reelection (θ1 and θ2). These variables
speak to three variations that explain the use of referendums by states. I make
three assumptions25 to go from the model to the empirical hypotheses: (1) costs
of referendums vary across regime types, (2) costs of bribery vary across electoral
systems and regime types, and (3) importance of the agreement for reelection changes
with the importance of the settlement of the issue for that particular set of elections.
The foreign policy choices that need to be explained by the theoretical model is
the choice between continuing negotiations and taking the agreement negotiated in
for domestic approval. The problem is that not all legislatures will agree to ratify or
approve an international agreement. Therefore, as the leader is negotiating he has to
make the calculation of whether to take the agreement to the legislature or directly
to the voters for their approval. Once negotiations have finalized and a settlement
has been agreed upon, the leader has to have the agreement approved domestically
by the legislature. This approval could come from the legislature or first go to
the electorate and then the legislature more indirectly. Anything approved by the
25Recall that some of these assumptions are first introduced in §2.5.1.
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electorate has to be approved by the legislature (de facto or automatically) meaning
that the referendum could be used to convince the legislature that the electorate
would like this agreement to pass. Given the electoral motivations of political leaders,
the leaders may sometimes force agreements into referendums which the legislature
will have a resistance to.
The motivations of the leaders are difficult to read, however we can get at the
function of the referendum by looking at the factors that were important for the
choices made between negotiating and going to referendum, and between negotiat-
ing and going to the legislature.
H1: The more democratic the state, the more likely is the leader to
use legislative approval and referendums than continuing ne-
gotiations, and the more autocratic the state, the more likely
is the leader to use referendums than legislative approval than
continuing negotiations.
H2: Among democracies, Proportional Representation systems are
more likely to use continuing negotiations than legislative
approval than referendums, than Plurality/Majority systems
which more likely to use continuing negotiations and legisla-
tive approval than referendums.
H3: The more complex the agreement (or difficult to negotiate)
the more likely is the leader to use legislative approval than
referendums; and to choose to continue negotiations than leg-
islative approval and referendums.
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H4: Domestic costs of an agreement are more likely to increase re-
sistance in the legislature and more likely to lead to continued
negotiations than referendums.
H5: National security concerns of an agreement are more likely to
increase resistance in the legislature and more likely to lead
to referendums than continued negotiations.
2.6.2 Testing the Theory
Chapters 3 through 5 will test the referendum game with respect to the hypothe-
ses above using three different datasets. The first dataset comes from an updated
version of the Huth and Allee (2002) data between 1945-2000. The second dataset
constructed for this dissertation looks at privatization decisions of strategic enter-
prises between 1945-2006. The third dataset constructed for this dissertation is of
Paris Club borrower nations and their rescheduling decisions and meetings between
1945-2006. The datasets are all examined in monadic terms and explain legislative
decisions and ratification of international agreements negotiated by leaders. The
leaders whose objective is to get reelected would prefer to negotiate treaties which
the electorate approves of. The study will show the effects of the regimes, electoral
institutions and agreement features on the leader’s decision. It is these constraints
of domestic institutions and the agreement’s influence on domestic interests as repre-
sented in the legislature that leads to the various outcomes of domestic ratification.
Referendums are modeled in terms of their use by political leaders, with the goal
of convincing their legislatures to ratify the agreements. If no satisfactory treaties
emerge from negotiations, the leader is coded as continuing to participate in ongoing
68
negotiations.26
Table 2.6.2 below is a first cut at the empirical problem modeled in the refer-
endum game. The main explanatory variables are: DEMOCRACY (democratic
regime type), AUTOCRACY (autocratic regime type), PROPORTIONAL REP
(proportional representation as electoral system), PLURALITY/ MAJORITY (plu-
rality/majority as electoral system), COMPLEXITY (complexity of the agreement),
ECONOMIC COSTS (domestic economic costs associated with an agreement), and
SECURITY CONCERNS (security concerns associated with an agreement). The
hypotheses predict a positive relationship between complexity of the agreement and
all three odds comparisons. The regime variables (DEMOCRACY, AUTOCRACY)
are thought to have opposite effects to each other, on the choice between continuing
to negotiate, and going to the legislature, and going to the legislature and taking
the agreement to referendum. Electoral systems (PROPORTIONAL REPRESEN-
TATION, PLURALITY/MAJORITY), with predictions more relevant to the more
consistently democratic states, have positive expectations for continuing negotiations
versus legislative approval, and negative for legislative approval versus referendum
for PR, and negative expectations for continuing negotiations versus legislative ap-
proval, and positive for legislative approval versus referendum. The last two variables
(ECONOMIC COSTS, SECURITY CONCERNS) pertain to the choice between go-
ing to referendum and continuing negotiations with opposite effects, because they
both obstruct legislative approval. The empirical model cannot make predictions
beyond the relationships and assumptions allowed by the referendum game. This is
why some of our predictions are not applicable to this analysis. Those are relation-
ships that we can’t presume to predict with the set up of the game and the definition
26See also Appendix A for a list of the cases, details of the variables are included in Appendix C.
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of the problem, though as the reader probably knows this is typical of multinomial
logit comparisons.
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DEMOCRACY (H1) + + NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) - - -
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) + + NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) - + -
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT(H3) + + +
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA + +








DEMOCRACY (H1) + + NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) - - -
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) + + NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) - + -
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT (H3) + + +
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA + +








DEMOCRACY (H1) + + NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) - - -
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) + + NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) - + -
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT (H3) + + +
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA + +
SECURITY CONCERNS (H5) NA + -
Note: A positive sign (+) indicates that in the statistical tests the estimated
coefficients should be > 0; a negative sign (-) indicates that in the statistical
tests the estimated coefficients should be < 0; “NA” indicates that there is no
hypothesis to be tested.
CHAPTER III
‘Convincing’ the Legislature: Institutions and Conflict
Behavior
In December of 1983 the Radical Civic Union’s Raul Alfonsin emerged as the
newly elected leader of Argentina. His main challenge from the outset was to prove
himself politically as the first democratic leader elected after two decades of military
junta rule.1 Part of that challenge involved overturning the legacy of the Peronists
to make a name for himself before the next elections. The signing of the Peace and
Friendship Treaty between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel Dispute was
the first step in demonstrating Alfonsin’s good performance in office. Even though
mediation efforts on the dispute had begun by the Vatican at the end of 1979, it
wasn’t until his coming that the tone of the negotiations turned positive. Argentina
had already objected to the Papal proposal of 1981, but Alfonsin managed to get the
April 1984 proposal approved by Congress in full. Previously, the Argentines had
been wary of any ICJ (International Court of Justice) arbitration, because of their
weak legal position on the disputed waters. They also did not want to go to war over
this issue, although they came very close to military conflict with the Chileans in
1978. As a result of the escalation in that year, both sides agreed to have the matter




25, 1984, then sealed the deal on the Argentine side, even though the result was not
binding to the Argentine Congress. The Peronists were nonetheless forced to accept
the deal after a 77% approval in the referendum. Alfonsin knew there was a good
chance the agreement would be accepted by the electorate. The positive response of
the electorate to the referendum campaign had reassured him of the result.
The Beagle Channel dispute was settled through the domestic and international
initiatives of President Alfonsin. The President knew he had to overcome the Peronist
opposition in the legislature to be able to establish any kind of staying power. This
was especially difficult because of the economic situation left to Alfonsin by the past
administrations. In terms of the relations between the two states, Alfonsin knew
there was mistrust of Pinochet of Chile in the Argentine electorate. He also knew
the legislative opposition would not allow him to pass this agreement and get credit
for the agreement on a dispute that had lasted for 79 years.2 He tried to make a
deal with the Peronists in the legislature, but the votes didn’t add up and the deals
became too costly. Alfonsin then decided to convince the Peronists by other means.
He carried out a referendum and found out the proposed agreement did have support
in the electorate. This is a prime example of how electorates and referendums aid in
domestic and international negotiations. Alfonsin’s combined goal of satisfying both
Chile’s Pinochet and the Peronists was made possible by an electorate that favored
that particular agreement.
This chapter explores the use of referendums in international territorial dispute
negotiations. The main premise is that there are political incentives to making
international agreements, to the degree that the electorate would like to see the
signing of that agreement. Territorial disputes are one area where leaders choose
2Laudy, Mark, ‘The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building,’
in Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, Barton John H. and Margaret E.
McGuinness, eds., New York: Carnegie Comission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, pp. 293-320.
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to demonstrate effort to make up for domestic political accomplishments that fall
short of what is required to get reelected. My argument is that referendum use will
vary (1) with how complex an agreement is required by the dispute, (2) across the
regime types of challengers, and (3) according to the electoral systems of challengers
in territorial disputes. It is possible then to group the explanatory variables into two
categories: those relating to the domestic institutional variables and those relating
to the features of the agreement. My approach has implications for the study of
territorial disputes and for the study of referendums in international relations.
3.1 The Argument: Referendum use in territorial dispute settlement
Convincing the legislature to approve territorial dispute settlement agreements is
difficult, but this requirement works to prevent the leaders from engaging in reckless
behavior in negotiations. The legislature’s approval is necessary for an agreement
to pass, and is the preferred option when the leader does not know whether the
electorate favors the agreement or not. Asking the electorate whether they would
approve an agreement is risky, which is one of the reasons why referendums are so
rare. On the other hand, asking the electorate (provided that the outcome is positive)
may mean reelection for a leader who faces opposition in the legislature and does
not have a good enough record to go to elections without the agreement.
There are four main points that should be taken from the success case of the
Beagle Channel: (1) what happens in cases where the electorate is not supportive of
the agreement; (2) what can we say about the position of the legislature in relation
to the electorate’s; (3) what are the factors that might increase the resistance of
the legislature, requiring additional action by the leader; and (4) what does the
literature say about the tradeoff between domestic political costs it takes to convince
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the legislature across various domestic institutional variables? The empirical analysis
shows some of the conditions under which referendums occur. The Beagle Channel
case is one out of the 32 referendum cases in my dataset. All of the referendum
decisions used in the analysis are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Referendum Decisions in Territorial Disputes, 1919-1995
Challenger Target Years
Country Country








Soviet Union / Russia Romania 1941-1944
W. Germany France 1955-1956
W. Germany Czechoslovakia 1955-1973
W. Germany France 1955-1959
Turkey Greece 1996-2000
Comoros France 1975-2000


















In all of these cases, the resistance in the legislature was at a point that required
either further bribery by the leaders or a referendum to get approval. Where referen-
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dums are less costly and bribery is too expensive, referendums were carried out. In
addition to the regimes and electoral systems, three other factors are deemed impor-
tant to this analysis: complexity of the agreements, and the type of opposition in the
legislature: economic costs of the agreement and/or security concerns of the agree-
ment. With the Beagle Channel, the maritime extensions of the water gave the owner
fishing and mineral rights. Besides the economic value of the waters surrounding the
islands of Lennox, Nueva and Picton, settling the dispute would mean a serious slash
of the military budget of Argentina. This fact made the Peronists, who had strong
military backing, to oppose the proposed settlement proposed by Alfonsin. As the
first civilian and democratically elected leader of Argentina for some time, Alfonsin
took the issue to referendum.3 The dataset itself comes from an updated version of
the Huth and Allee (2002) dataset, that has been recoded to fit the research design
here. The negotiation rounds have all been reviewed and new variables have been
coded to account for the variance in domestic opposition in the legislature and refer-
endum cases. That original dataset contains 1,710 rounds of negotiations across all
disputes between the years 1945 and 2006, making 8,237 country-months within all
rounds of negotiations. This puts the dataset for this chapter somewhere between
the sizes of the datasets for Chapters 4 and 5. The analysis is carried out on 171
cases from 188, after 17 are dropped due to bad data and/or missing information.
There is an average of 10 rounds of negotiations per state. The outcome dataset is
made up of 1,976 country-months.
3—‘Argentina: Military Budget To Be Slashed After Beagle Channel Accord,’ Inter-Press Service, Dec 12, 1984.
76
3.1.1 Literature Review: The Democratic Peace: Institutional Constraints Argu-
ments vs. Other Explanations
Democratic peace theories have emphasized the differences in behavior of democ-
racies and autocracies in wartime (Russett 1993, Rousseau et al. 1996, Smith 1996,
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999, Bennett and Stam 2001).4
Current discussions in the democratic peace literature come from a long line of re-
search on the link between domestic politics and international behavior. What was
once a theoretical and empirical dispute between the structural, institutional and
normative (Maoz and Russett 1993, Chan 1993, Oneal and Russett 1997, Doyle
1999) arguments for the observed regularity of the democratic peace, has lent itself
to a different debate. The refined discussion features various rational choice and
neo-liberal institutional arguments (BdM and Lalman 1992, Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson 1995, Rousseau et al. 1996, BdM2S2 1999, Oneal and Russett 2001) against
other variants such as common interest (Farber and Gowa 1997a, Gowa 1999) and a
democratic affinity/preference for peace (Gartzke 1998, Gleditsch and Hegre 1997)
among democracies.5 More recent claims have led to a push for better specification
of leaders’ own incentives and the influence of the electoral cycle. This dissertation
builds on the debates where political leader incentives and electoral gain intersect.
I ask: What are the domestic institutional constraints that allow the leader to ma-
nipulate domestic audiences to overturn oppositions in the legislature?6
4Russett, Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993: pp. 20-27, 34;
Rousseau, David, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter and Paul Huth, ‘Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic
Peace, 1918-88,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90 (3), (Sept 1996): pp. 512-533; Smith, Alastair,
‘Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1), 1996: pp.623-638;
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith, ‘An Institutional Explanation
of the Democratic Peace,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 (4), (Dec 1999): pp. 791-807 ; Reiter,
Dan and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002.
5Farber, Henry S. and Joanne Gowa, ‘Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic
Peace,’ Journal of Politics, Vol. 59 (2), (May 1997); Gleditsch, Petter and Havard Hegre, ‘Peace and Democracy:
Three Levels of Analysis,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41 (2), (Apr 1997); Gowa, Joanne, Ballots and
Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
6Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,’ The Amer-
ican Political Science Review, Vol. 87 (3), (Sept. 1993): pp. 624-638; Chan, Steve, ‘In Search of the Democratic
Peace: Problems and Promise,’ Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41 (1), (May 1997): pp. 59-91; Oneal,
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As of late, the persistence of questions of war and variance in regime type has
spilled into the intervening variable of institutions. It is thought that the determi-
nants of public support for a leader’s actions are affected by the type of domestic
institutions.7 The focus of these studies has also shifted to the ending and initia-
tion of conflict, so as to better able to assess the impact of civilian leadership on
what the state does to peace. The relevance of electoral cycles to conflict has also
been robust across types of electoral systems (minority, coalition or majority). Auer-
swald (1999) compares the behavior of executives and the use of force in the face
of accountability via various institutions: parliamentary, presidential and premier-
presidential.8 Ireland and Gartner (2001) find that minority governments are less
likely to initiate wars, while coalition and majoritarian governments are more likely
to initiate.9 Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) find no strong evidence for an
autocratic peace across personalist, military or single party regimes. They say there
is a need to further specify autocratic institutional variations.10
The arguments these empirical results are based on depend on the theory of in-
stitutional constraints where democratic leaders have to face legislative oppositions.
The assumption is that the legislature is acting on behalf of the voters, and rep-
resenting their interests. But what if what the electorate wants is revealed in a
John R. and Bruce M. Russett, ‘The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Farber, Henry
S. and Joanne Gowa, ‘Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace,’ Journal of
Politics, Vol. 59 (2), (May 1997): pp. 393-417; Gleditsch, Petter and Havard Hegre, ‘Peace and Democracy: Three
Levels of Analysis,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41 (2), (Apr 1997): pp. 283-310; Gowa, Joanne, Ballots
and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
7Ireland, Michael J. and Scott Sigmund Gartner, ‘Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in
Parliamentary Systems,’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45 (5), (Oct 2001): pp. 563, examine whether
minority governments (as the most constrained of all types) should have a longer duration of peace using hazard
rates and find support for monadic hypotheses; Reiter, Dan and Erik R. Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative and Executive
Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict,’ The Journal of Politics, Vol. 64 (3), (Aug 2002): pp. 814, look
at conflict initiation and several domestic institutional characteristics such as parliamentary vs. presidential, fraction
of the public that votes and single-party majorities and find significant support for regime type but not legislative
dynamics (number of parties in the legislature).
8Auerswald, David P., ‘Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts,’ International Organization,
Vol. 53 (3), (Summer 1999): pp. 469-504.
9Ireland, Michael J. and Scott Sigmund Gartner, ‘Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in
Parliamentary Systems,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45 (5), (Oct 2001): pp. 550-556.
10Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, ‘Dictatorial Peace?,’ The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 96 (1), (Mar 2002): pp. 15-26.
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referendum? The opposition will usually not contest any international actions taken
by the political leader for issues it thinks the electorate supports.11 This is because
the opposition would like to share the credit from doing what the electorate wants
in the next elections. Since neither side can be sure what the electorate believes
on certain controversial issues until an election is actually held after an action is
taken, they will not oppose a leader who they think is in sync with the electorate.12
‘Convincing’ the legislature is not so difficult if the legislature thinks the electorate
is supporting a policy introduced by the leader. Territorial dispute agreements are
a typical example of what it would take to convince the legislature to make peace in
the face of legislative opposition.
Separating the stages of a conflict and evaluating electoral motivations for leader
helps to determine when the voters would be permitted to weigh in on territorial
dispute decisions.13 The dearth of empirical evidence for the voter’s role in the
domestic institutions argument in democratic peace may be remedied by looking for
indirect evidence of the audience costs question in territorial disputes (Fearon 1994,
1998, Schultz 1999, 2001). Territorial disputes are an issue area which is amenable
to the study of interstate crises, and empirical evidence has strongly linked domestic
politics to state behavior in these disputes (Partell and Palmer 1999, Eyerman and
Hart 1996, Gelpi and Griesdorf 1997).14 I show that leaders seeking reelection may
use voter support to side-step more severe domestic political costs for failure, if there
is strong opposition for concessions in the legislature (Gartzke 1998, Gaubatz 1999,
11Schultz, Kenneth, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001: pp. 197
- 200.
12Schultz, Kenneth, A, ’Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,’ The American Political Science
Review, 92: pp. 8.
13Huth (1996) and Huth and Allee (2002).
14Partell, Peter and Glenn Palmer, ‘Audience Costs and Interstate Crises,’ International Studies Quarterly, 43 (2),
1999: pp. 389-406; Eyerman, John and Robert Hart, ’An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition,’ Journal
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40 (4), 1996: pp.597-616; Gelpi, Christopher, and Michael Griesdorf, ‘Winners or Losers?
Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-1994,’ The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95 (3), pp. 633-648;
Weeks, Jessica, ‘Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,’ International Organization, Vol.
62 (1), pp. 35-64.
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Guisinger and Smith 2002).15 By taking the issue directly to voters, leaders may
choose to give pre-approved concessions; but what about cases where the electorate
is against the signing of a peace agreement for the territorial dispute?
This scenario will mean that the leader will first try to do everything it can to
obtain legislative majorities in other ways. The result of a failed referendum will
likely be non approval by the legislature and a loss of elections. Therefore, the costs
of carrying out referendums can be quite high, which also explains why they are not
more prevalent. The risks involved in carrying out a referendum suggest that the
leader has to be more certain of the results before he undertakes such a confidence
vote. There are many cases however, where the result was negative.16
To be able to integrate these ideas into the democratic peace, Russett and Oneal
(2001) characterize the rational-choice view of liberalism as a summary of the im-
portant aspects of Kantian liberalism of (1) popular selection and (2) replacement of
leaders.17 Huth and Allee (2002) equate these measures to the domestic determinants
of negotiation behavior of states.18 They operationalize the two most important in-
dependent variables as one side having the majority in the legislature and the timing
of electoral cycles.19 The importance of legislative majorities is also outlined in Allee
and Huth (2008) as having a monotonic relationship with the amount of concessions
15Gartzke, Erik, ‘Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic
Peace,’ American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42 (1), 1998: pp. 1-27; Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor, Elections and War:
The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999;
Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith, ‘Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions
in International Crises,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46 (2), Apr 2002, pp. 175-200.
16Matsusaka, John G., ‘Direct Democracy Works,’ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19 (2), (Spring
2005): pp. 197-200 has a comprehensive discussion on the risks involved in referendums and on the question of
whether the median voter can be more informed.
17Russett, Bruce and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organi-
zation, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001: pp. 76-79.
18Huth, Paul and Todd Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
19Russett and Oneal (2001) also note that Kantian liberalism includes a more comprehensive set of relationships
of: loyalty to the institutions (nationalism) gained by consensus between persons and groups; legitimacy of the
institutions of government (willingness to follow the laws); and obligations of the government to society (social
welfare as a moral imperative). Their measures also reflect the importance of legitimacy of the government. The key
role given to the legislature and the obligations of government draw attention to the role of democracy on peace or
war demanding a closer examination of how well the institutions reflect the general will.
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offered to the negotiating party. This comes from the idea that the leader would
have to be politically secure within the state before it can make concessions on ter-
ritorial dispute negotiations.20The empirical study used here agrees that legislative
majorities are an obstacle to leader success in passing agreements it would like to get
domestic approval for. I am proposing that they will use a referendum or bribery to
gain legislative majorities if they do not already have them.
The flip side of this is that the leader is not secure politically, meaning he/she does
not hold majority support in the legislature. I suggest that the leader will then seek to
use the international agreement to make up for this weakness in the next elections.
Morrow (1991) proposes resistance in as an important constraint in international
negotiation behavior of states in a bilateral agreement. Thus, lack of legislative
support for a newly negotiated international agreement is seen as essential for the
agreement to pass and help the leader in the next general election. Referendums
are one way of convincing the legislature to pass an agreement, with the end result
of winning the following elections.21 The goal then is to convince the legislators
because once they know the electorate favors the agreement, they will have to accept
the agreement, and the leader can then enter the next election with a stronger hand.22
The timing and type of elections depend on the electoral systems, which can
also mean referendums are going to be used at different frequencies.23 The office-
seeking leader will be aiming to win the next elections, and what will get him there
20Allee, Todd and Paul Huth, ‘Divided Government and the Resolution of Territorial Disputes,’ in Robert Pahre,
ed., Democratic Foreign Policy Making: Problems of Divided Government and International Cooperation, New York:
Palgrave, 2006: pp. 151-203.
21Chambers, Simone,‘Constitutional Referendums and Democratic Deliberation,’ in Matthew Mendelsohn and
Andrew Parkin, eds., Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns, New
York: Palgrave, 2001: pp. 240.
22Huth, Paul and Todd Allee, ‘Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International
Disputes,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46 (6), (Dec 2002):pp.754-790; show the empirical importance of
majority control in the legislature and electoral incentives for territorial dispute negotiations.
23Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992: pp. 95, examines the role of legislative constraints on
the executive in the context of policy-making; Lijphardt, Arend, ‘Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved
Dilemma,’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (1), (Mar 1997): pp. 8-9; connects electoral systems and
turnout in referendums.
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will be approval of the agreement by the legislature, with or without a referendum.
The use of the electorate in this way suggests that the leader will be switching the
principal and agent roles of an elected leader, long enough to have the electorate
vote to convince the legislature. The reason why this becomes a dominant strategy
is because the electorate will evaluate the incumbent leader on his performance in
office, and not on whether or not he has kept his electoral promises.24 Allee and Huth
(2007) find that leaders with a stronger political position will be more likely to give
concessions in territorial dispute negotiations.25 Alfonsin recognized that to create a
legacy for himself he would have to overcome the Peronist control of the legislature.
In order to achieve this goal he used the electorate to pass the international agreement
through the legislature. The referendum on the Beagle channel was a sure-fire way
of convincing the legislature that the voters wanted peace and the talks were largely
successful.
Alfonsin’s success in the security arena was not paralleled in economic policy; as
he followed statist policies at a time when Argentina fell deeper into bankruptcy. His
Beagle Channel victory was not enough to get him out of this failure. Even Menem,
the Peronist leader who came after Alfonsin, switched from the statist tradition to
one of privatization. He recognized the need to get the country out of bankruptcy,
which Menem did by switching allegiances from unions to the business owner set
in the legislature and interest groups. As a result, the Menem government was
successful in pulling Argentina towards economic growth and general stabilization of
the economy with the funds brought in by the privatizations.
The Beagle Channel case shows the close relationship between the Peronist leg-
24Ferejohn, John, ‘Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,’ Public Choice, (Jul 1986), Vol. 50: pp.2.
25Allee, Todd and Paul Huth, ‘Divided Government and the Resolution of Territorial Disputes,’ in Robert Pahre
, ed., Democratic Foreign Policy Making: Problems of Divided Government and International Cooperation, New
York: Palgrave, forthcoming 2008.
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islators and the military authorities in Argentina in the early 1980s. This is one
of the reasons why Alfonsin could not obtain majority support for his measures in
the legislature. Alfonsin was faced with two choices according to the principal-agent
model: to prove his competency, he would have to either win over the swing votes of
provincial party legislators, or seek to carry out a referendum as a show of effort to
the electorate. He chose the latter option. As a political leader, he had to make the
choice of using private goods to win over legislative blocks, or using a public good
such as an international treaty to win over the electorate. The public good of settle-
ment of the territorial dispute was less costly than trying to obtain majority among
the MPs through logrolling and side-benefits. The use of the referendum allowed
Alfonsin to convince the legislature. Alfonsin’s referendum is a way to demonstrate
to the legislature what the electorate would like to have happen. The dynamics in
Alfonsin’s case described so far is confirming to the equilibria result of Chapter II.
The empirical study will distinguish the determinants of the use of referendums and
why the leader chooses to undertake them.26
3.1.2 Literature Review: Political Survival, Domestic Outcomes and Type of Elec-
torate
The use of two different groups to obtain domestic approval for policies is not
new to international relations. The arguments regarding policy failure and political
survival have previously examined variations across regimes in the relative sizes of
selectorates and winning coalitions.27The argument for the use of private goods (i.e.
in kind benefits) to construct winning coalitions has two sides. It also argues that
public goods (i.e. good public policies) can be an alternative method of winning over
26Martin, Lisa, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2000: pp. 23-24, speaks to the effects of logrolling and side-benefits as a source of influence on legislators, who
do not just care about the law.
27Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘Political Institutions, Policy
Choice and the Survival of Leaders,’ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, (Fall 2002): pp. 7.
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coalitions within selectorates.28 The same logic applies to the Referendum Game
of Chapter 2. I argue that the use of bribery to obtain majority support in the
legislature is not the only option available to a leader. In fact, for leaders trying
to gain electoral credit for negotiating peace, referendums can remove uncertainties
which stand in the way of majority support in the legislature for the agreement.29
Two main predictions can be made using their findings: Authoritarian states have
smaller winning coalitions, though the benefits received by members of these coali-
tions are much greater than in democratic states, where the winning coalitions are
larger.30 The leaders of the more authoritarian states have to bribe from among
members of selectorates, to stop defectors from their winning coalitions. This disser-
tation reconciles the legislative constraints arguments of democratic peace with the
winning coalition argument of the political survival literature. For democratic states,
the most significant institutional constraint is that of the legislature restraining of
the executive. Legislative opposition is greater for some electoral systems than oth-
ers, making bribery more prevalent where oppositions occur more frequently.31 The
electoral system is the one defining feature of democracies and their international
behavior. If legislative opposition varies considerably across electoral systems, then
winning coalitions may be more probable in one than the other. This makes the
electoral system with less guarantee of winning coalition support more likely to use
both private goods/bribery and referendums to achieve the same results. I will be




30Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘Political Institutions, Policy
Choice and the Survival of Leaders,’ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, (Fall 2002): pp. 570.
31Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘Political Institutions, Policy
Choice and the Survival of Leaders,’ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, (Fall 2002): pp. 570-574.
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3.1.3 Hypotheses
The theory suggests the following hypotheses for territorial dispute settlements:
H1(i): The more democratic the state, leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H1(ii): The more autocratic the state, leaders are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendum.
H2(i): Among democracies, the leaders of Proportional Represen-
tation electoral systems are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H2(ii): Among democracies, leaders of Plurality/Majority electoral
systems are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
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H3: The more complex the agreement (or difficult to negotiate),
leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H4: Domestic costs of an agreement are more likely to increase
resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H5: National security concerns of an agreement are more likely to
increase resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
3.1.4 Empirical Models
The political crises caused by economic and security concerns of the electorate
affects the leader’s choices in territorial dispute negotiations. Features of any terri-
torial deal made with targets will have costs to the electorate. Territorial dispute
agreements, as they are analyzed here, have to follow formats established in pre-
vious studies. The more popular ways of resolving disputes among states include:
(1) escalation of military conflict, where the winner takes ownership of the disputed
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territory, and (2) adjudication in international courts (typically, the ICJ or ECJ32),
which use legal rules and codes established by international law to identify the le-
gal owner of the disputed territory.33 The logic of this chapter is that only cases
passing these two criteria qualify for referendum use. According to Huth and Allee
(2002), actors in territorial disputes are divided into challengers and targets of the
dispute at various times. By methodological design, the challengers are defined as
those without legal possession of the area, but with continued claims to ownership.
The claims are specified as challengers of the status quo state of ownership. This is
the reason for including the binary military capabilities ratio variable in the anal-
ysis. This variable (milbin) controls for the military discrepancy between the sides
included in the analysis.
The targets are typically the militarily stronger side. The assumption is that,
no challenger would wait with a claim to the territory, but would take it over using
its relatively strong military capabilities. This would be true, unless the target
has a strong legal claim to the territory (such as would be proven with evidence
of historic ownership). In which case, the issue would have already been resolved
and would have to be domestically ratified through use of legislative approval, in
accordance with the rules and decisions of an international court. The statistical
model accounts for the military differences between the sides, by the inclusion of the
explanatory variable called milbin. For the military capabilities relationship to hold,
the military capabilities of the challenger have to be greater than the target’s by a
ratio of 0.4.
The empirical model thus builds upon the Referendum Game of Chapter 2.
The domestic institutional variables to be tested are democracy and autocracy in
32European Court of Justice
33See Huth 1996, Huth and Allee 2002, Huth and Allee 2007 (forthcoming).
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Model 1. The electoral systems variables are proportional representation and plural-
ity/majority as in Model 2.
The general formula of equations to be estimated in Model 1 are as follows:
Model 1:





Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
milbin = challenger to target military capabilities ratio,
democracy = democratic regime,
autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of an agreement,
ethnicvaluedch = dummy for ethnically valued territory for the
challenger,
stalematedtalks5yrs = dummy for stalemated talks of five years,
economiccosts = domestic economic costs of an agreement,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
commonopponent = dummy variable for challenger and target hav-
ing a common opponent.
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The control variables used for the territorial disputes study are conceptual aspects
of territorial settlements that were important in Huth and Allee (2002) and Huth
and Allee (2007). The two that were significant were ethnic valued territory dummy
(ethnicvaluedterritory) and stalemated talks of 5 years dummy (stalematedtalks5yrs).
These variables relate an aspect of the dispute and an aspect of the negotiations to
domestic ratification.
3.2 Data Analysis and Results
There are three possible outcomes that are not clearly ordered. Hence, a model
that treats outcomes as nominal instead of ordinal is required, so I utilize a multino-
mial logit model. The primary drawback of multinomial logit is the fairly restrictive
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. However, I employ the
the best-known Hausman test of IIA assumption and all the models pass this test.
The multinomial logit coefficients estimated by Stata for Model 1 and 2 are given in
Tables 3.2 and 3.4, respectively. I also present the discrete change results to facili-
tate a better interpretation of variable effects in Tables 3.3 and 3.5. Moreover, these
tables provide the impact of a unit change in the explanatory variables on certain
outcomes, by holding all other variables constant at their means.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the empirical test of Model 1 of the territorial
disputes hypotheses. For democracies, legislative approval over referendum yields
a coefficient of -3.226, continuing negotiations over legislative approval gives 0.712,
and continuing negotiations over referendum yields -2.514. This means a democratic
leader is more likely to choose referendums over legislative approval and continuing
negotiations (with high relative risk ratios), and continuing negotiations over leg-
islative approval. For autocracies, I am assuming there is a legislative body (this
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could be the leader’s advisory council for dictatorships and monarchies) and/or the
governing party (in single-party autocracies or military-style autocracies) which the
leader consults before settling a territorial dispute. The results for autocracies are
different from the ones for democracies: referendums are more likely to be chosen
over legislative approval and continuing negotiations (with high relative risk ratios,
but less than the ones for democracies), but legislative approvals are more likely to
be selected over continuing negotiations. Autocracies seem to want to avoid nego-
tiations as much as possible. Democratization effects become more apparent from
the results in Table 3.3. If the main (binary) explanatory variable of democracy is
increased from 0 to 1, the probability of choosing legislative approval drops by 50.5%
while referendum probability goes up ten-fold, which is twice as much as a unit in-
crease in autocracy. The large jump in probability of using referendums due to the
change in regime is an interesting result, supporting the conclusions from Table 3.2.
With regards to the features of the agreement variables, the first one I consider
is complexity of the agreement (measuring difficulty of negotiation, multiple issues).
The results show that complex territorial agreements are less likely to continue nego-
tiations before referendums and legislative approval, and less likely to seek legislative
approval before referendums. This result has the opposite effect than expected, and
complexity in territorial agreements does not mean the negotiations will take longer.
In fact, leaders will be anxious to get whatever has been negotiated ratified before
more issues arise. In doing so, they choose to have the legislature approve the mea-
sure, before they would consider referendums. As can be observed in Table 3.3, one
unit change of complexity increases the probability of the leader holding a referen-
dum by 221.1%. We can say that referendums of territorial disputes do become more
likely with a rise in the complexity of the agreement. I attribute this to failures by
90
the legislators to give a majority support (in the legislature) for any agreement with
multiple points of contention among MPs.
The Referendum Game of Chapter 2 lays out what incentives legislative resistance
poses to the leader’s efforts to get approval for a negotiated agreement. The model
accounts for legislative resistance through two variables: economic costs the agree-
ment will bring, and the national security implications of the negotiated agreement.
The results of Table 3.2 demonstrate that: (1) legislative resistance caused by high
economic costs will not prevent agreements from going to the legislature (a leader
prefers legislative approval over referendum and continuing negotiations with respec-
tive positive coefficients of 1.584 and 0.207), but (2) legislative resistance caused
by high security concerns will prevent leaders from seeking legislative ratification (a
leader prefers referendums over the other two options with coefficients of 1.393 and
2.104). The findings show that security concerns of territorial peace agreements are
more conducive to referendums, than economic costs. The referendums help convince
disparate legislatures, where majority support is difficult to obtain. This argument
is supported by the results of the discrete change analysis of Table 3.3. (Note how a
unit change in security concerns increases the probability of referendums more than
six-fold.)
The control variables of Table 3.2 are dummies for ethnically valued territory
for the challenger, stalemated talks of five years, and the existence of a common
opponent between the challenger and target. If the territorial settlement is being
negotiated over territory containing ethnic co-nationals for the challenger, then the
political leader of the challenger state will be less likely to choose legislative approval
over referendums. These disputes will also lead to lesser odds of choosing legislative






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































attention paid to ethnic co-national habited territory will make the leader seek the
best possible result before settling. As soon as there are terms acceptable to both
sides, the leader will seek legislative approval. Only if there is difficulty obtaining
legislative support, will there be an attempt at a referendum. We can tell from the
unit change in ethnicity (ethnicvaluedch increasing from 0 to 1), the probability
of referendum increases by almost 16.8%, and legislative approval by 10.7%. The
problem with these results is that the multinomial logit coefficients for the first and
third column are not statistically significant.
Territorial disputes have been known to go on for decades, but the other dimen-
sion of talks is the progress made. To account for this, the second control variable
is that of stalemated talks. Continued negotiations is not always a sign of progress
towards a settlement. As we know from really long border conflicts, more negotia-
tions could mean greater disagreements on issues.34 Results of Model 1 show that
referendums are preferred to legislative approval (with a coefficient of 0.482) and
continued negotiations (with a coefficient of 0.631) if the talks have been dead for
some time. Moreover, a leader is 1.160 times more likely to prefer legislative approval
over continuing negotiations. The results of Table 3.3 also support these findings: a
discrete change in stalemated talks yields 84.3% and 13.8% increase in the respective
probabilities of holding a referendum and seeking legislative approval. I interpret
stalemated talks of five years as being stalled talks. The findings from Tables 3.2
and 3.3 simply say that leaders are eager to resolve these stalled territorial disputes,
so they restore to domestic approval (referendum or legislative ratification), which
serve as an alternative to continuing and prolonged negotiations.
The last control variable is the existence of a common opponent between the chal-
34For examples see Appendix A for length of conflicts in years of Argentina’s disputes with its neighbors (i.e. Chile,
Uruguay and Paraguay), and China’s disputes with some of its colonists (i.e. Britain, Portugal and France). Most
of these disputes been around since 1919.
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lenger and target. Exponentiating the coefficients in Table 3.2 leads to the following
interpretations: a leader is (1) 2.246 times more likely to choose referendum over leg-
islative approval, (2) 1.511 times more likely to choose referendum over continuing
negotiations, (3) 1.486 times more likely to continue negotiations than to seek leg-
islative approval. The results of Table 3.3 are in agreement with Table 3.2. All these
suggest that referendums will be more often chosen if there is a common opponent
with the target of the territorial agreement.
Overall, Model 1 supports the expectations laid out at the end of Chapter 2, in
Table 2.6.2. The results are mostly significant except for the complexity variable, and
some of the negotiations vs. legislative approval comparisons. Model 2 analyzes the
choices of domestic approval for a bilateral agreement across electoral systems. The
electoral systems of democracies are compared to autocracies in their use of referen-
dums. What is interesting about this model is the option it provides of comparing
leader behavior across electoral systems within democracies. The general formula of
equations to be estimated in Model 2 are:
Model 2:
Yi|j = β0 + β1(milbin) + β2(proportionalrepresentation)






Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
milbin = challenger to target military capabilities ratio,
proportionalrep = proportional representation system,
plurality/majority = plurality/majoritarian system,
autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of the agreement,
ethnicvaluedch = dummy for ethnically valued territory for the
challenger,
stalematedtalks5yrs = stalemated talks of 5 years,
economiccosts = domestic economic costs of an agreement,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
commonopponent = dummy variable for challenger and target hav-
ing a common opponent.
Table 3.4 shows the results of Model 2 testing for territorial disputes and domestic
approval choices of leaders from Huth and Allee (2002) data. The empirical findings
are mostly consistent with that hypothesized, this time across the leader’s options of
trying to resolve the dispute with the other negotiating party. The first explanatory
variable of Proportional Representation (PR) systems reveals that the leaders in
those electoral systems are more likely to go to legislative approval before wanting
to continue negotiations. In the same binary comparison of outcomes, leaders of
Plurality/Majority (PLMAJ) systems have a higher log odds of choosing to continue
negotiations over legislative approval (compare the log odds of -0.053 for PR and
0.575 PLMAJ). This suggests that legislative approval is the preferred option for
96
territorial disputes for the PR systems, but not so much for the Plurality/Majority
systems. Moreover, PR system leaders are also 1.189 times more likely to choose
to go for legislative approval than referendums, while PLMAJ system leaders are
going to be more in favor of choosing referendums over legislative approval with an
odds of 5.452. What does match with my predictions is the tendency of PR systems
to want to go to the legislature first, and continue negotiations as the second best
option. The results of Table 3.5 support these conclusions: The probability of a
leader choosing legislative approval increases by 5.1% (decreases by 42.8%) while the
chance of selecting referendums decreases by 11.6% (increases by 211.8%) when a
unit change is introduced for PR (PLMAJ) variable.
Another important aspect of these results is the insignificance of the coefficients
for Proportional Representation systems. Table 3.4 shows that Plurality/Majority
systems are more significant, at the p < 0.001 level for legislative approval over refer-
endums, and negotiations over referendums; and at the p < 0.05 level for continuing
negotiations over legislative approval. A second disappointing result is that of com-
plexity. Once again complexity is negative in relation to all three binary comparisons
(with coefficients -0.952, -0.103 and -1.055). This result echoes the complexity as a
feature of agreements result of Model 1 above. The findings together indicate that
the more complex agreements will not be leading to the longest territorial dispute
negotiations. Instead, we should expect there to be resolutions via legislative ap-
proval or referendums as early as possible. The result comparing options legislative
approval against referendum indicates that the leader is 2.591 times more likely to
remain with the referendum option. The increase of 181.2% in the probability of
choosing referendums in case of a unit increase in the complexity variable in Table
3.5 is in line with the preceding observation. This is reminiscent of the earlier inter-
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pretation that difficulties of negotiating disputes with many issues will prompt the
leader to go for referendums before all else.
The other two features of territorial agreements looked at were the economic and
security costs incurred by approving a particular agreement. The theoretical model
did not make a prediction about the preference of legislative approval versus ref-
erendums, and continuing negotiations versus legislative approval (see the column
of NA predictions for these variables from Table 2.6.2). The oppositions to the
economic and security dimensions of territorial agreements yield the following coef-
ficients: 1.228 and -1.291. These results mean referendums will be preferred over
legislative ratification for strategic concern based legislative oppositions; and legisla-
tive approval will be sought for economic based legislative oppositions. The second
column brings a result in favor of continuing negotiations over legislative approval
for both agreement features with -0.078 and -0.775. Again with security concerns
having greater affect on the choice of the leader to seek legislative approval before
negotiations.
Of the two predictions made regarding the type of legislative opposition, the
economic concerns variable on the negotiations over legislative approval does not
hold up. The theory predicts that economic demands from territorial agreements
would make it difficult to seek legislative approval at any one point. The reason
for this prediction is the chance that economic issues may be a serious obstacle to
settlements. The results show that economic issues will lead to leaders continuing
negotiations with odds of 0.924 over legislative approvals. The case study used
earlier is an example of this, as in Adenauer’s choice of going to the legislature, over
the Paris Accords in 1954 as outlined in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1). The
agreement negotiated by the leader of the challenger government will drop the option
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of continuing to negotiate in favor of legislative approval. I presume the negotiations
in the face of the economic costs, led the leader to seek legislative approval.
If the opposition is economic, then the leader will prefer to continue negotiations
with odds of 3.158, and go to referendums with odds of 0.316. If the opposition to
the agreement is sourced in national security concerns, then the leader has odds of
3.636 times more likely to go to referendum before legislative approval, and 2.171
times more likely to go for legislative approval instead of continuing negotiations.
The leader will choose referendum than continue negotiations by almost eight times.
Thus, security concerns will be more likely to go to referendums first, then legislative
approval, then resuming negotiations. The results of Table 3.5 suggest that a unit
increase in economic costs (security concerns) yields to -68% (620.2%) change in the
probability of referendums, and 1.2% (-8.8%) change in the chance of continuing
negotiations. The analysis for the two variables reveals that economic concerns will
not be going to referendums as much as opposition to approval by security measures of
an agreement. Therefore, we can say that the two types of oppositions get differing
responses from the leader. The economic reasoned legislative resistance leads to
less referendums and longer negotiation periods; and the security based legislative
resistance leads to more referendums and shorter negotiations.
The control variables of Chapter 3, both for Models 1 and 2, are the ethnic value
of a territory for the challenger, stalemated talks of five years and the existence of a
common opponent for the challenger and target. The results show that the presence
of ethnic co-nationals on a territory will make the leader of the challenger state less
likely to seek referendums to convince the legislature, and less likely to seek legislative
approval. Ethnic territories are deemed to have the most public attention, for Huth
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to be more persistent in their attempts at diplomacy for ethnic valued territory.35
The findings here support their conclusion that territory with ethnic co-nationals
will have more magnified support from the public than they would otherwise since
they attract more of public’s attention. These disputes are 1.2 times more likely to
be resolved by legislative approval than referendums, and would lead to continued
negotiations more than 1.381 times it goes to referendums. As I discussed for Model
1, under the light of these results, I conclude that ethnic co-national habited territory
will make the leader seek the best possible result before settling, hence, the leader
will prefer to continue negotiations.
Stalemated talks, an often cited reason for prolonged negotiations in territorial
disputes, has values very close to those predicted with Model 1. Among the three
option available to the leader, the binary comparisons reveal that referendums will be
chosen over legislative approval over continued negotiations. Common opponents, a
third control variable make referendums prevail over legislative approval and contin-
ued negotiations. This suggests that leaders will be more eager to settle with another
state that has the same enemy as them. Observe that when common opponent vari-
able has a discrete increase from 0 to 1 in binary variable commonopponent, the
probability of legislative approval shows a decrease of 30.7% (from 0.100 to 0.069),
while the probability of referendum increases by 38.4% (from 0.012 to 0.016). Ade-
nauer and Mendes-France’s choice of referendum is supportive of this finding, because
both legislatures were aware of the dangers posed by the Soviets in Europe in the
post-World War II period. I attribute the referendum on the Saar to this com-
mon purpose. This referendum then led to the eventual acceptance of the the Paris
Accords by both legislatures.
35Huth and Allee (2002), pp. 78-80, 157 and 186.
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3.3 Conclusion
Empirical testing of the two models reveals that barring the complexity variable
in both models and the PR variable in Model 2, the data is supportive of the theo-
retical predictions of the referendum game. Therefore, Chapter 3 has the following
implications for our hypotheses:
For Model 1, we do not reject : H1i(b), H1ii(a), H1ii(b), H1ii(c), H4(b), H5(a),
H5(b); and can reject H1i(a), H3(a), H3(b), H3(c), and H4(a).
For Model 2, we do not reject : H2i(a), H2ii(a), H2ii(b), H2ii(c), H4(b), H5(a),
H5(b); and can reject H2i(b), H3(a), H3(b), H3(c), and H4(a).
The analysis here uses existing data and contributes the following to the discussion
in territorial disputes: (1) it introduces a first cut set of predictions and results to
what the domestic political causes of referendum use in territorial disputes might be;
(2) it examines the domestic processes behind legislative approval of negotiated ter-
ritorial agreements; and (3) it highlights the leader’s own role in achieving domestic
ratification for agreements being negotiated.
CHAPTER IV
Resisting Globalization: Domestic Institutions & [Electoral]
Influence
Uruguayan voter’s rejection of the proposal for a Public Enterprises Law of De-
cember 9, 1992, was the major determinant of the country’s future course of priva-
tization and economic openness. The referendum went against the law with 72% of
the votes, choosing to reject the five part proposal. The law would have aided in
the government’s attempts to forge an oil policy allowing the monopoly ANCAP to
partially privatize 49% of the state owned oil company. The more immediate auction
for the telecommunications firm ANTEL would go through.1 Luis Alberto Lacalle’s
loss in the referendum meant the legislature would not be passing any laws on pri-
vatization for some time to come. Moreover, his main opposition in the legislature,
Julio Sanguinetti of the Colorados gained some ground to win over the next general
elections.2
As a result of the vote, Lacalle’s five year term met with serious obstacles, in
the end, leading his party to lose the following elections. The president’s reason for
undertaking the referendum was to overcome the domestic opposition to market re-
forms. The opposition groups included unions, students and center-left politicians.3
1—‘Uruguayans resisting call for changes,’ The New York Times, February 21, 1993.
2—‘Uruguay vote rejects oil policy,’ BBC News, Dec 8, 2003.
3—‘In Uruguay, a puzzling vote over privatization,’ Agance France Presse, July 5, 1992.
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The Broad-Front (‘Frente-Amplio’) opposition coalition carried out a strong cam-
paign against the referendum. The campaign focused on slogans such as ‘Don’t sell
your country’ and ‘Keep foreigners out’, with strong support across the board. In-
stead of privatization, what the voters wanted was a continuation of the socialist
traditions, such as life-long employment. Uruguay’s example demonstrates how cru-
cial legislative support for privatization is for a political leader when in negotiations
with foreign investors.4 The referendum was initiated as a result of the gridlock of
the three main parties in parliament. In the November 1994 elections that followed,
the lack of progress in privatization in Lacalle’s term put an end to the reputation
of Lacalle as the most free-market oriented president of Uruguay.
4.1 Use of referendums to privatize
The entry of foreign direct investment (FDI) imposes two decisions on the po-
litical leader: identifying and deciding upon (1) the domestic beneficiaries of the
privatization and (2) the foreign awardees of the investment. Lacalle was hoping to
find a long-term solution to the economic problems creeping up on Uruguay through
this law. The referendum game of Chapter 2 explains that domestic institutions can
account for the choice of ratification mechanism of the leader. Privatization with
foreign capital demands that the leader consider both economic and political aspects
of any deal and decide accordingly. Legislative oppositions often represent strong
interest groups, as labor unions and those to be unemployed after restructuring in
the enterprises.5 They will also campaign against privatizations on grounds of se-
4—‘Politics gridlocked as 3 parties wrestle; Runaway statism can’t be reined in,’ The Washington Times, January
7, 1996.
5Henisz, Witold J., and Edward D. Mansfield, ‘Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial
Openness,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50 (1), 2006: pp. 200, mentions others who have looked at domestic
fragmentation and trade policy and uses a Political Constraints variable by Henisz, measuring the likelihood of
disagreement between the executive and one or more institutional veto points. This variable does not fit the research
design used here, but will be used in future studies; Biglaiser, Glen and David S. Brown, ‘The Determinants of
Privatization in Latin America,’ Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56 (1), (Mar 2003): pp.81-82, speaks to domestic
legislative opposition, and pp. 85, examines the delay in ANTEL’s (national telecommunications) sale in Uruguay
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curity interests of the state and sovereignty over natural resources. These criticisms
will influence the leader’s decision to go to referendum over the difficult issues of
privatization.
What makes foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions even tougher for the politi-
cal leader is identifying which groups will bear the costs of the privatization. Making
these decisions is costly in electoral terms. The reelection plans of any leader can
be upset by those who have lost their jobs or capital in the privatizations.6 The
challenge for the leader is to be able to balance these distributional concerns before
agreeing to any foreign investment deals. The pressures are lessened for cases where
privatization was only open to domestic investors. The difficulties multiply when
foreign investors are included in the sales.7 The fear of voters includes exploitation
of natural resources and local labor by foreign firms. This aspect of privatizations
makes referendums on the sales more controversial.8 Legislative opposition could be
dealt with using backroom deals to bribe opposition to privatizations. By removing
the domestic critics of privatizations in the legislature, the leader can ensure the
privatization deal will be passed through. Studies on FDI note patterns in variance
of legislative opposition. The opposition can sometimes be caused by the unequal
distribution of economic burdens of privatizations. Similarly, the inflow of funds
due to legislative resistance to privatization.
6Rodrik, Dani, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997:
pp. 77, gives the example of the 1995 French labor strikes opposing the Maastricht criteria involving fiscal cost-
cutting and pension reform; Bhagwati, Jagdish, In Defense of Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press,
2005.
7The use of referendums in privatization is not a new concept. Leaders may choose to carry out referendums
to mitigate some of the electoral costs of the privatization. By giving the whole of the electorate a say in the
privatization, the leader is getting approval before doing something the electorate does not want. The implication
is that the electorate will have an idea of how much of the privatization deal is made with foreign investors, and
whether they themselves will be hurt by the sale. The identity of the foreign party in a privatization is generally
not made public to protect the deals. The most the electorate will be asked to vote on, is whether or not a state
owned enterprise should be privatized. The electorate is not assumed to understand the details of the privatizations,
though they would know the general outlines of the deals as explained to them by the political leaders.
8Biglaiser, Glen and Karl DeRouen, Jr., ‘Security, Property Rights and US Foreign Direct Investment,’ Working
Paper, (Nov 2005): pp. 7 argues that political stability caused by regime type is an important explanatory variable
for FDI in other studies; pp. 17, finds defense alliances a significant predictor of U.S. Foreign Investors. They
emphasize the security interests can complicate FDI deals.
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from privatization usually goes to the treasury, but many privatization deals end
up with corruption scandals.9 This tends to occur when leaders try to distribute
the windfalls of the privatizations to please legislative supporters and others within
the enterprises. Managements of state enterprises that are privatized, will often get
rewarded or bribed if they support the privatization.
Many emerging market states have had varying degrees of success with regards
to privatization negotiations. The challenge for the leader is to find an agreement
that satisfies both domestic voters and the negotiating party or firm. The advantage
for the leader is that he (or his negotiators) determine how the privatization will
be carried out (floating of shares on local or international stock markets, bilateral
negotiations with a firm of choice or auctions).10 These methods vary by the choice
they give to the privatizing state over how much control they want to keep: such as
ability to limit the amount of offers coming in, the option to reject more than one
bid in an auction, the choice of how much of the shares will be sold as stock, and
the ability to announce bid floors before auctions.11 The role of the legislative oppo-
sition is crucial to any privatization deal, especially if it is a strategically important
industry such as the ones included in this dataset. I include utilities, mining, energy,
transportation, defense and agriculture in this group of strategic industries.12 Priva-
9Kapstein, Ethan B., Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward and Level Playing Field, Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2006: pp. 154-157; Loh, Ai Tee, Booi Hon Kam and John T. Jackson, ‘Sri Lanka’s plantation
sector: a before-and-after privatization comparison,’ Journal of International Development, Vol. 15 (6), (Aug 2003):
pp. 727-737.
10Chamberlain, John R. and Jackson, John E., ‘Privatization as Institutional Choice,’ Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, Vol. 6 (4), (Summer 1987): pp. 305-521; note the most successful privatizations are those where
the rents coming from the sales are distributed between both public and private actors – in other words, those
that make an effort to include the general public will generally have more wide-spread support. Burgoon, Brian,
‘Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties That Bind,’ International Organization, Vol. 55
(3), (Summer 2001): pp. 512-514, presents four of the main arguments on welfare compensation. His empirical study
on pp. 534-546 explains that investment openness has differential effects on the types of welfare benefits used, as
with retirement, family, retraining and health-care benefits.
11—‘South America’s Petroleum Progress - Bolivian petroleum privatization taking shape,’ Oil and Gas Journal,
Aug 7, 1995, Vol. 93 (32): pp. 43; —‘Israel’s Port Strike Looming,’ Journal of Commerce, Jan 6, 2005.
12Stiglitz, Joseph E., Making Globalization Work, W.W. Norton, September 2006: pp. 25-61, in this chapter titled
The Promise of Development, Stiglitz recounts the devastating effects multinational corporations bearing FDI have
had on the natural resources and human rights of various newly democratized states. He then outlines ways that
globalization could be made to work to benefit local communities.
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tization of the strategically key industries is going to be subject to more scrutiny by
the electorate, because of the national security aspects of the sales. The electorate
will be apprehensive of any leaders who give up control over strategic enterprises to
foreign investors.13
My theory follows the literature linking democracy and FDI openness, arguing
that domestic institutions can explain a political leader’s choice of approval of pri-
vatization policies. I argue that referendum use varies (1) with the privatization
agreement being negotiated, (2) across regime types, and (3) for electoral systems.
The explanatory variables are of two types, those relating to the features of the
agreement and institutional explanations. This approach accepts that there are do-
mestic institutional structures which influence outcomes of the domestic politics of
an international agreement. In Uruguay, the rising radical left parties opposed the
privatization of oil on the economic terms of the sale. The majority coalition which
Lacalle had formed with the Blancos was also not in full support of the deal. The
security concerns for privatization of the national oil company was prevalent among
the moderates in the coalition in government. The existence of various reasons to
oppose agreements, makes features of the agreement relevant. This is true for op-
positions in cases such as Lacalle’s. This aspect of the empirical models cannot be
examined independent of domestic institutions, but only as a complementary group
of explanatory variables. I include the complexity of the agreement among this group
of variables. The more complex the agreement, the greater will be the likelihood that
the agreement will meet legislative opposition.
13Westlake, Michael, ‘Future Up in the Air: Doubts Surround Thai Airways Privatization Plan,’ Far Eastern
Economic Review, May 18, 1989, Vol. 144 (20), pp. 60; Jensen, Nathan, Nation-States and the Multinational
Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006: pp. 47,
examines the reverse, or the considerations of political risk for multinational corporations when negotiating an FDI
agreement.
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4.1.1 Literature Review: Privatization, FDI and Democracies
Governments are pressured from inside the state against privatization, and from
outside the state to open up their economy to investment. Within states there is a
constant battle for resistance to international economic trends of capitalism and a
defending of status quo policies. Voters become relevant to FDI decisions of states
in one of two ways: when there are significant layoffs in privatization restructurings
and when legislative opposition has security concerns with the deal.14 Theories of
Foreign Direct Investments debate the causes of a state’s choice of one course of
economic policy over another. Statist theories say it is policy preferences of state
leaders and political institutional structures that together determine the supply of
capital liberalization policies. The counter-argument is that interest groups can
better explain the relationship between FDI and democracy. The latter emphasizes
the influence of unions and lobbying groups on investment decisions by the state.15
I show that the domestic cost of privatizations vary across domestic institutions,
depending on whether the executive decides to make use of referendums to alter the
course of negotiations for proposed privatizations. The duality of the relationship
between democracies and FDI is evident in FDI attractions to democracies and the
relative inability of democracies to reverse privatizations. Li and Resnick (2003)
show that (1) electoral institutions may be the key to explaining variance across
democracies, and (2) that democracies are in fact more responsive than autocracies to
the concerns of the voters regarding foreign multinational company (MNC) presence
14Quinn, Dennis and Carla Inclan, ‘The Origins of Financial Openness. A Study of Current and Capital Account
Liberalization,’ The American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41 (3), (July 1997): pp.785-786 include a majori-
tarian legislature variable to test their domestic institutions argument; Simmons, Beth, ‘The Internationalization
of Capital,’ in Herbert Kitchelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in
Contemporary Capitalism, 1999, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: pp. 36-69.
15Swank, Duane, ‘Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market
Economies,’ Political Studies, Vol. 46 (3), 1998: pp. 674, assumes that economic performance is key to reelection.
He examines the role of taxation in capital account openness, where domestic institutions and economic structures
are taken as intervening variables.
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in their country.16 Following them, this dissertation looks at domestic institutions in
the study of FDI flows, and explains several domestic causal processes for divergence
of behavior among democracies.
Oneal (1994) notes that developed democracies provide the most advantages to
FDI, but that authoritarian states [among developing democracies] will provide the
most stable environment for an outside investor.17 The difficulty with developing
democracies is that there may be a reversion of policies at any time. Another key
study is Guisinger and Smith (2002). They show the differences between attributing
political risks to states versus the political leader. They argue that international
reputations are made by the governments in power, not the states themselves. Their
finding demonstrates that it is leaders and political institutions that have impact on
state behavior. Scholars of FDI have more recently turned to the role of domestic in-
stitutions in the measurement of political risk for investment. Although the causality
could be going the other way. Just as Li and Reuveny (2003) find that globalization
leads to more democracy though the effect seems to be reduced over time.18
The nature of the relationship between democracy and FDI is best summed by Li
and Resnick (2003), who claim democracies are more likely to follow popular opinion
on foreign direct investment and autocracies are more likely to follow elite policy:
“Under democratic institutions, politicians have incentives to develop public
policies reflecting the popular sentiment. Representative democracy also al-
lows various interests to be represented in the legislature, thereby constrain-
ing executive power. Even in fledgling democracies, the state is subject to
16Li, Quan and Adam Resnick, ‘Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment
Inflows to Developing Countries,’ International Organization, Vol. 57(1), (Winter 2003): pp. 181.
17Oneal, John R. and Bruce M. Russett, ‘The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and
Conflict, 1950-1985,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41 (2), (Jun 1997): pp. 267-293.
18Kayser, Mark Andreas, ‘How Domestic is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections,’ Annual Review of
Political Science, Vol. 10, (Jun 2007): pp. 356-357.
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a broad spectrum of political interests as it attempts to broker compliance
with democratic rules, offering relevant political actors welfare improve-
ments to induce their consent. Hence, democratic political processes are
characterized by the influence of diverse opinions over electoral and public
policymaking outcomes.”19
Li and Resnick’s (2003) test of 53 states between 1982-1995, finds that democracy
has negative effects on FDI inflows. They highlight that both international and
domestic factors have effects on privatization. They argue that democracy is more
volatile than autocracies and therefore can lead to political instability.20 Jakobsen
and de Soysa (2006) claim this is a feature of the cases selected and add to Li
and Resnick’s (2003) dataset to show that democracy may have a positive influence
on privatization.21 Statist theories have found empirical evidence in other areas of
international political economy (IPE): including varieties of trade protection, the
setting of exchange rates and maintenance of central bank independence.22
In the interest group view, the demands of multinational enterprises buying into
the newly privatized industries and their operations within states are seen as political
compromise and an issue of distributional politics. This side of the debate contains
proponents who see economic value of factors of production are key to supporting
privatization policies.23 The inequalities in incomes brought about by globalization
19Li and Resnick 2003, pp. 181.
20Li, Quan and Adam Resnick, ‘Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment
Inflows to Developing Countries,’ International Organization, 57(1), (Winter 2003): pp. 181.
21Jakobsen, Jo and Indra de Soysa, ‘Do Foreign Investors Punish Democracy? Theory and Empirics, 1984 - 2001,’
Kyklos, Vol. 59 (3), 2006: pp. 383-410.
22Leblang, David A, ’Domestic and Systemic Determinants of Capital Controls in the Developed and Developing
World,’ International Studies Quarterly, 41, 1997: pp. 435-454; Bernhard, William and David Leblang, ’Democratic
Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commitments,’ International Organization, 53, (1999): pp. 71-97; Simmons, Beth,
Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994; Bernhard, William, ‘A Political Explanation of Variation in Central Bank Independence,’
The American Political Science Review, 92 (2), (June 1998): pp. 311-328; Clark, William Roberts, Capitalism, Not
Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy, Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2003; McGillivray, Fiona, Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade
and Industrial Policy, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
23Rodrik, Dani, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997;
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are then thought to be responsible for the backlash by labor and other interest groups
who stand to lose most from opening up the economy to foreign investors.24 The most
recent studies have moved from distributive debates of interest groups to electoral
systems and onto which are likely to empower one group over the other.25 I argue
that among democracies electoral institutions will also make a difference in which
policies get to go to referendum.
4.1.2 Relevance of Domestic Political Costs and Unions to the Study of FDI
This chapter, rather than look at aggregate measures of globalization, asks what
the causal process is behind the political decision to follow or abandon privatizations
through referendums.26 In addition to the democratic accountability arguments,
what electoral arguments can be had for tendency to consent the public regarding
strategic enterprise privatizations. Electoral institutions is an explanatory variable
that captures the policy preferences of those who might be hurt by privatization of
the economy.
One argument is that domestic business interests would like the IMF and private
funding such as FDI to continue to come in. Therefore, big business and corpora-
tions will often support liberalization and the opening up of the economy (Jensen
Frieden, Jeffry, ‘International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation,’ International Organization,
Vol. 48 (4), (Fall 1994): pp. 565-568; Stiglitz, Joseph E., Making Globalization Work, W.W. Norton, September 2006;
Oatley,Thomas and Robert Nabors, ‘Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basel
Accord,’ International Organization, Vol. 52 (1), (Winter 1998): pp. 35-54, Swank, Duane and Sven Steinmo, ‘The
New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies,’ American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 46 (3), 2002: pp. 477-489.
24Garrett, Geoffrey, ‘Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?’ in Katzenstein,
Peter J., Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner, Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics:
A Special Issue of International Organization, 1999: pp. 147-184; Burgoon, Brian, ‘Globalization and Welfare
Compensation: Disentangling the Ties That Bind,’ International Organization, Vol. 55 (3), (Summer 2001): pp.
509-551.; Henisz, Witold J., and Edward D. Mansfield, ‘Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial
Openness,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50 (1), 2006: pp. 6-7, 18-20.
25Swank, Duane, ‘Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and Taxation of Business in Advanced Market
Economies,’ Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 46 (4): pp. 671-692; Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter,
Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics,
2001; Garrett, Geoffrey, ‘Globalization and Government Spending around the World, Studies in Comparative Inter-
national Development Vol. 53 (4), 2001: pp. 3-29.
26Garrett 1995, Hellwig 2001, Kayser 2007.
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2006, Hays 2007).27 Another argument specifies that producers will be stronger
in proportional representation (PR) systems, since majoritarian systems will give
more power to the median voter, approximated by consumer interests (Rogowski
and Kayser 2002).28 Race to the bottom (RTB) theories emphasize the competition
among states in terms of taxation policies affecting FDI. Basinger and Hallerberg
(2004) model the RTB among states in terms of the domestic political competition
in each state.29
Resistance to liberalization of the economy often comes from voters - those most
concerned about the loss of jobs from costly restructurings involved in privatiza-
tions.30 Thus, the majority of voters could be for/against privatization, depending
on the opposition displayed in the legislature and policy favored by the government.
Consultation of the voters through referendums or elections allows the political leader
to find out his/her chances for reelection with the approval of the agreement negoti-
ated and expand political support for policy beyond the legislature.31
Empirical evidence has been found for parallels between prices, taxation levels
and domestic institutions in host countries. The most recent debates have centered
on the differences between electoral systems and their tendencies towards taxation
of corporations vs. labor. The differences are likely to show which electoral system
27Jensen, Nathan, Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct In-
vestment, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006: pp. ; Hays, Jude, ‘Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus
and Majoritarian Democracies,’ World Politics, 2003: pp.
28Rogowski, Ronald and Mark Andreas Kayser, ‘Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level
Evidence from the OECD Countries,’ The American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46 (3), 2002: pp. 526-528.
29Basinger, Scott J. and Mark Hallerberg, ‘Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases
the Race to the Bottom,’ American Political Science Review, Vol. 98 (2), May 2004: pp. 269-270.
30Rueda, David and Jonas Pontusson, ‘Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism,’ World Politics, Vol. 52 (3),
2000: pp. 350-383.
31Boeri, Tito and Katherine Terrell, ‘Institutional Determinants of Labor Reallocation in Transition,’ Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16 (1), (Winter 2002): pp. 53 - 57, 58 - 59; in their comparison of transition states
in Eastern Europe via privatizations call all social safety nets towards unemployment ‘nonemployment’ insurance.
Their argument that the state (to workers unemployed, disabled and retired by the economic transition) is not to
blame for the difficulties of the transition, is a strong counter-claim to the campaigns of globalization’s opponents.
They attribute the inflexibility of the workforce to labor flows across sectors and rates of employment turnover as
a feature of the economy, and as part of the institutional features of the transition flexibility of a privatizing state.
This is an interesting and novel viewpoint.
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is more FDI friendly and hence harsher on labor. Rogowski and Kayser (2002) for
instance, claim that majoritarian systems will have more populist appeal leading
to taxation of capital, while proportional representation systems would be more in
favor of the elite view.32 Similarly, Hays (2003) finds that PR democracies will be
more likely to redistribute and have higher capital taxation rates. Hays (2009) cites
PLMAJ systems as having been most hurt by globalization of trade, because of their
difficulties with redistribution and embedded liberalism. 33
More recently, there has been research done on the debate that combines the in-
terest group and statist theories.34 The design of the study enables a comparison of
tendencies to use referendums vs. legislative logrolling to determine the results of
privatization talks. The voters only become relevant if the leader wants a privatiza-
tion, but cannot pass it through the legislature either because of interest groups or
legislative opposition.
4.1.3 What is the role of the legislature?
This research conceptually builds upon veto players and credible commitments
literatures in studies of the international political economy. Both these literatures
claim democracies are favored by foreign investors over authoritarian states. By
emphasizing democratic guarantees against expropriation, credible commitment ev-
idence favors democracies in the study of FDI. The strongest argument (Gaubatz
1996, Martin 2000, Jensen 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2005) uses audience costs
as one way of capturing the credibility of a state’s words or actions in IPE policies
32Rogowski, Ronald and Mark Andreas Kayser, ‘Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level
Evidence from the OECD Countries,’ The American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46 (3), 2002: pp. 526-539.
33Hays, Jude, ‘Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies,’ World Politics,
2003: pp. 95, 99-101 ; Hays, Jude, Domestic Institutions, and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009 (forthcoming): pp. 138-140 argues that Plurality/Majority democracies will be
the ones having trouble with globalization of capital, since corporate taxes are more prominent for those electoral
systems, and race-to-the-bottom of corporate taxation will mean less funds for majoritarian states.
34Henisz, Witold J. and Edward D. Mansfield, ‘Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial
Openness,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50 (1), 2006: pp. 189-212.
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(Smith 1996, Leeds 1999, Milner 1997).35
Credibility of commitments to privatization and foreign direct investments is
threatened by national security priorities and regime turnover. The commitments
include those made by states upholding various partnerships and investments from
foreign capital. Past credibility of commitments endangered by expropriations in
coup d’etats, civil wars, elections, and inter-state wars also concern foreign capital.
Most guarantees come by way the reassurances provided by today’s political leaders
and may not be upheld when circumstances change and there is a new administration
in place.
The instability of politics reflects on the economic arrangements (e.g. tax breaks
and joint ventures) made by states to attract FDI in the first place (Resnick 2001,
Jensen 2005). The political risks involved are thus an example of the fear of lack
of commitment on the part of states to foreign capital. Because of their domestic
institutions, democratic states are thought to be less likely to renege on their commit-
ments to FDI (Li and Resnick 2003). It is only through undertaking measures that
remove or alleviate audience costs, that democratic states can change their existing
policies.
Veto players have also been used in examination of difficulty of overturning the
status quo in policy-making (Tsebelis 1995, 1999, Hallerberg 2002, Keefer and Stasav-
age 2002). The veto player literature does include elections (and thus voters) as a
potential veto player accounting for the partisan differences among veto players to
predict outcomes. A similar approach is taken here with regards to referendums,
35Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor, ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,’ International Organi-
zation, Vol. 50(1), (Winter 1996): pp. 109-139; Martin, Lisa, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and Interna-
tional Cooperation, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000: pp. 168, notes that early involvement of the legislature
in international negotiations, enhances transparency, and pp. 199, says the regular involvement of the legislature
in bargaining is a feature of strong legislative institutions. Jensen, Nathan, ‘Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low
Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations?,’ Working Paper 2005; McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair
Smith, ‘The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States,’ International Organization, Vol.
58 (3), 2004: pp. 567-600.
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where voters are introduced as a way to prevent further privatizations. The greater
number of veto points in Tsebelis (1995) predicts that parliamentarian systems will
be more stable in policy-making. What this study does is to show that empiri-
cally, referendums and untimely elections are a way to resolve legislative blockage of
privatizations.
4.2 Referendums and Patterns in Privatization
Table 4.1 summarizes the 15 cases of referendums that make up the outcome of
interest in the dataset. Some of the states met the same types of oppositions to dif-
ferent cases of privatizations, because several privatizations often took place at the
same time. The income obtained from privatizations is a strong incentive for gov-
ernments to undertake them. The Czech, Uruguayan and Italian cases are examples
of this type of initiative. There are others privatizations that did go through with
legislative approval. These are the ones where the legislature had serious opposition
to prompting referendums.
Almost all the FDI agreements which end in referendums rate at the highest for
security concerns and at the middle levels for economic concerns associated with the
agreement. The two cases of referendum where the economic concerns are the lowest
were Tocumen International Airport privatization for Panama and the Kenyan Port
deals. The security issue was quite high for all of the privatization cases, since my
focus remains that of the strategic sectors. Privatizations tend to come in waves as
reformist governments are inclined to negotiate a few of them at a time.
Privatizations also come with regional patterns of behavior by liberalizing lead-
ers. For instance, one pattern to note in East European privatizations were the
common legislative oppositions to Russian ownership of privatized enterprises. For
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example, there is Belarus’s resistance to sale of Beltransgaz to Gazprom in a joint-
venture agreement. Bulgaria’s insistance against Yukos and LUKoil bids for Petrol
AD ownership which was of a similar nature. The Slovak preference for sale of Slovak
Electrarne is also telling: with Prime Minister Meciar’s influence resulting in 66%
of ownership going to Italy’s ENEL and away from Russian control. Bunce (2001)
shows the difficulties of forming coalitions when carrying out economic reform after
democratization in Eastern Europe in her case studies.36 Vachudova (2005) supports
this in her examination of six Post-Communist countries outlining the importance of
strategic and security concerns on liberalization of the economy and their relevance
to the legislative oppositions in these states.37 She points out that after 1989, Euro-
pean states became a clear alternative to Russian influence. As a result, the economic
development of three of the states (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) which
sought European foreign investors, diverged from the others (Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovakia) who permitted precedence of Russian bids for ownership. The dataset
is designed to reflect such preoccupations with security when privatizing strategic
enterprises.
The security concerns of Eastern Europe varied over two groups: those closer to
Russian influence, and the rest. The states that still had strong relations with Rus-
sia were Belarus, Bulgaria, Albania (as recently as 2006), and Romania and Slovakia
(until 1998). The group which from the start had opposition to Russian ownership
in the FDI contracts were Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Ukraine. As a
result, the states that had problems with the old-style economic relationships with
Russia were more open to partnerships with Europe and the United States. The op-
36Bunce, Valerie, ‘Democratization and Economic Reform,’ Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 4, (2001):
pp. 50-52.
37Vachudova, Milada A., Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005: 30-61.
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Table 4.1: Referendum Decisions in Privatizations, 1948-2006
Host Country Firm Date
Argentina ENTEL Dec 2, 1992
Bolivia YPFB Jul 18, 2004
Colombia ETB Oct 25, 2003
Mexico Cananea Copper Mines Aug 22, 1989
Uruguay ANTEL Dec 14, 1992
Uruguay ANCAP Jul 23, 2005
Peru PETROPERU Apr 19, 1996
Paraguay PETROPAR Apr 26, 1996
Paraguay ANTELCO Dec 15, 1992
Panama Tocumen International Airport Oct 30, 1998
Panama INTEL Oct 22, 2006
Venezuela PdVSA Aug 12, 2004
Kenya Kenya Electricity Generating Company Nov 21, 2005
Kenya Kenya Ports Authority Nov 21, 2005
Thailand PTTEP 2008-2009∗
Belarus Mozyr and Novopolotsk Oil Refineries Nov 24, 1996
Belarus BELTRANSGAZ Nov 24, 1996
Bulgaria Petrol AD Nov 10, 1989
Czechoslovakia Tesla-Liptovski, Tesla-Karin Nov 17, 1989
Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Airlines (CSA) Nov 17, 1989
Czech Republic Czech PTT/Telecom Nov 17, 1989
Czech Republic Czech Energy Works (CEW) Nov 17, 1989
Czech Republic Czech Radio Nov 17, 1989
Iceland Karahnjukar Hydropower Project 2008-2009∗
Italy STET Telecom Jun 14, 1997
Italy ALITALIA Apr 1, 2001
Italy ENEL Nov 8, 1987
Italy ENI Jul 27, 1992
Poland Roads & Polish State Railways Oct 13, 2003
Slovakia Slovak Electrarne Sep 25, 1998
∗ Privatization decisions for these cases are to be determined by referen-
dums also put off to a later date due to disagreements in the legislature.
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position to sale of ‘strategic’ enterprises sometimes forced governments into rejection
of bids or rearranging of auction rules. Sometimes it took the form of restricting
foreign ownership to less than the controlling shares (the golden share concept).
Bulgaria used this latter strategy with respect to the sale of Balkan Air (99.9% sold
to the Balkan Hemus Group), Hungary with respect to RABA (Railway Carriage
Corporation) where only 19% of shares were sold to a U.S. company, and the Czech
Republic with respect to Czech Energy Works and Czech Radio Communications
(privatized with 16% and 7% floats respectively).
For example, one of the strongest oppositions to privatization of state enterprises
was felt during the incumbency of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia. Slo-
vakia’s privatization battle began in 1994 and Meciar managed to turn around the
political opposition long opposed to the the sale of strategic enterprises, such as
the Slovenska electricity firm.38 Between 1994 and 1998 Meciar privatized Slovak
Telecom and Bratislava Airport’s operations, besides some others. The referendum
regarding the Constitutional Law on energy privatizations took place in September
1998, on account of the strong opposition in the legislature (The Slovak National
Council). The referendum later failed and Meciar lost his position in government,
yet most of the firms were successfully privatized by late 2006.39
The political crises, caused by economic and security concerns of the electorate,
also affects the leader’s choices of legislative approval in privatization decisions. Fea-
tures of any privatization deal made with foreign companies will be seen in terms
of various types of costs to the electorate. The empirical model builds upon the
referendum game of Chapter 2. The game made available three main explanations
for the occurrence of referendums in domestic approval processes of an internation-
38—‘Nor good red herring,’ Finance East Europe, October 6, 1995; — ‘Meciar is for Plebiscite on ban on privatising
energy companies,’ Czech News Agency, July 109, 1998.
39Fila, Lucas, ‘Sale Must Go On,’ The Slovak Spectator, November 17, 2003.
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ally negotiated agreement. These include the costs of referendum (R), the cost of
bribery to gain support in the legislature (c), and the pertinence of the agreement
to the following elections (θ1 and θ2). In translating these into an empirical test of
the hypotheses, the research design makes use of three main explanatory variables.
The domestic institutional variables to be tested include both regime and electoral
systems variables. The regime variables to be tested are democracy and autocracy in
Model 1 (Hypotheses 1(i) and 1(ii)); the electoral systems variables are proportional
representation and plurality/majority in Model 2 (Hypotheses 2(i) and 2(ii)). The
third group of variables are features of the agreement. These serve to explain factors
that exist independently of the domestic method of approval, but still have an effect
on the leader’s choice. These are outlined in Hypotheses 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 4 and 5.
4.2.1 Hypotheses
The theory suggests the following hypotheses:
H1(i): The more democratic the state, leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H1(ii): The more autocratic the state, leaders are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendum.
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H2(i): Among democracies, leaders of Proportional Representation
electoral systems are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H2(ii): Among democracies, leaders of Plurality/Majority electoral
systems are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H3: The more complex the agreement (or difficult to negotiate)
leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H4: Domestic costs of an agreement are more likely to increase
resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
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H5: National security concerns of an agreement are more likely to
increase resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
The dataset constructed for Chapter IV contains 246 cases and a total of 27,919
country-months. The original 246 states dropped to 203, because the rest of the
cases had missing information and/or lower data quality. With around 15 rounds of
negotiations per state, there is a total of 3,045 rounds of negotiations, and 27,919
country-months within all rounds of negotiations. The outcome dataset alone is com-
posed of 7,439 country-months. All of the variables included in the dataset and their
sources are available in Appendix C. The following section will lay out two multino-
mial logit models testing the political leader’s choices of continuing negotiations or
domestic approval of negotiated agreement (legislative approval or referendum). All
the variables have been recoded and entered in binary form.
The control variables used for the territorial disputes study are aspects of FDI
agreements that were important to Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen (2003), in
that there is an emphasis on general direction of FDI inflows as a precondition for
investment. Out of these I formulated my own variable of ‘reduced annual FDI entry’
dummy (negativefdientry). This variable has two dimensions, as it relates to an
aspect of the FDI deal and an aspect of the privatization negotiations to domestic
ratification.
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4.3 Empirical Models, Data Analysis and Results
The general formula of equations to be estimated for Model 1 are:
Model 1:
Yi|j = β0 + β1(finbin) + β2(democracy) + β3(autocracy)
+β4(complexity) + β5(securityconcerns)
+β6(economiccosts) + β7(negativefdientry) + ε,
where
Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
finbin = percentage ownership to be privatized,
democracy = democratic regime,
autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of an agreement,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
economiccosts = domestic economic costs of an agreement,
negativefdientry = negative current year FDI entry.
Model 1 examines the relationship between the regime variables and the differ-
ences in the political leader’s choice of continuing negotiations or obtaining domestic
approval, for the latest version of investment deal. Model 2, on the other hand,
looks for evidence of electoral system influence on the same. The multinomial logit
coefficients estimated by Stata for Model 1 and 2 are given in Tables 4.2 and 4.4,
respectively. In order to provide a more substantive interpretation of variable effects,
I also present the change in probability estimates in Tables 4.3 and 4.5. The impact
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of discrete changes in an explanatory variable on the log odds of a certain outcome
is estimated by holding all other variables at their mean values. I use both the coef-
ficient results (Tables 4.2 and 4.4) and the predicted probability results (Tables 4.3
and 4.5) to test the hypotheses introduced in the previous section. As in Chapter
III, I used Hausman test of IIA assumption and found no evidence to reject the
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption.
The results of Table 4.2 suggest that democracies will be more likely to choose
legislative approval over referendums (with an odds ratio 2.113), and continue nego-
tiations over legislative approval and referendums (with odds ratios 1.126 and 2.380).
The variable of autocracy, (coded 1 for the negative values of the net autocracy score
of the Polity 2001/2003 datasets), demonstrates that the leaders of autocracies prefer
referendums over legislative approval, and both legislative approval and referendums
over continuing negotiations. This implies that autocracies will be more open to
going to referendum over legislative approval, and democracies will be more in favor
of legislative approval over going to the electorate first.
The difference in the coefficients of democracy and autocracy’s methods of ac-
ceptance of foreign investment deals of Table 4.2 is not as obvious from the second
column, since those coefficients are revealed to be less significant for this multinomial
logit run. The insignificant coefficients have autocracies avoiding negotiations and
democracies preferring negotiations over legislative approval. The negative coeffi-
cients on the autocracy variable in each binary comparison is consistent with the
predictions of the referendum model. Note that the democracy variable is consis-
tent for all hypothesized; the choice of legislative approval over referendums and
negotiations over referendums are both in the expected direction.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of democratic and autocratic countries. On the one hand, the probability of a leader
choosing a domestic resolution (legislative approval with 0.261 or referendum with
0.017), falls significantly as the regime shifts from being not democratic to democratic
(-7.6% and -56.3% respectively). On the other hand, the probability of choosing
the same rises when the state becomes more autocratic (11.0% and 87.2%). This
reaffirms the notion that democracies will be more willing to make preparations to
get a better deal, while autocracies will be choosing to get deals done by selecting
who they will give the privatization deal to. The authoritarian states will be choosing
who they negotiate with before hand, removing competitiveness of their auctions. It
also confirms that democracies will have more to deal with in terms of opposition to
privatization by domestic groups that will be hurt by the privatizations.40
Complexity of the agreement makes it more likely that the leader will continue
negotiations than choose legislative approval (coefficient of 0.237) and less likely
to continue negotiations than referendums (coefficient of -0.246), and less likely to
choose legislative approval over referendums (coefficient of -0.483). Therefore, we can
say, in cases where there is complexity, the leader will likely go for referendums than
continuing negotiations than legislative approval. Complexity of FDI agreements
makes it so that the leader will try to convince the legislature through referendums,
and continue negotiations longer due to the complexity. The only prediction con-
sistent with our hypothesis is the choice of continuing negotiations over legislative
approval. I attribute this to the difficulty of removing resistance in the legislature
for privatization deals.
The general theory of the Referendum Game had predicted that the economic
and security concerns of an agreement would lead to increased resistance for the
40Fila, Lucas, ‘Sale Must Go On,’ The Slovak Spectator, November 17, 2003; — ‘Israel’s Port Strike Looming,’
Journal of Commerce, Jan 6, 2005.
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particular negotiated agreement, making it difficult to go for the legislative approval
option. What is tested empirically, is what the response of the political leader will
be to each type of opposition. In other words, the empirical tests are about what the
leader’s choice will be, when faced with legislative opposition of either type. This is
a continuation of the Referendum Game discussions. The hypotheses that came out
of the game extend this to what the leader’s response would be. The predictions of
the hypotheses H4(a), H4(b), and H5(a) are supported by the empirical results. It is
only the security based oppositions predictions of the last column, that goes against
hypothesis H5(b). If the privatization/FDI deal has some security consequences,
there is a significant log odds of the leader going for referendums instead of continuing
to negotiate. Otherwise, both types of oppositions will lead to more negotiations.
The predictions are thus only correct in 3 out of the 4 hypotheses.
The security concerns seem to be more dominant of the two influences (compare
the magnitudes of the coefficients for security concerns against economic costs in
Table 4.2). The difference in the two effects, becomes even more obvious when
we look at the discrete change results presented in Table 4.3. A unit change in
economic cost based opposition in the legislature yields a sharp 60.6% decrease in the
probability of referendums, and 9.8% drop in the probability of legislative approvals.
One unit change of the security concerns variable, on the other hand, translates
into 52.3% increase in the probability of legislative approvals, and the probability
of referendums becoming more than six-fold. The interpretation of the results of
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 is that oppositions to privatization based on national security will
not be as effective as those based on economic concerns. The leader will take the
issue to legislative approval and referendums instead of continuing negotiations (if
the opposition is security based) suggesting that the leader will be more adamant to
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get approval if the opposition is not economically based. Economic oppositions to
FDI deals will do more to prevent domestic approval than security based ones. What
is also noteworthy is the percentage fall in the probability of referendums outcome
for a unit increase in economic cost oppositions (0.020 to 0.008), and major rise in
the legislative approval option for a unit increase in security cost oppositions (0.002
to 0.013). Note the very small initial probability of choosing referendums when there
is no security opposition.41
The dummies for the negative annual FDI entry, indicative of an unattractive state
of a borrower economy has a positive influence on referendums and continuing nego-
tiations, but a negative effect on legislative approvals. This control variable makes
referendums most preferred, followed by negotiations and then legislative approval.
The results are significant at p < 0.001 level. The percentage change in the probabil-
ity of referendum outcome in Table 4.3 for this dummy is very high (111.1%), which
means a fall in the level of FDI coming in will increase the probability of referendum
on ongoing privatization deals.
The general formula of equations to be estimated for Model 2 are as follows:
Model 2:
Yi|j = β0 + β1(finbin) + β2(proportionalrep)
+β3(plurality/majority) + β4(autocracy)
+β5(complexity) + β6(securityconcerns)
+β7(economiccosts) + β8(negativefdientry) + ε,
where
41The security and economic concerns associated with privatization agreements are “not applicable” or NA (see
Table 2.6.2) for the choices between legislative approval and referendums, so no predictions have been made. It is
easier to predict that leaders will continue negotiations when faced with oppositions of either kind in the legislature.
The same is true of the comparisons of negotiations before referendum coefficients for democracies and proportional
representation systems, which are more difficult to discern with our model. Thus, the table of predictions contains
NA for these choices.
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Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
finbin = percentage ownership to be privatized,
proportionalrep = proportional representation system,
plurality/majority = plurality/majoritarian system,
autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of an agreement,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
economiccosts = domestic economic costs of an agreement,
negativefdientry = negative current year FDI entry.
The second table of results for this chapter, Table 4.4, summarizes the findings of
electoral system (a continuum that has been recategorized into two - Proportional
Representation (PR) or Plurality/Majority (PLMAJ) and the remaining cases that
fall into the authoritarian set that have no elections/electoral systems). We note the
insignificance of the legislature versus referendum of the PR and PLMAJ variables.
The rest of the predictions are significant at p < 0.001 level. The electoral systems
variables have positive log odds, except for the legislature to referendum comparison
for the PR variable. (There is statistical evidence that this variable may also have a
positive coefficient.) The discrete change results for PR and PLMAJ probabilities for
different outcomes are very close, with referendums falling more for a unit increase in
PLMAJ (61.9%) than a unit increase in PR (46.4%), and legislative approvals falling
more for a unit increase in PR (48.5%) than a unit increase in PLMAJ (46.4%).
The first two columns of Table 4.4 are more significant for the complexity vari-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































decrease the odds that the leader will choose to continue negotiations over referen-
dum (-0.228), and reduce the odds to choosing legislative approval over referendum
(-0.468). As the complexity increases (see Table 4.5), the chances of seeking a referen-
dum increases by 134.4%, and the leader turns away from direct legislative approval.
The results of both Models 1 and 2 are consistent, with only the negotiations to
legislative approval option giving a positive coefficient.
The dummy variable negativefdientry has consistent results for Models 1 and
2. Hence, our observations and conclusions in Model 1 related to the two variables
carry over to the interpretation of the results of Model 2. Similarly, the results for
security concerns and economic costs for Model 2 are aligned with the results of
Model 1. The other control variable used for all tests in this chapter is the binary
variable finbin, and contains only those cases of privatization where foreign ownership
is greater than 1/3. This threshold of percentage ownership have an impact on the
decisions of privatization when continuing negotiations is one of the options, for
both models, the other binary comparison of legislative approval to referendum is
not significant. This confirms the reason for inclusion of the variable, such that
it would not make a choice between the method of domestic approval, as much as
it would affect the decision to continue negotiations when there is only one option
available for domestic ratification: either legislative approval or referendum. These
are both in the same direction and magnitude. The negotiation option for Model 1
(democracy versus autocracy) is slightly more preferred by 1.111 (equal to odds of
3.037) if the only other domestic option available is to go to the legislature. The
negotiation option for Model 2, is slightly more preferred by 0.917 (equal to odds
of 2.501) if the only other domestic option available is to go to referendum. The
significance of this variable is encouraging for the dataset, since the threshold of
133
0.33 as a foreign ownership percentage seem to be an important one according to
the FDI dataset. This number was obtained from the substantive information about
problematic privatization decisions, and is an estimation obtained from the data.
4.4 Implications
The leader’s domestic priorities with regards to privatizations will have some
weight in the amount of FDI entering the country. FDI by definition depends on the
direct deals made between governments and the firms they make investment agree-
ments with. The rejection of a privatization law by the legislature or referendum will
put an end to any negotiations with outside investors. The results of the multinomial
logit model demonstrates referendum use in privatization decisions is not necessarily
a populist act, but one that is dependent on the legislative resistance posed to the
leader by parliament members who represent the voters. The maximum-likelihood
analysis employed here takes electoral systems as the primary determinant of the
choice between legislative approval and referendums. The results of the analysis are
as follows:
For Model 1, we do not reject H1i(a), H1i(b), Hii(a), Hii(b), Hii(c), H3(b), H4(a),
H4(b), H5(b); and can reject H3(a), H3(c), H5(a).
For Model 2, we do not reject H2i(b), H2ii(b), H3(b), H4(a), H4(b), H5(b); and
can reject H2i(a), H2ii(a), H2ii(c), H3(a), H3(c), H5(a).
4.5 Conclusion
The central argument of this study is that referendums can be rational in terms
of the leader’s own calculations and for demonstrating his/her performance. The
counter-argument to this is that referendums are a tool of populist politics and
therefore may be irrational. This empirical study supports the former argument by
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providing statistical evidence that (i) there are electoral reasons for the leader’s choice
of carrying out referendums, and (ii) there is evidence that domestic institutions (in
terms of both regimes and electoral systems) can account for use of referendums, and
that complexity of the agreements matters.
CHAPTER V
Sovereign Lending, Institutions & Democratic Priorities
The Costa Rican rescheduling of Paris Club debt of 1982 was one of the most
significant negotiations of recent past, with talks lasting for almost two years. Ne-
gotiations with the IMF, which preceded the Paris Club’s own negotiations, had
brought serious belt-tightening measures for Costa Ricans in exchange for $53 mil-
lion in loans.1 The Paris Club meetings which followed entailed the recontracting of
the $111 million dollars due. The Paris Club debt agreement was also significant be-
cause once signed, it became part of the accomplishments of President Louis Alberto
Monge.
The more challenging task for Monge was not the negotiations, but passing the
agreement through the legislature. This was mostly because the parliament did
not want to pass such tough measures through. In the end, Monge convinced the
center-right Unity Coalition to agree to approve the measures in exchange for the
government’s promise to cut public spending.2 After Monge’s term was over, he is
credited with causing his party The National Liberation Party, PLN’s victory and
the election of the next candidate of the Oscar Sanchez Arias.3
Monge’s accomplishment is more significant when compared with the performance
1— ‘Costa Rica: Heads Toward Face-Off with IMF,’ IPS-Inter Press Service, September 5, 1985.
2— ‘Costa Rica: Legislature Approves Club of Paris Debt Accord,’ IPS-Inter Press Service, March 8, 1985.
3— ‘Costa Rica: Still Deadlocked with IMF,’ IPS-Inter Press Service, September 20, 1984.
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of Rodrigo Carazo Odio of the Unity Party. Carazo who served between 1978 and
1982, dealt with legislative opposition to debt agreements with letters warning of a
moratorium to all lenders. Costa Rica was at that time sufferring from a fall in coffee
prices and a rise in the price of oil. Furthermore, the Unity coalition in government
was not supportive of economic measures such as raising taxes, which led Carazo
into more borrowing. The lending financed fiscal budget eventually grew so much
as to increase foreign debt owed to $2.6 billion.4 The Unity Party itself began to
lose support in the legislature, plunging the government into further economic crisis.
When the Costa Rican government prevented the IMF from inspecting its books, the
agreement for a $325 million loan was frozen. After this, the negotiations with the
IMF collapsed. As inflation reached 100%, capital flight rose to a maximum. Along
with a stoppage on the servicing of all foreign bank debt, Costa Rica announced a
moratorium of all of its sovereign international obligations.5
Carazo lost the following elections; he was not able to overcome the next electoral
hurdle due to the legislative block and his inability to give the IMF what they
wanted. In contrast to Monge’s strong presence in the legislature, Carazo’s lack of
control meant he was unable to pass reforms. Carazo’s loss of support by unions
and determination not to revalue the currency (colón) (which he could have done by
removing the multiple pegs to the dollar), led to further unraveling of support.6 One
major reason for the strong opposition in the legislature were issues associated with
Carazo’s involvement in the U.S.- Nicaraguan controversy and Costa Rican help in
arms shipments. As a result, the elections that followed became a referendum against
Carazo’s decision to defy the IMF. In the end his party lost the 1982 elections to
4Aguila del, Juan M., ‘The Limits of Reform Development in Contemporary Costa Rica,’ Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 24(3), (Aug 1982): pp. 356-357.
5The IMF agreement was signed, but after Carazo did not carry out the structural-adjustment measures, the
agreement was no longer valid.
6—‘Costa Rica Loan Default,’ New York Times, November 19, 1981.
137
the Nationalist Party. The general view is that the legislature was against Carazo
and refused to cooperate due to economic and security concerns associated with the
agreement. The legislature was afraid of violence and social unrest in the country
resulting from the IMF prescriptions. Their fears came on the heels of the massive
union protests against carrying out the programs. Moreover, the legislature wanted
to bring an end to Carazo accusing him of arms trafficking and allowing Sandinistas to
stay in Costa Rica. It was also these security concerns surrounding Carazo’s decision
to seek U.S. aid to replace the IMF lending that led the legislative resistance against
Carazo.7
The IMF programs required the government to raise in the prices of public utilities
and major cuts in the fiscal deficit and the social spending programs in the budget.
This was a politically difficult plan to follow. Like Costa Rica, many of the states that
borrow from the Paris Club tend to be heavily dependent on donors for their economic
well-being, making electoral incentives relevant to debt repayment. This is especially
so for states where economic policy changes are due to regime instability. More recent
theories of the conditions for repayment of sovereign debt tend to focus on the effects
of the median voter or of the representativeness of the legislature for interests other
than capital.8 Saiegh (2007), Rogowski and Kayser (2002), and Vreeland (2003) note
that the income of the median voter is key to rescheduling payments, whereas Saiegh
(2005) and Stasavage (2003) emphasize the representation of the interests of lenders
in legislative institutions.9 I focus on finding empirical support for the latter set of
arguments using domestic institutional explanations.
7Riding, Alan, ‘Troubled Costa Rica gets new chief,’ The New York Times, May 9, 1982; Ross, Oakland, ‘Hopes
pinned on 1982 elections storm clouds gather over once-serene Costa Rica, The Globe and Mail, Aug 31, 1981.
8Stasavage, David, ‘Credible Commitments in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited,’ Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18(1), 2002: pp. 155-186.
9Saiegh, Sebastian, ‘Do Countries Have a ‘Democratic Advantage’? Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies,
and Sovereign Borrowing,’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38 (4), 2005: pp. 366-387; Vreeland, James R., The
IMF and economic development, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: pp. 135, examines the impact of
IMF programs on the distribution of income in borrower states.
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Keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the Paris Club and its role in sovereign
debt lending, it is fair to assume that most of the states are newly democratic or
democratizing states with circumspect elections and an old-guard in the legislature.
The debates over debt repayments are done at the same time as deals are made with
the previous military leaders who oppose any and all reform measures that are likely
to place past military spending up for evaluation.10 Take the newly democratized
state of Albania for instance. The Stalinists of Fatos Nano were replaced by Sali
Berisha and the new Democratic Party. The new group then formed legislative
coalitions with the ethnic minority parties, so that the conditions to debt payments
could be fulfilled. This led Albania to a better position in terms of fulfilling its
international obligations. The new anti-communist parties and leaders had better
relations with the Europeans, allowing them to perform better in the international
economy, compared to their communist counterparts.11
The domestic political explanations for the choice of legislative approval come in
three parts: (1) domestic institutional variables (electoral systems), (2) latent vari-
ables of interests represented in the legislature other than capital (costs to unions
and the military of budget cuts), and (3) features of the debt agreements. Schultz
and Weingast (2003) also start out their analysis by looking at domestic constraints
on international commitments. These variables further specify some domestic con-
straints.12
10Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, Charles Chukwuma Soludo and Mansur Muhtar, The Debt Trap in Nigeria: Towards a
Sustainable Debt Strategy, Africa World Press, June 2002: pp. 172-173, recalls the Nigerian negotiations with the
Paris Club in October of 2005 for a debt write-off, presenting the Nigerian view of sovereign debt – the agreement
was a major breakthrough for a state mired in debt. She details the Nigerian process of preparing for Paris Club
meetings. Shows that out of the whole of Nigerian sovereign debt in May 2001, the Paris Club made up 69% of total,
and of the Paris Club debt 58% was the principal in arrears borrowed, 34% was interest and 18% was the principal
balance.
11Eichengreen, Barry and Richard Portes, ‘After the Deluge: Default, Negotiation, and Readjustment during the
Interwar Years,’ in The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective, Barry Eichengreen and Peter H. Lindert,
eds.: pp. 17-20, emphasize the relationship between past debt repayment and future treatment by lenders.
12Schultz, Kenneth and Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial
Power in International Competition,’ International Organization, Vol. 57 (1), (Winter 2003): pp. 3-42.
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5.1 Literature Review: Elections & Sovereign Debt
The terms of restructuring are pretty standard, even though they vary across
criteria of poverty and past good behavior. This standardization makes the domestic
determinants of reschedulings a more prominent feature of our explanation here.13
According to the implications of the referendum model, the lack of say by the state
in the major terms of repayment (for equal treatment purposes) does not negate the
leader’s role in reschedulings with the Paris Club.
The domestic institutional variables differentiate between democratic electoral
systems and democracies vs. autocracies.14 Elections are assumed to serve as a
test of the economic performance of leaders in most of the borrowing states. The
leaders will be paying serious attention to domestic deals and their competence in
dealing with international lenders for the economic advancement of the state.15 The
study assumes the elections following the Paris Club rescheduling negotiations will
be relevant to repayment, especially when the economic situation is not going well.16
I look at legislative oppositions to repayment in the context of electoral systems.17
More specifically I use the opposition to rescheduling agreements by various groups,
to code partisanship of the legislative opposition. The left may be against repayment
since their budget discipline often involves union wage freezes or cuts in employment
for newly reformed states.18 The right-wing maintains their priority on military
13Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?’ The American Economic Review,
Vol. 79(1), March 1989: pp. 43-50; Tomz, Michael, Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational
Reasons for Lending and Repayment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007: pp. 15, discusses willingness to
pay as the major criterion of lending.
14Rodrik, Dani, ‘Understanding Economic Policy Reform,’ Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34, 1996.
15Biglaiser, Glen and Karl DeRouen, Jr., ‘The Expansion of Neoliberal Economic Reforms in Latin America,’
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48 (3), Sept 2004: pp. 561-578.
16Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz, ‘Country Risk and the Organization of International Capital Transfer,’
NBER Working Papers, No: 2204, 1987.
17Block, Steven A., Burkhard, N. Schrage, and Paul M. Vaaler, ‘Democracy’s Spread: Elections and Sovereign Debt
in Developing Countries,’ William Davidson Institute, Working Paper Number 575, June 2003: pp. 7-9; underscores
the importance of candidates for possible future default.
18Ibid., pp. 137 - 139.
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spending as is assumed in most of the partisan literature on budgets.19 The latent
variables chosen in this case are the oppositions to IMF agreements which cut costs
from one or the other budgetary items: union pay and military portions of budgets.
Stasavage (2003) emphasizes that borrowers have to have good relations with the
lenders and its extension is that borrowers have to demonstrate some effort towards
democratization to be able to maintain good relations. Yet, there are various forms
of capital and both are capable of cooperation with the lenders abroad making do-
mestic interest representation in the legislature more important for the developing
states that have recently become democratic.20 On the other hand, empirical re-
search on foreign direct investment has shown political stability is more important
than type of regime for there to be economic relations with other states.21 This
paper uses the Paris Club as its sole source of cases of borrowers, the question posed
here is more relevant to domestic opposition to IMF agreements which serve as the
pre-requisites to rescheduling for this particular group of lenders. The domestic op-
position to measures posed by international lending agencies as conditions to further
lending and/or rescheduling. The two types of oppositions outside of the domestic
capital with friends abroad, include cuts to military spending and increases in union
wages. This set up builds on Stasavage’s theory that types of representatives in the
legislature may differentiate the source of sovereign debt abroad.
The incentives for reelection of leaders are tied to the state of the economy and
other deals struck by international lenders such as the Paris Club in our model.22
19Ibid., pp. 139 - 142.
20Stasavage, David, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789,
Cambridge University Press, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series, 2003, pp. 23, discusses how
credibility of public debt can involve undemocratic means such as restricting access of certain groups to the political
system.
21Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz, ‘Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,’
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 48 (2), 1981: pp. 289 - 303, note that typically countries are not one-time




What usually happens is the Club lenders will meet each year to consider potential
rescheduling of the year, often made through requests of leaders of borrowing states
in the months leading up to the annual meetings. Incidentally, states that have
defaulted or rescheduled in the past are negotiated with under more cautionary terms
and face higher interest rates for the rest of the borrowed amounts. The preferred
course of action for leaders who have rescheduled in the past is to strike political
agreements with the legislative opposition in order to pay their lenders on time. The
international reputational costs for default are outlined in Stone (2002) and Tomz
(2007).23
What about the domestic institutional incentives for the electorate and the leader
of borrower states? We had stated earlier that legislative control was an important
factor in debt repayment, furthermore as Saiegh (2007) shows, there is less likelihood
that coalitions repay their debt than majorities in the legislature.24 Saiegh despite
demonstrating this generality, does not explain the underlying mechanism for such
an outcome.
5.2 Elections as Referendums
The dataset contains 15 cases of referendums and/or elections where economics
of debt became a decisive-issue in elections. These are summarized along with their
lenders for the agreement in Table 5.1. Several of the cases are autocracies, includ-
ing, Indonesia in 1997, Kyrgyz Republic in 1994, Mexico in 1985, Jordan in 1989,
Yemen in 1993, Senegal in 1993, and the Ukraine in 1998. The democracies include
Argentina in 1993, Bolivia in 1983, Costa Rica in 1982, Guatemala in 1991, Pakistan
23Stone, Randall W., Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transi-
tion, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002; Tomz, Michael, Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation:
Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repayment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
24Saiegh, Sebastian, ‘Do Countries Have a ‘Democratic Advantage’? Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies,
and Sovereign Borrowing,’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38 (4), (2005): pp. 366-387.
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in 1997, Senegal in 1993, Russian Federation in 1991, Serbia and Montenegro in 2000,
Ukraine in 1998, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. The elections that served as
referendums were in Argentina of January 1993, Bolivia of July 1985, Costa Rica of
March 1982, Guatemala of January 1991, Indonesia of May 1997, Kyrgyz Republic
of December 1995, Mexico of July 1985, Pakistan of January 1997, Senegal of May
1993, Serbia of December 2000, Ukraine of March 1998, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
of September 1998 (paid later due to the civil war).
The preconditions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Paris Club debt
has been problematic for several countries, autocracies and for democratic states right
after their democratization. The design of the dataset and its analysis resembles a
limited information multinomial logit (LMNL). Sovereign debt negotiations for Paris
Club borrowers are preconditioned on IMF agreements. The Paris Club lenders will
usually not reschedule loans, unless the IMF has agreed to lend to that country. The
reason for this is that IMF lending comes with policy conditions that have to be met
before more funds can be released. The model captures this relationship by coding
the Complexity, Economic Costs and Security Concerns variables of Models 1 and 2,
according to the IMF agreement that preceded each Paris Club rescheduling. The
codings are done with potential oppositions to IMF lending conditions in mind.25
5.2.1 Hypotheses
Our theory suggests the following hypotheses for sovereign debt negotiations:
25Of the elections as referendum examples above, both Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia & Montenegro had to
repay the portion of ex-Yugoslavian debt that belonged to them after the civil-war was over.
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Table 5.1: Elections as Referendums on Rescheduling of Debt, where Economic Performance was a
major issue, 1948-2005
Borrower Rescheduled Agreements With Lenders Date
Argentina Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Great
Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, US
Jan 1993
Bolivia Austria, Denmark, Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Israel, Holland, Switzerland, UK, US
Jan 1983
Costa Rica Austria, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, UK, US
Jan 1982
Guatemala Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain
Jan 1991
Indonesia Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,





Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Russian
Federation, Turkey
Aug 1994
Mexico Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US
Dec 1985
Pakistan Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, S. Ko-
rea, Netherlands, Norway, Russian, Federa-
tion, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US
Aug 1997
Jordan Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Spain, Sweden,
pr Switzerland, UK, US
Jan 1989
Yemen Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, UK, US
Jan 1993
Senegal Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy,





Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,




Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK
Dec 2000
Ukraine France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US Dec 1998
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian




H1(i): The more democratic the state, leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H1(ii): The more autocratic the state, leaders are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendum;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendum.
H2(i): Among democracies, leaders of Proportional Representation
electoral systems are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval.
H2(ii): Among democracies, leaders of Plurality/Majority electoral
systems are:
(a) less likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
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H3: The more complex the agreement (or difficult to negotiate)
leaders are:
(a) more likely to use legislative approval than referendums;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(c) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H4: Domestic costs of an agreement are more likely to increase
resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) more likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
H5: National security concerns of an agreement are more likely to
increase resistance in the legislature and leaders are:
(a) more likely to continue negotiations than legislative ap-
proval;
(b) less likely to continue negotiations than referendums.
The dataset prepared for Chapter V contains the leader’s choice of outcomes across
4,292 country-months (or rows of data) in total for the 77 states that borrowed from
the Paris Club, between the years 1945 and 2006. With an average of rounds of
negotiations per state at 12, this makes close to 922 total rounds of negotiations and
4,292 country-months within all rounds of negotiations. This dataset is considerably
smaller than both the territorial disputes dataset which contains 1,710 rounds of
negotiations and the foreign direct investment dataset of Chapter IV which has
3,045 rounds of negotiations. The outcome dataset for sovereign debt, consists of
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2,195 country-months. All of the variables that make up the dataset along with
their sources are available in Appendix C. The following section will layout two
multinomial logit models testing political leader’s choices of continuing negotiations
or domestic approval of negotiated agreement (legislative approval or referendum).
To test the hypotheses above, I use a multinomial logit model which compares
the binary odds of one policy choice (continuing negotiations) relative to two others
(elections which act as referendums to debt repayment or legislative approval). The
three comparisons I look at are (a) the leader’s choice to seek legislative approval for
decision to repay on time relative to referendums (going to elections over budgetary
issues); (b) the leader’s choice to continue negotiations for renegotiation of the latest
debt agreement relative to seeking legislative approval; and (c) the leader’s choice
in continuing negotiations for renegotiation of the latest debt agreement relative
to referendums (going to elections over budgetary issues). I used Stata software
to estimate the coefficients of the multinomial logit model. These coefficients are
used to obtain the predicted probabilities of the outcomes, see §1.4 for a detailed
discussion of the multinomial logit model.
5.2.2 Empirical Models
The political crises caused by economic and security concerns of the electorate
affects the leader’s choices in repayment decisions. Features of any debt deal made
with Paris Club lenders impose costs on the electorate. The empirical model thus
builds upon the Referendum Game of Chapter 2. The domestic institutional variables
to be tested are democracy and autocracy in Model 1. The electoral systems variables
are proportional representation and plurality/majority as in Model 2.
The general formula of equations to be estimated for Model 1 are as follows:
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Model 1:
Yi|j = β0 + β1(debtbin) + β2(democracy) + β3(autocracy)
+β4(complexity) + β5(economiccosts-imf)
+β6(securityconcerns) + β7(foreignreserves) + ε,
where
Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
debtbin = debt to GDP ratio of borrower,
democracy = democratic regime,
autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of the agreement,
economiccosts-imf = domestic economic costs of an agreement X
no IMF meetings in the last 12 months,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
foreignreserves = negative current year foreign reserves.
The control variables for this chapter are sourced in the textual analysis of the
previous studies of Stasavage (2003) and Saeigh (2005).26 These works make se-
rious headway in terms of influence of institutional representation and domestic
oppositions to sovereign debt repayments. The two variables that I find impor-
tant in their analysis included here in Models 1 and 2 are ‘no recent IMF meet-
ings in the last twelve months’ and ‘negative current year foreign reserves’ dummy
26Stasavage, David, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789,
Cambridge University Press, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series, 2003: pp. 19-23 and 51 em-
phasize the importance of creditor interest representation in the legislatures of borrowing states. This argument is
similar to our characterization of the economic and military cost concerns of any oppositions to debt agreements in
the legislatures. Likewise, the difficulties of legislative approval for IMF agreements often stem from opposition to
the budget cuts or wage increases by the government.
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(foreignreserves) which I created for this analysis. Both these papers are in agree-
ment that IMF agreements and the valuation of the currency are important to debt
repayment deals. The second model will compare the effects of electoral systems on
using elections as a deciding vote on reschedulings of Paris Club debt, as approxi-
mated by IMF Agreements. The initial analysis showed that the non-existence of
IMF meetings were affecting the economic opposition variables. As a result, I in-
clude an economic opposition variable economiccosts-imf here that is composed of
no IMF meetings (0-1) X economic opposition (0-1). The economic opposition vari-
able is comparable to the one in the FDI analysis of Chapter 4. The existing research
suggests the likelihood of obtaining majorities in the legislature (Saeigh 2005); the
representation of interests outside of left and right-wing capital (Stasavage 2002) will
have an impact on the rescheduling of debt decisions of states. The second model
looks at the electoral system effect and is formulated as follows:
Model 2:
Yi|j = β0 + β1(debtbin) + β2(proportionalrep) + β3(plurality/majority)
+β4(autocracy) + β5(complexity) + β6(economiccosts-imf)
+β7(securityconcerns) + β8(foreignreserves) + ε,
where
Yi|j = domestic political outcome,
debtbin = debt to GDP ratio of borrower,
proportionalrep = state with a proportional representation elec-
toral system,
plurality/majority = state with a plurality/majority electoral sys-
tem,
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autocracy = autocratic regime,
complexity = complexity of the agreement,
economiccosts-imf = domestic economic costs of an agreement X
no IMF meetings in the last 12 months,
securityconcerns = security concerns associated with an agree-
ment,
foreignreserves = dummy negative current year foreign reserves.
The dataset consists of all Paris Club borrowers between 1948 and 2005, their
rescheduling dates, negotiation rounds along with political explanatory variables. I
use economics indicators such as foreign reserves and time to rescheduling as controls.
The supposition for the control variables of economic costs and security concerns (as
features of agreements) are that the agreements contain cuts on wages are opposed
by the unions, and those where the military budget is cut are opposed by the military
circles.
5.3 Data Analysis and Results
The multinomial logit coefficients estimated by Stata for Model 1 and 2 are given
in Tables 5.2 and 5.4, respectively. In a binary comparison (an outcome j versus
a baseline), the coefficient of an explanatory variable gives the expected change of
the logit of outcome j relative to the baseline outcome by its respective parameter
estimate (in log-odd units) in response to a unit change of that variable given the
other variables in the model are held constant. Even though the estimated coefficients
provide the estimated directions and significance of the relationships hypothesized
by the model, one can learn more by analyzing the impact of discrete changes in
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explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities of certain outcomes. Thus, I
also present predicted probability results in Tables 5.3 and 5.5. Both Models 1
and 2 pass the Hausman test of IIA assumption, which is simply an indication of
no evidence found for the violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumption.
Among regimes, autocratic leaders are more likely to continue negotiations than
repay or go to elections over the issue of debt. Leaders of borrower states face
this decision at their annual meetings with lending organizations, and especially in
the years they have debt due. The results for the sovereign debt dataset is in line
with the hypothesized relationships, most especially for democracies in legislative
approval versus referendum, autocracies for continued negotiations and legislative
approval, proportional representation for legislative approval over referendums, plu-
rality/majority for legislative approval versus referendum. The predictions also pan
out for the economic costs of a debt agreement for continued negotiations over refer-
endums, negotiations over legislative approval, and for the military costs of the debt
agreement on the choice of continuing negotiations when the only domestic option
is legislative approval. The effects have the sign predicted and are significant with a
p < 0.001. The encouraging performance of the empirical models demands a more
detailed expose of the results.
The regime variables indicate that democracies go for legislative approval over
referendums, more than autocracies with 0.417 and -0.644 log odds respectively.
Similarly, autocracies are more in favor of continuing negotiations over legislative
approval, where democracies give priority to legislative approval. One unit change
in the autocracy variable leads to a drop in the probabilities of choosing legislative

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variable, on the other hand, leads to a jump up in the probabilities of choosing
legislative approval 207.7% and referendums by more 102.8%. The converse is true for
the choice between negotiations and referendums, where democracy’s unit increase
leads to a fall in the chance of negotiating further(-56.8%), and autocracy’s unit
change means more lengthy negotiations will follow (139.8%).
These results are supportive of the first group of hypotheses related to domes-
tic institutions. Findings indicate a general preference of democracies for seeking
domestic approval over negotiating. For FDI negotiations we got results in a differ-
ent direction and magnitude comparisons between democracies and autocracies. For
territorial dispute tests, we obtained the similar results for all three issue areas in
comparing legislative approval and referendum. Democratic behavior in negotiation
versus domestic approval comparisons, of territorial disputes fall somewhere in the
middle of the FDI and sovereign debt results. For Chapters 3 and 4, continuing
negotiations is indicative of seeking the best solutions, and prolonged talks, whereas
for Chapter 5, continuing negotiations means avoiding repayment.
Autocracies give significant results for refusing to repay (and going to elections)
instead of going for domestic ratification of measures. Interpretation of the results in
this way suggests the tendency of democracies to pay their debt on time, and most
autocracies to avoid paying debt. It doesn’t help that most borrowing states are
autocracies.27 This comparison supports why referendums may be so much more rare
in FDI and sovereign debt negotiations, than territorial disputes. The comparison
of legislative approval to referendum, is in favor of legislative approval for both, but
is in favor of the referendum option for territorial disputes.
Complexity of the agreement (Table 5.2) for debt could be indicative of a newly
27See reviews of studies by Saiegh (2003, 2005), Stasavage (2002, 2003), Tomz (2007) and Vreeland (2003) for
discussions over regimes, in the literature review above.
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designed agreement to repay. This is supported by the significant and positive log
odds of the leader’s choice of getting domestic approval by referendum or legislatures,
instead of continuing negotiations (0.288 and 0.683). Where debt restructuring is an
issue, the leader will be more likely to choose to go to elections/referendums than
repay, and repay more than choose to continue negotiations. Another aspect of debt
repayment is refusing to repay, which the leader, given the terms of the agreement.
The results indicate a large rise in the probability of referendums at 328.8%, and an
increase in the probability of seeking legislative approval at 31.0% that come with
increases in complexity. These trends carry over to the results in Table 5.5 where the
change in complexity from 0 to 3 yields 32.63% increase in the chance of legislative
approval and a ten times of that increase in the chance of referendums.
The reason for this might be the preference of states to not pay off their debt only
a few times in their debt cycle (i.e. requiring restructurings of 5-10 year agreements
to repay), along with their interest. We can say that the more state-specific the debt
agreements, come with an unwillingness of legislature to repay that particular term.
Given that Paris Club debt agreements are often more general, and get more specific
when the country is in serious trouble with regards to ability to repay, the findings
makes sense. Complexity may mean uniqueness of the agreement, because of the few
types of agreement terms usually used by the Paris Club. The legislature will thus
be more in favor of approving the more complex agreements, and these are presented
to approval by the electorate as they get more complex.28
As far as the other features of agreements: Model 1 performs well in relation to the
28The complexity issue is less so for the IMF, especially after the financial crises of the 90s and later, when the IMF
was criticized for ignoring differences among states in their dealings and chose to alter their policies to accommodate
this general pattern. Part of this has been tried to be remedied by the IMF officials, who maintain that they will
be doing their best to take into consideration domestic differences of borrowing states. In this sense, the statistical
findings confirm and increase in chance of domestic approval when the lenders have drafted a more specific agreement
for the state in question. I am assuming the states with better economic indicators will be better able to fit the
general categories of lending, making their payments on time and not requiring further complexity for their debt
agreements.
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economic causes of opposition to sovereign debt agreements. The protest marches
against the IMF and strong backlash against debt preconditions are reflected in our
results. The voter’s response to heavy-duty economic demands by the lenders means
the leader will prolong talks as much as possible, avoiding making repayment an issue
for elections. The military cost cutting concern empirics do not fulfill all expectations
as the hypothesis of 5(b) had predicted the leader would ask the electorate whether
they favor non-payment. The empirical test yields a positive coefficient (0.591) in-
dicating that the leader is 1.806 times more likely to choose continued negotiations
over the approval of the agreement as a response to the cut in military costs. The
leader seems to favor negotiations no matter what the domestic option is.
The economic concerns variables, win out over the security issues legislative op-
positions have with debtors, in all except for this last binary comparison: continuing
negotiations versus referendums. The security concerns coefficient of 0.591 (signif-
icant at p < 0.01) is higher than the economic costs coefficient of 0.041, which is
not significant. Otherwise, the economic costs have larger coefficients than mili-
tary concerns, for the comparison of negotiations and legislative approval.29 This
means leaders faced with legislative opposition to agreements will prefer continuing
to negotiate the agreement over seeking legislative approval with more odds, if the
opposition is economic rather than security based.30
The general sign of the economic concerns variable is more like that of the privati-
zation/FDI results of Chapter 4. I attribute this result to the lesser influence security
issues have over the leader’s choice of domestic approval versus prolonged negotia-
tions. This can be interpreted as the eagerness of the political leader to demonstrate
his/her performance before the next election. Having an economic agreement com-
29See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
30This is the same trend as in the FDI study of Chapter 4.
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pleted may be more beneficial for the leader’s record, before the next election, than
if he chose to delay the signing of a deal due to security concerns. My introduction
(Chapter 1) and the referendum game (Chapter 2) explains these relationships in
more detail.
I should also add that the similarities in the leader’s response to economic cost
based legislative oppositions in Chapters 4 and 5 are not true for his/her responses to
the the security based oppositions. The national security based legislative oppositions
have more power to overturn FDI deals than sovereign debt agreements as shown
in the results. This means that, the leader will be more in favor of prolonging
negotiations for either type of legislative opposition in debt issues, but will be more
adamant to get FDI deals accepted when the opposition is national security based.
Therefore, even though oppositions to investments that cause security scares in the
public get a lot of airtime in the news, they do not have as much an influence as
domestic groups may have with the economic consequences of a deal.
The political incentives posed by electoral system differences are also important for
the negotiation vs. legislature approval and negotiation vs. referendum comparisons.
Plurality/Majority systems seem to favor leaving the matter of rescheduling over
repayment up to the legislators and the electorate, see Table 5.4. The Proportional
Representation results are also in the same direction, but have relatively smaller
effects. As observed in Table 5.5, the chance of seeking a referendum style approval
(through elections after having rejected debt repayment) and legislative approval
have respective percentage increases 174.6% and 104.6% for a unit change in PLMAJ
systems. In a similar fashion, the same unit increase in PR systems leads to a 190.0%
increase in the probability of legislative approval, a larger percentage jump compared
to 53.1% increase in the probability of choosing the referendum option. Both electoral
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systems decrease the chance of continuing negotiations sharply with a unit increase.
Moreover, both (electoral system) variables give results that are consistent with that
of democratic regimes. The avoidance of prolonged negotiations could be attributed
to lower costs of bribery for coalition formation in democracies. We observe that
democracies (both proportional representation and plurality/majority systems) have
less affinity for referendums than autocracies.
Tomz (2002, 2004) and Saiegh (2004) agree that the importance of sovereign debt
varies across elections.31 Debt restructuring or repayment decisions can become key
to winning elections. It is these elections that we treat as referendums in the above
analysis.32 The Argentine default in Fernando de la Rua’s time is exemplary of
cases where debt decisions had a major impact in elections. The referendum model
captures this relationship between debt decisions and elections by θ1 and θ2. The
inability of the electorate to view all debt negotiations and lack of transparency in
this area means debt negotiations will have varied effects on election decisions.33
The Referendum Game of Chapter 2 and the theory presented since then take
as relevant not all elections, but only those where there is a visible debt decision
made before the elections and the elections thus have a major impact on the vot-
ers’ evaluations of that decision. In this sense, the elections act as a referendum on
that particular economic decision made by the leader. Governments are aware of
the electoral imperatives when they make any type of decision, especially if taken
31Tomz, Michael, Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation: Reputational Reasons for Lending and Repay-
ment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007: pp. 39 begins a discussion of reputations formed as a result
of sovereignty and general behavior of borrowers that are more advanced in economic terms, which would be to-
day’s more democratic countries; Tomz, Michael, ‘Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with
International Agreements,’ 2002, Working Paper; Tomz, Michael, ‘Interests, Information, and the Domestic Politics
of International Agreements,’ 2004, Working Paper; Schultz, Kenneth and Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Democratic
Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition,’ International Organization,
Vol. 57(1), (Winter 2003): pp. 6-9 and 3-34; Saiegh has more recently sought the effect of electoral systems on debt
behavior in his working paper on government coalitions (single party versus coalition governments) and sovereign
debt behavior.
32Fiegert, Frank B. & Pippa Norris, ‘Do By-Elections Constitute Referenda? A Four-Country Comparison,’
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 15 (2), (May 1990): pp. 183-185.
33Saiegh (2004) mentions this in relation to the difficulties lenders have of observing the domestic decision-making
developing democracies.
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right before elections. Electoral incentives influence debt decisions by equating the
decision of leaders to repay or refuse to repay, with a referendum on that decision.
Interestingly, although this is not examined in greater detail here, proportional repre-
sentation systems have a tendency for ‘snap’ elections: Elections where the coalition
members or a minority coalition, and the majority opposition in the legislature have
trouble agreeing on a decision made by the leader of the government.34 These are
times when a decision to repay or not repay debt can be a deal-breaker for coalition
governments trying to balance financial crisis budgets and disagreeing on whether to
give precedence to domestic priorities instead of international obligations. However,
this is only a more extreme example of when elections would be acting as refer-
endums. The effect of debt repayment on elections really occurs more often than
assumed, and only becomes a problem when the leader decides not to repay the
amount when large payments are due.
The control variables used in this analysis are minimal in the interests of par-
simony, and examine three variables of interest to the choice of negotiating versus
domestic approval. The debtbin variable which is a binary dummy variable of debt
to GDP ratios of all the borrowers over all the years in the dataset that is avail-
able. The data is more consistently available after the 1950s, even for developing
states who have to report these measures in order to be eligible for further lending.
Measures were obtained from the IFC Annual Statistics. The effect of the debt to
GDP ratios for Model 1 above are positive and significant for all comparisons. Log
odds of staying in the negotiations option more positive when the domestic approval
mechanism available is referendum, as opposed to when the only available domestic
34Moore, Will H. and Bumba Mukherjee, ‘Coalition Government Formation and Foreign Exchange Markets: Theory
and Evidence from Europe,’ International Studies Quarterly, 50 (2006): pp. 100-101, see propositions 1 & 2; Saiegh,
Sebastian, ‘Do Countries Have a ‘Democratic Advantage’? Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies, and Sovereign
Borrowing,’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 38 (4), (2005): pp. 366-387.
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option is legislative approval. The unit change in this ratio is positive for negotia-
tions (at 197.8%) and highly negative for legislative approval and referendums (at
-54.3% and -92.4% respectively). Model 2 of Table 5.4 shows the somewhat larger
effect debtbin ratio has (1.816, 1.888 and 3.704 in log odds) across the three binary
comparisons. The significance of these coefficients points to the relevance of this
ratio as a control variable. A unit increase in the ratio of debt to the state’s GDP,
see Table 5.5, leads to an increase in the probability of prolonging negotiations with
a 197.8%, and a sharp percentage drop in chance of either choice of domestic rati-
fication. By exponentiating the coefficients in Table 5.4, I find that a leader is 40.6
times more likely to prefer negotiations over referendums, and 6.6 times more likely
to choose negotiations over legislative approval. This suggests that leaders of highly
indebted states will be in favor of continuing negotiations if the only domestic option
is to going to elections over the issue of non-payment.
The other two variables of interest, dummy for more than twelve months since
IMF meetings, and dummy for negative annual foreign reserve entry, are also sig-
nificant in terms of our results. An examination of the records of meetings through
newspaper articles reveals an increased frequency of meetings and the lack of annual
meetings with the IMF could be indicative of problems between the borrower state
and its lenders. The Paris Club officials are highly adamant in their requests for IMF
referrals for their reschedulings and any signs that meeting schedules have changed
course could be problematic.35 Leaders of states will often seek additional meetings
with both lending organizations when they are in need of renewing terms to existing
agreements or are unable to meet obligations. This observation is reflected in my
dataset through the dummy for more than twelve months since IMF meetings.
35— ‘Costa Rica: Still Deadlocked with IMF,’ IPS-Inter Press Service, September 20, 1984.
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This variable is multiplied with the economic opposition variable, however, be-
cause it seems to overpower the analysis if left by itself. This allows us to account for
cases where meetings have not been held and there is legislative opposition based on
domestic costs (economiccosts-imf=1) and the cases where meetings are held and/or
there is no domestic cost oppositions in the legislature (economiccosts-imf=0). This
shows the power of IMF meetings over the leader’s response to opposition to agree-
ments by MPs. The most noteworthy observation from unit change analysis is the
huge drop in the probability of legislative approval (from 0.605 to 0.295 in Table
5.3 and from 0.609 to 0.296 in Table 5.5) and the big increase in the probability of
continuing negotiations (from 0.355 to 0.637 in Table 5.3 and from 0.354 to 0.639 in
Table 5.5) as economiccosts-imf is increased from 0 to 1. This implies the tendency
of the leader to continue negotiations in the presence of domestic economic concerns
and no IMF meetings within the last twelve months.
The foreign reserves variable is included as a general indicator of the economic
trends of the state and of a downturn in the addition of foreign currency into the
country’s flow of assets. The MLE results (consistent in both discrete change tables)
have determined that negative foreign reserve entry serves to decreases the chances
of the leader preferring to seek domestic approval; and increase the probability of
choosing to continue to negotiate. A negative turn in foreign currency increases the
probability of prolonging negotiations by more than 40%, and decreases the choice
of either domestic approval in Tables 5.3 and 5.5. The log odds results, on the other
hand, demonstrate a preference for referendums over legislative approval, with a fall
in foreign reserves. Both Model 1 and Model 2 support this finding, with coefficients
of -0.303 and -0.237 respectively; though both are less significant than we would like.
In the conclusion to Chapter 2, I had explained that there would be two sets of
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offers to the Paris Club (the other Negotiating Party in this case) depending on (1)
where the resistance is in the bribery equilibrium, and (2) where the resistance is in
the referendum equilibrium. Recall that the offers matched the level of resistance
in the legislature up until the threshold when referendum or bribery was required.
Carazo’s Costa Rican debt example demonstrates this more closely. The difficulties
he had in the legislature were exacerbated by the increased resistance on security
grounds to his agreements. The legislature was critical of Carazo’s choice to forgo
repayment to the Paris Club while trying to gain favors with the U.S. government
in hopes they would make up for the difference in lack of future lending by the IMF
and the the Paris Club. As a result, the resistance in the legislature remained where
it was, without a new agreement. None of his offers to the negotiating party (NP)
were accepted; NP is IMF/Paris Club in this case. This meant, Carazo could only
seek to bribe the legislature, or go for referendum, to get the agreement passed. At
this time, Costa Rica was a democratic state with a Proportional Representation
system. The empirical hypothesis says the leader would want to choose either type
of domestic approval over prolonging negotiations, but will also choose legislative
approval over going to referendum (election) over the issue. In the case of Carazo,
we see that he goes to referendum instead of the legislature. This I attribute to
the national security and economic based oppositions to his agreements from the
legislature. Even though Costa Rica was a Proportional Representation democracy,
the fact that there were both economic and security based oppositions to his rule
may have forced him into referendum.
5.4 Conclusion
With that, the results of the analysis are as follows:
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For Model 1, we do not reject : H1i(a), H1ii(a), H4(a), H4(b), H5(a); and can
reject H1i(b), H1ii(c), H1ii(b), H3(a), H3(b), H3(c), H5(b).
For Model 2, we do not reject : H2i(a), H2ii(a), H2ii(c), H4(a), H4(b), H5(a);
and can reject H2i(b), H2ii(b), H3(a), H3(b), H3(c), H5(b).
Our overall results support the three hypotheses regarding electoral systems, eco-
nomic costs and security concerns. The results are not as supportive for the regime
variable predictions and complexity. The analysis here uses new data and contributes
the following to the discussion in sovereign debt negotiations: (1) it introduces some
of the domestic political causes of the relevance of Paris Club negotiations to elec-
tions; (2) it examines the domestic processes behind legislative rejection of Paris
Club rescheduling agreements; and (3) it underscores the leader’s electoral incen-




This study set out to theoretically and empirically analyze what referendums can
do for a leader’s reelection prospects and contribute to the course of international
negotiations. Assuming that the leader and electorate switch the roles of principal
and agent in the process of referendum inquiries, I obtained five main hypotheses
relating to the use of referendums. The empirical results support the theoretical
framework set out by the Referendum Game of Chapter 2. The results support the
notion that costs of referendums, costs of bribery in the legislature and the degree
to which the international issue pertains to the next elections determine whether the
leader will choose to utilize the referendum option.
In this study, the leader is assumed to be a utility maximizing office holder seeking
re-election, based on the successful signing of an international agreement. The game
models how the leader decides on what to propose to the other negotiating party
(NP) and the action for ratification of the agreement (if it is accepted by the other
NP). An important finding of the game is that it is in the interest of the leader
to satisfy the legislature’s requirements for the negotiated agreement, as long as,
the resistance at the legislature is moderate. Whenever the legislative resistance
reaches extremes however, the leader seeks to resolve the legislative block by using
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referendums or bribery in the legislature. The game formalizes these processes, and
presents referendum action by the leader as a rational response at an equilibrium.
The game is based on cases of a series of referendums in the areas of territorial
disputes, foreign investment and sovereign debt agreements of the recent past.
Of the six case-studies examined, four had democratic regimes and proportional
representation (PR) electoral systems. Of these four: Konrad Adenauer had a suc-
cessful referendum on the Saar; Luis Alberto Lacalle carried out a failed referendum
on the privatization of oil; Raul Alfonsin forced a successful referendum on the Beagle
Channel; and Rodrigo Carazo Odio was ousted with a failed election after difficulties
signing a new debt agreement. The first two had domestic economic cost concerns
leading the opposition to the referendums, while the last two had security concerns
associated with the agreement seizing the resistance in the legislature. Only one of
each type of legislative resistance cases met with an unanticipated (by the leader car-
rying out the referendum) ‘no’ in the ballot box. As rarely as referendums do occur,
this is a fitting analogy to real world cases where the only two probable outcomes
occur (yes/no), with very close percentages at the ballot box.
In these four cases of democratic proportional representation systems, the leader’s
choices can be explained in terms of the variations in four parameters of the game:
m2, pω and pL.
1 The costs of bribery of the legislature (c) was indeed too high for
all four cases of referendum. As such, Adenauer’s expectations that the electorate
would be for a union with Germany, because of the existence of ethnic co-nationals
and post-war economic boom in Germany, is supported by both the model and the
empirical results. Lacalle’s expectations of strong relevance of privatization reversals
to the election (θ1 and θ2) and the resulting high m2 (or loss of electoral reputation
1p: probability of the leader being reelected in the coming election, ω: utility of holding office for the leader, so
pw is the utility the leader is expected to obtain from the coming election; pL: probability of electorate being in
favor of the agreement; m2: reputational cost of no as an outcome of a referendum to the leader (in units of utility).
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that would accompany a ‘no’ result) caused him to lose the following elections.2
Conversely, in Alfonsin’s referendum, his anticipation of the positive effects of Papal
mediation and the value of last offers was right on. This made his attempt to obtain
electoral support for his peace agreement successful yielding a ‘yes’ result. Carazo’s
case was not so fortunate. He chose to go to elections after his refusal to pay,
miscalculating the high m2, and with a poor understanding of pL and pω. He should
have continued to negotiate with the IMF and got himself out of the debt hole.3
Empirical findings of the three chapters confirm most of the arguments put forth
by the referendum game. The first major result is that democracies have mixed
responses to referendums across the three issue areas. For territorial disputes, demo-
cratic leaders prefer referendums to legislative approvals, but choose legislative ap-
provals before referendums in foreign direct investment and sovereign debt. On the
other hand, democracies prefer prolonged negotiations to legislative approval for ter-
ritorial disputes and foreign direct investment. This is not in the same direction as
the preference of legislative approval over continuing negotiations result for sovereign
debt. The most important finding with regards to democracies across the chapters is
the willingness of democracies to negotiate to obtain the best agreements, except on
sovereign debt. In sovereign debt, democratic leaders seek legislative approvals, then
wait until elections, and lastly choose to continue negotiations. These findings talk
to the negotiating power of lending organizations like the Paris Club, which borrow-
ing state leaders also recognize. Leaders of borrowing states will thus seek to justify
non-repayments with their own legislatures and electorates, before communicating
their intentions to international organizations like the Paris Club or IMF. Both ref-
erendums and legislative approval are the preferred options for democratic leaders,
2θ1: increase in the probability of the leader being reelected after a referendum with an outcome yes; θ2: decrease
in the probability of the leader being reelected after a referendum with an outcome no.
3Table 2.5 has more detail on changes in xr and xref with respect to these parameters of the model.
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except when negotiating on territorial conflict. The results in Table VI summarize
the findings of the multinomial logit analysis of the three chapters.
Secondly, autocracies also behave consistent with our hypotheses. There is ev-
idence that autocracies will choose referendums over domestic legislative approval,
over continuing to negotiate for territorial disputes and foreign direct investment.
This result emphasizes the lack of reverence to domestic approvals, and imply that
bribery is more costly than referendums in these regimes. The avoidance of auto-
cratic leaders of prolonged negotiations does not hold for sovereign debt negotiations.
Economic issues with negotiated agreements from elites or legislature-like approval
bodies will prompt autocracies to want to seek legislative approval or referendums
before continuing negotiations for territorial disputes. This can be attributed to the
ease of getting referendum or election results leaders want in autocratic states, often
by way of elections that are unfair with results obtained by intimidation or fear.
Autocratic leaders are going to avoid negotiating as much as possible, except when
dealing with sovereign debt lenders. This is also supportive of what we would think
of as autocratic privatizations or opening the country up to foreign direct investment;
many of the deals are chosen by the autocratic leader who plans to gain by way kick-
backs from the deals with the multinational corporations of their choice. This is not
to say that democracies are not prone to the same corrupt behavior in privatizations.
Yet, the difficulty of passing privatization deals through the legislatures is evidenced
in the favoring of prolonged negotiations by democratic leaders.
The third main finding of the empirical test comes from the features of agreements.
The characterization of the two types of legislative oppositions to legislative ratifica-
tion is an interesting aspect of this study. The direction of the log odds coefficients
are as predicted. The legislative oppositions to new agreements predominantly come
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from security concerns in Chapters 3 (Territorial Disputes) and 4 (Foreign Direct
Investment). Economic costs dominate other concerns for legislative oppositions of
Chapter 5 (Sovereign Debt). There are conclusions to be drawn from the findings.
For instance, the results show that both economic and security type oppositions in
the legislature make leaders prolong negotiations in sovereign debt. There is a consis-
tent preference for continuing negotiations, no matter what type of opposition there
is in the legislature. Only economic oppositions consistently lead to continued nego-
tiations for foreign direct investment. If the opposition to the agreement is national
security based, then leaders seek domestic approval before proceeding.
The fourth major result to come out of the empirical testing is the preeminence of
referendums and legislative approval for the more complex agreements. Comparisons
of choice of legislative approval against referendums yield negative log odds for all
three issue areas of negotiations. This means political leaders prefer to take the
more complex agreements to referendums. As one of the three features of agreements,
complexity is conducive to use of referendums. These findings go against the idea that
complexity of agreements is the reason for not preferring referendums. Complexity
seems to favor all kinds of domestic ratification, except for privatization/investment
deals, where it leads to prolonged negotiations. I interpret this to be a result of the
international legal advantage caused by the sovereignty of a state, over a firm or
multinational corporation that it is negotiating with.
The Referendum Game says that referendums will occur if the leader has some-
thing to gain by the results. The electoral objective of the leader is what prompts
him/her to seek referendums in the first place. Complexity of agreements increases
chances that the electorate will not be in favor of an agreement they do not under-
stand. If the outcome of the referendum is not going to support the signing of a new
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DEMOCRACY (H1) +(W) +(S) NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) -(S) -(S) -(S)
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) +(S) +(W) NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) -(S) +(S) -(S)
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT (H3) +(W) +(W) +(W)
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA +(W) +(S)








DEMOCRACY (H1) +(S) +(S) NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) -(S) -(S) -(S)
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) +(W) +(S) NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) -(W) +(S) -(W)
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT(H3) +(W) +(S) +(W)
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA +(S) +(S)








DEMOCRACY (H1) +(S) +(W) NA
AUTOCRACY (H1) -(S) -(W) -(W)
PROPORTIONAL REP (H2) +(S) +(W) NA
PLURALITY/MAJORITY (H2) -(S) +(W) -(S)
COMPLEXITY OF AGREEMENT (H3) +(W) +(W) +(W)
ECONOMIC COSTS (H4) NA +(S) +(S)
SECURITY CONCERNS (H5) NA +(S) -(W)
Note: A positive sign (+) indicates that in the statistical tests the estimated coef-
ficients should be > 0; a negative sign (-) indicates that in the statistical tests the
estimated coefficients should be < 0; “NA” indicates that there is no hypothesis to
be tested; “S” indicates support for the hypothesis;“W” indicates no support for the
hypothesis.
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agreement, then the leader will not have a strong incentive to hold a referendum.
Therefore, even though we empirically observe that the leaders will take the issues
to a referendum, we find the electorate’s pL (probability that the electorate will be
in favor of the agreement) may not be as the leader expected. If the electorate’s type
is UFE or ‘unfriendly’ to the agreement, the leader will have less of a reason to find
out what they think.
The goal of using the electorate to convince the legislature, does not exist for
those cases where the electorate is of type UFE (unless the leader does not want the
agreement to pass).4 The empirical hypotheses here assume that the more complex
the agreement, the greater the chance that the electorate will be of the type UFE.
Yet for leaders who are not able to use bribery in the legislature, going for a refer-
endum may be the only option, even if there is a chance of losing ratification for the
agreement. The leader seeking reelection knows a referendum will work just as well
as a legislative ratification of the agreement. Recall our example of Lacalle and the
privatization question of 1992. The president took the gamble of a referendum when
the odds were stacked against him. The privatization reforms were too complex for
a leftist movement that was sweeping whole Latin America in early 90s. The resur-
gence of the left at that time was based on the simple argument that energy costs
would increase if the privatization/FDI agreements were to pass.
These two results highlight cases where the leader may have no choice left, but to
take the agreement to a referendum. For instance, if bribery costs (c) are too high
and the punishment to a no vote in referendum (m2) is low, the leader may seek
referendums first. Examples of this include debt agreements where new funds are
conditioned on passing of negotiated agreements, and territorial agreements where











































































































































































































































































mediated terms may be the last offer made by the negotiators. Office-seeking leaders,
wanting to demonstrate performance before the next elections can then be open to
referendums. These results support our theory of how domestic democratic institu-
tions work through electoral incentives to determine leader actions in international
relations. The empirical findings also explain why referendums are so rarely used.
The behavior of leaders in territorial disputes are consistent with the leader doing
nothing for cases where both m2 and c are too high. The behavior of leaders are
also related to the expected reelection prospects (pω), which may be so low as to
prompt the leader to ride out the existing odds of reelection. This is the case for
some sovereign debt cases, where elections serve as referendums on the demonstrated
performance of the leader.
The fifth major claim that can be made is that the statistical findings for do-
mestic institutions are generally supportive of the theory of referendums. Costs of
bribery and costs of referendum become relevant to the leader’s choice when resis-
tance in the legislature is greater than the offers made (r > x) to the other NP.
These costs and the relevance of the decisions to the next elections, also varies with
the electoral systems. Proportional Representation (PR) systems tend to choose leg-
islative approval over referendums, for resolution of territorial conflicts and sovereign
debt agreements (where some elections serve as referendums), and referendums over
legislative approval for ratification of foreign investment deals. Electoral systems of
Plurality/Majority (PLMAJ) make leaders more in favor of referendums over legisla-
tive approval for territorial disputes and sovereign debt deals (where some elections
serve as referendums), and legislative approvals over referendums for foreign direct
investment agreements. These results are in full agreement with what the literature
has shown so far with regards to electoral systems. FDI research is the only one
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out of the three that has found consistent evidence for PR and choice of FDI policy.
Territorial disputes and sovereign debt research has not had overly impressive results
with regards to electoral systems effects.
Referendums are also a strong choice over continuing negotiations for PLMAJ
electoral systems, dealing with territorial dispute peace agreements and sovereign
lending agreements. Leaders making FDI agreements prefer to continue negotiating,
if the only domestic option is to go to a referendum. One can think of this as cases
where the legislature is not in favor of the privatization or investment deal, and the
leader can only go for a referendum to get his/her agreement approved. In those
cases, leaders will choose to continue negotiations. Lacalle is an example of a leader
that did not continue negotiations, but chose to wait until the election to resolve
the issue. The empirical models obtain mixed results for performance across the
issues. The case studies support these findings. Lacalle and Carazo who were both
dealing with international economic agreements had as much difficulty completing
their agreements in accordance with electoral goals as Alfonsin and Adenauer had in
dealing with international territorial agreements. All three datasets give satisfactory
answers for the economic or security concerns associated with negotiated agreements
expressed in the legislature.
Secondly, the magnitude of coefficients of proportional representation leader be-
havior against plurality/majority leader behavior are consistent across territorial
disputes and FDI. PR systems are going to make leaders go for legislative approval
instead of referendums when they can; they do this more than PLMAJ systems
do. PR electoral systems allow leaders to seek referendums instead of prolonging
negotiations for all three issue-areas, more than PLMAJ systems. PR electoral sys-
tem leaders are going to be more in favor of referendums, when economic issues
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are negotiated, as opposed to territorial conflict. Thus, these results speak strongly
for differences in electoral systems and referendum use by leaders in these electoral
systems.
Moreover, these results support our notion of the purpose of referendums as an
electoral institution. These include providing electoral input into issues where the
leader and the opposition have serious differences of opinion. The role of resistance of
the legislature for bringing about bribery or referendum is key to interpreting these
findings. This makes up the core assumption of our Referendum Game. Perhaps
the single most significant result to come out of the analysis is that democracies
are not so keen on dismissing referendums (provided, like elections, they are free
and fair). Democratic leaders are aware of the benefits referendums provide in the
face of legislative gridlock and as a last resort of political urgency. According to
the quantitative results, we can only reject 10/24 of the hypotheses for territorial
disputes, 9/24 hypotheses for foreign direct investment negotiations, and 13/24 of
the hypotheses for sovereign debt dealings. The results are 58.3% in the hypothesized
direction for territorial disputes, more than 62.5% in the hypothesized direction for
foreign direct investment; and more than 45.8% in the hypothesized direction for
sovereign debt.5
Individually, the empirical results did not provide the sign(s) expected by the
theory for the leader’s response to legislative resistance to the COMPLEXITY of
agreements. However, the complexity of FDI agreements in the choice between ne-
gotiations and domestic approval has the opposite sign to the predicted relationship.
The reason for this prediction was twofold. Firstly, complexity increases legislative
resistance, because number of issues increase, and it becomes difficult to agree on
5There are three binary comparison of odds, or tests of each hypothesis per empirical chapter.
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a majority support in the legislature (increasing r in the Referendum Game). Sec-
ondly, complexity of an agreement may lead to unfriendly electorates, where referen-
dums would be more likely to yield a ‘no’ response (decreasing pL in the Referendum
Game). These two effects work in opposite directions, the former leading to an avoid-
ance of legislative approvals, and the latter leading to legislative approvals or contin-
ued negotiations. The empirical results support the idea that complex agreements
will go to referendums over legislative approval and over continued negotiations. The
leader’s preference for both legislative approval and referendums in FDI’s economic
opposition variable may be an indication that electorates can be used to support
the performance-based electoral incentives of leaders as the Referendum Game of
Chapter 2 predicts.
Two of the more interesting results were the following:
• the leader’s response to legislative resistance caused by SECURITY concerns in
territorial agreements and foreign direct investments;
• the leader’s response to legislative resistance caused by ECONOMIC concerns
in sovereign debt agreements.
Both the formal model and the case-studies indicate that either of these factors could
be dominating legislative debates at the time of domestic approval of these agree-
ments. The dominance of security issues for investment and territorial dispute negoti-
ations (both versus legislative approval and referendum when compared to the choice
of continuing negotiations) is another common pattern of legislative oppositions to
controversial privatization/FDI deals. The security issue dominance in investment
negotiations may go against our understanding of investment negotiations having a
predominantly economic tone. However, even this result is justified when we consider
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that all of our foreign direct investment/privatization cases come from ‘strategic’ in-
dustries. The importance of security concerns to FDI deals is supportive of what we
know is true about oppositions to foreign ownership of state enterprises. Typically,
the opponents to privatization are going to be actively campaigning against owner-
ship by foreigners. This result captures the effects of legislative opposition, and the
calls for referendums that we are used to seeing for those controversial privatization
decisions. The impact of lender preconditions against increases in wages and the
IMF belt-tightening measures is in the expected direction in the case of sovereign
debt. We know that the models make no claims beyond the dominance of one or the
other on the domestic approval side of negotiations. Therefore, although surprising,
these results do not contradict our models.
In terms of the overall results, we see that in table VI Autocracies have greater
log odds of being in a referendum choice than in a legislative approval choice in
FDI and Sovereign Debt. Whereas, it turns out to be the case that, democracies
have higher odds of choosing referendums than autocracies in Territorial Disputes.
In terms of electoral systems, PR systems have lower log odds of being chosen in
the Territorial Disputes and Sovereign Debt, and higher log odds of being chosen in
Foreign Direct Investment.6 In complexity, we see that the results of all three issue
areas suggest the complexity leads to higher log odds of referendum. And finally,
in terms of the types of legislative opposition, leaders face greater costs based on
security in Territorial Disputes and FDI, than in Sovereign Debt where economic
reasons are more often the case for legislative opposition to a negotiated agreement.
There are several implications that can be drawn from these results.
The strength of the respective findings reveals additional patterns in the results
6Note that the PR findings for Territorial Disputes is insignificant.
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of the data analysis. Firstly, the regime findings indicate that democracies are more
inclined to use referendums for disputes on territory, and less inclined to do so for
investment and debt issues. This is in line with the controversial nature of these
referendums, as legislatures of democracies tend to take more convincing in their dis-
pute negotiations, than autocracies where the legislature is not as effective. We also
note that many authoritarian states have reversed their FDI agreements with Multi-
national Corporations using referendums. For instance, both Chavez and Morales
have broken existing FDI agreements using referendums. This is reflected in the
data.7 Next, the finding of PLMAJ’s use of referendums with higher log odds than
PR for territory and debt. This finding suggests there is still room for theorizing
here. Although the question of which domestic group is strengthened by the use
of referendums seem consistent with the empirical findings for FDI, there has been
less published work on the implications of electoral systems for territorial disputes
and sovereign debt findings. Though, there have been strong arguments made for
various ways they affect sovereign debt the last few years.8 Thirdly, complexity re-
sults reveal that referendums may be the solution to difficulties of agreeing in the
legislature. The multitude of issues in negotiated agreements may lead to greater
number of disagreements, leading to problems in getting legislative approval. This
result shows that there may be benefits to solving these difficulties. Finally, security
is more dominant for the Territorial Dispute and FDI, though the security impli-
cations of territory is more obvious than investment. The importance of legislative
opposition based on security concerns of an agreement are the case for FDI, because
of the ‘strategic’ nature of the industries which made up the dataset for investment
7See for example, — ‘South America’s Petroleum Progress - Bolivian petroleum privatization taking shape,’ Oil
and Gas Journal, Aug 7, 1995, Vol. 93 (32): pp. 43; Ingham, James, ‘Crucial Year for Chavez Revolution, BBC
News, January 11, 2008.
8See Saiegh 2007, Tomz 2003
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cases.
The rarity of international referendums has previously prevented international re-
lations scholars from studying them more extensively. This study overcomes that
obstacle by emphasizing the domestic political aspects of referendums, which then
prompt leaders to use them to solve the difficulties they have with international
negotiations. This dissertation recognizes the leader’s need to find out the type of
the electorate on their views regarding particular agreements. It then applies this
framework onto what we know statistically about what happens after each negotia-
tion round between negotiating parties. Future studies using these datasets will look
at (1) empirical testing of the relationships between domestic institutions and the
levels of offers given to the other NP, (2) the strategy of making offers to the other
NP using this domestic set up, and (3) using domestic institutional information from






A.1 Territorial Dispute Cases
Note: The cases denoted by asterisk (*) are cases with dual challengers as per Huth
and Allee (2002).
Africa
1. Benin - Niger (1960 - 1965)*
2. Botswana - Namibia (1992 - 1999)
3. Britain - Ethiopia (1945 -1954)
4. Comoros - France (1975 - 2000)
5. Ghana - France/Ivory Coast (1959 - 1966)
6. Ghana - France/Togo (1958 - 1966)*
7. Italy/Somalia - Ethiopia (1950 - 2000)
8. Lesotho - S. Africa (1966 - 2000)
9. Liberia - France (1919 - 1960)
10. Liberia - France (1919 - 1958)
11. Madagascar - France (1973 - 1990)
12. Malawi - Zambia (1981 - 1986)
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13. Mali - Mauritania (1960 - 1963)
14. Mali - Burkino Faso (1960 -1987)
15. Mauritius - France (1976 - 2000)
16. Mauritius - Britain (1980 - 2000)
17. Morocco - France/Mauritania (1957 -1970)
18. Namibia - S. Africa (1990 - 1994)
19. Niger - Benin (1960 - 1964)*
20. Nigeria - Cameroon (1965 - 2000)
21. Somalia - Britain/Kenya (1960 -1981)
22. Somalia - France (1960 - 1977)
23. Togo - Ghana (1960 - 2000)*
24. Uganda - Tanzania (1974 - 1979)
25. Zaire - Zambia (1980 - 2000)
26. Eritrea - Ethiopia (1997 - 2000)
27. Benin - Niger (1993 - 2000)*
Americas
1. Argentina - Britain (1919 - 2000)
2. Argentina - Chile (1919 - 1998)
3. Argentina - Uruguay (1919 - 1973)
4. Bolivia - Chile (1919 - 2000)
5. Cuba - US (1959 - 2000)
6. Ecuador - Peru (1950 - 1998)
7. El Salvador - Honduras (1919 - 1992)
8. Guatemala - Britain (1936 - 2000)
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9. Haiti - US (1919 - 2000)
10. Honduras - El Salvador (1919 - 1992)
11. Honduras - US (1921 - 1971)
12. Mexico - US (1919 - 1963)
13. Nicaragua - Honduras (1919 - 1960)
14. Nicaragua - US (1969 - 1970)
15. Netherlands/Suriname - Britain/Guyana (1928 - 2000)
16. Netherlands/Suriname - France (1919 - 2000)
17. Panama - US (1923 - 1977)
18. Uruguay - Argentina (1919 - 1973)*
19. US - Canada (1973 - 2000)
20. Venezuela - Britain/Guyana (1951 - 2000)
Asia
1. Afghanistan - Pakistan (1947 - 2000)
2. Afghanistan - USSR (1919 - 1946)
3. Britain/India - France (1919 - 1954)
4. Cambodia - S. Vietnam/Vietnam (1954 - 1967)*
5. Cambodia - Thailand (1954 - 1962)
6. China - Afghanistan (1919 - 1963)
7. China - Bhutan (1979 - 2000)*
8. China - Britain (1919 - 1984)
9. China - Britain/India (1919 - 1962)
10. China - Britain/Burma (1919 - 1960)
11. China - France/S. Vietnam/Vietnam (1932 - 1995)*
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12. China - Japan (1951 - 2000)
13. China - Nepal (1949 - 1961)*
14. China - Kyrgyzstan (1992 - 1999)
15. China - Outer Mongolia (1946 -1962)
16. China - Pakistan (1947 - 1963)
17. China - Portugal (1919 - 1975)
18. China - USSR (1919 - 1995)
19. China - Tajikistan (1948 - 2000)
20. France/S.Vietnam/Vietnam - China (1932 - 1995)
21. France - Thailand (1945 - 1946)
22. India - China (1963 - 2000)
23. India - Pakistan/Bangladesh (1947 - 2000)
24. India - Pakistan (1947 - 1948)
25. India - Pakistan (1947 - 1948)
26. India - Pakistan (1947 - 1968)*
27. India - Portugal (1947 - 1961)
28. Indonesia - Netherlands (1950 - 1962)
29. Indonesia - Malaysia (1980 - 2000)
30. Japan - USSR (1951 - 2000)
31. Malaysia - China (1979 - 2000)
32. Malaysia - Singapore (1980 - 2000)
33. N. Korea - S. Korea (1948 - 2000)
34. N. Vietnam - S. Vietnam (1979 - 2000)
35. Pakistan - India (1947 - 1968)*
36. Pakistan - India (1947 - 2000)
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37. Pakistan/Bangladesh - India (1947 - 2000)
38. Portugal - India (1962 - 1974)
39. Nepal - China (1949 - 1961)*
40. Philippines - Malaysia (1974 - 1978)
41. Portugal - Indonesia (1975 - 1999)
42. S. Korea - Japan (1951 - 2000)
43. Thailand - Laos (1984 - 2000)
44. Vanuatu - France (1982 - 2000)
Europe
1. Austria -Italy (1945 -1946)
2. Britain - France (1919 - 1953)*
3. Bulgaria - Greece (1945 - 1947)*
4. Croatia - Slovenia (1993 - 2000)*
5. Cyprus - Turkey (1974 - 2000)
6. Czech Republic - Slovakia (1993 - 1994)*
7. Czechoslovakia - Hungary (1946 - 1947)
8. East Germany/Soviet Union - US/W.Germany/France (1948 - 1971)
9. Estonia - Russia (1992 - 1999) 10. Finland - Soviet Union (1941 -1947)
11. France - Britain (1919 - 1953)*
12. France - Italy (1945 - 1946)
13. Greece - Albania (1945 - 1971)
14. Greece - Bulgaria (1945 - 1947)*
15. Greece - Cyprus (1969 - 1982)
16. Greece - Britain (1951 - 1959)
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17. Ireland - Britain (1922 - 1998)
18. Italy - Yugoslavia (1945 -1975)*
19. Latvia - Russia (1994 - 2000)
20. Netherlands - Belgium (1922 - 1959)
21. Netherlands - W. Germany (1955 - 1960)*
22. Romania - Hungary (1945 - 1947)
23. Slovenia - Croatia (1993 - 2000)*
24. Serbia - Macedonia (1996 - 2000)
25. Serbia - Croatia (1995 - 2000)*
26. Croatia - Serbia (1995 - 2000)*
27. Spain - Britain (1919 - 2000)
28. W. Germany - Czechoslovakia (1955 - 1973)
29. W. Germany - E. Germany (1955 -1972)
30. W. Germany - France (1955 -1959)
31. W. Germany - Poland (1955 - 1970)
32. W. Germany - Netherlands (1955 - 1960)
33. Yugoslavia - Greece (1945 - 1946)
34. Yugoslavia - Italy (1945 - 1975)*
35. Turkey - Greece (1996 - 2000)
Middle East
1. Chad - Libya (1973 - 1994)
2. Britain/Iraq - Najd/Saudi Arabia (1922 - 1981)*
3. Britain/Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (1920 - 2000)
4. Britain/S. Yemen - Saudi Arabia (1935 - 2000)
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5. Britain/UAE - Saudi Arabia (1934 - 1964)
6. Egypt - Britain (1922 - 1956)
7. Egypt - Sudan (1958 - 2000)
8. Egypt - Britain (1922 - 1954)
9. Egypt - Israel (1948 - 1988)*
10. Eritrea - Yemen (1995 - 1998)
11. Iran - Britain (1919 - 1970)
12. Iran - Britain (1919 - 1971)
13. Iran - Britain/Iraq (1920 - 1975)
14. Iran - Saudi Arabia (1949 - 1968)*
15. Iran - USSR (1919 - 1957)*
16. Iraq - Britain/Kuwait (1938 - 1994)
17. Iraq - Iran (1979 - 2000)
18. Israel - Egypt (1949 - 1967)*
19. Israel - Jordan (1949 - 1967)*
20. Israel - Syria (1949 - 1967)*
21. Jordan - Israel (1948 - 1994)*
22. Libya - France/Chad (1954 - 1972)
23. Mauritania - Spain (1960 - 1975)
24. Morocco - France/Algeria (1956 - 1972)
25. Morocco - Spain (1956 - 2000)
26. Morocco - Spain (1956 - 1972)
27. N. Yemen - Britain/S.Yemen (1919 - 1990)
28. Oman - Saudi Arabia (1971 - 1990)
29. Oman - UAE (1971 - 1993)
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30. Qatar - Bahrain (1971 - 2000)
31. Saudi Arabia - Britain/Iraq (1922 - 1981)
32. Saudi Arabia - Britain/Kuwait (1920 - 2000)
33. Saudi Arabia - Britain/Jordan (1922 - 1965)*
34. Saudi Arabia - Britain/Oman (1934 - 1990)*
35. Saudi Arabia - Britain (1949 - 1968)
36. Saudi Arabia - Iran (1949 - 1968)*
37. Saudi Arabia - Qatar (1992 - 2000 )
38. USSR - Iran (1919 - 1957)*
39. USSR - Turkey (1945 - 1953)
40. S. Yemen/Yemen - Oman (1981 - 1992)*
41. Syria - Israel (1948 - 2000)*
42. Tunisia - France (1956 - 1962)
43. Tunisia - France/Algeria (1959 - 1970)
44. UAE - Iran (1971 - 2000)
45. UAE - Oman (1971 - 1993)
Dropped because dispute ended before/within 1945:
1. Ethiopia/Italy - Britain/Kenya (1919 - 1943)
2. Ethiopia/Italy - Britain/Sudan (1919 - 1943)
3. Ethiopia - Britain (1924 - 1936)
4. Argentina - Paraguay (1919 - 1945)*
5. Paraguay - Argentina (1919 - 1945)*
6. Denmark - Germany (1919 - 1920)
7. France - Germany (1922 - 1936)
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8. Germany - France (1922 - 1936)
9. Poland - Germany (1938 - 1939)
10. Soviet Union/Russia - Romania (1941 - 1944)
Dropped because of Missing Data:
1. Nicaragua - Colombia (1980 - 2000)
2. Turkey - Britain (1955 - 1959)
3. Britain/Kuwait - Saudi Arabia (1922 - 1965)*
4. Britain - Saudi Arabia (1949 - 1958)*
5. Oman - S. Yemen/Yemen (1981 - 1992)*
6. Saudi Arabia - Britain/S. Yemen (1935 - 2000)
7. Saudi Arabia - Britain/UAE (1934 - 1974)*
A.2 Foreign Direct Investment Cases
Africa
1. Algeria - Sonatrach [Energy - 6/96 - 2/06]
2. Angola - Diamang (Companhia de Diamentes de Angola) [Mining - 11/75 - 12/86]
3. Botswana - Botswana Telecom Corp [Post & Telecommunications - 9/66 - 10/05]
4. Botswana - Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board [Agriculture - 9/66 - 10/05]
5. Botswana - Air Botswana [Transportation - 9/66 - 10/05]
6. Botswana - Botswana Power Corp (BPC) [Energy - 9/66 - 1/05]
7. Ghana - Ashanti Goldfields Corp (AGC) [Mining - 1/79 - 8/95]
8. Ghana - GPHA (Ghana Ports & Harbors Authority) [Transportation - 1/79 -
8/95]
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9. Guinea - ACG (Alumina Company of Guinea) [Mining - 7/94 - 11/05]
10. Egypt - Egypt Gas [Energy - 1/98 - 11/06]
11. Egypt - Telekom Egypt [Post & Telecommunications - 3/98 -12/00]
12. Kenya - Kenya Ports Authority [Transportation - ? - 4/01]
13. Kenya - Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) [Energy - 3/97 - ?]
14. Lesotho - Lesotho Airways [Transportation - 10/66 - 7/98]
15. Liberia - Freedom Gold [Mining - 4/99 - 5/01]
16. Madagascar - Air Madagascar [Transportation - 4/99 - 5/01]
17. Mali - Sotelma [Post & Telecommunications - 5/97 - 2/06]
18. Mauritania - Sonelec (Electricity) [Energy - 10/99 - 7/06]
19. Mauritania - Mauritel [Post & Telecommunications - 1/06 - 4/06]
20. Mauritius - Mauritius Telecom [Post & Telecommunications - 1/06 - 4/06]
21. Morocco - Societe Nationale de Siderurgie (Sonasid Steel Mill) [Mining - 9/94 -
11/97]
22. Morocco - Societe Marocaine du l’Industrie du Raffinage (Samir) and Societe
Cherifienne des Petroles (SCP) [Energy - 1/92 - 5/97]
23. Morocco - Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exteriur (BMCE) [Finance - 12/94
- 2/97]
24. Morocco - Office Nationale des Postes & Telecommunications (ONPT) [Post &
Telecommunications [Post & Telecommunications - 4/95 - 6/99]
25. Mozambique - Sodan (Namiola Cotton Development Company) & Canam (Nam-
pula Cotton Company) [Agriculture - 10/94 - 4/06]
26. Mozambique - TDM (Telecommunicacoes de Mocambique) [Post & Telecommu-
nications - 10/94 - 5/06]
27. Mozambique - Cashew Industry [Agriculture - 10/94 - 12/95]
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28. Niger - Societe Niegerienne des Equx (SNE) [Infrastructure - 12/92 - 9/99]
29. Nigeria - Delta Steel Company, Ajaokutas Steel Project [Mining - 10/60 -12/06]
30. Nigeria - Nigerian National Petroleum Corp (NNPC) [Energy - 10/60 - 12/98]
31. Nigeria - Nigerian Airways [Transportation - 10/60 - 10/99]
32. South Africa - SA Electricity Commission [Energy - 2/90 - 6/98]
33. South Africa - SUN AIR [Transportation - 2/90 - 4/06]
34. Tunis - Societe Nationale des Distribution des Petroles (SNDP) [Energy - 9/97
- 12/99]
Americas
1. Argentina - Entel [Post & Telecommunications - 8/89 - 5/90]
2. Argentina - Aerolineas Argentinas [Transportation - 8/89 - 7/06]
3. Argentina - YPF (State Oil Company) [Energy - 5/89 - 12/91]
4. Argentina - Belgrano Cargas (State Railway Cargo) [Transportation - 5/89 - 6/04]
5. Bolivia - Comibol [Mining - 5/89 - 6/04]
6. Bolivia - Lloyd Aereo Boliviano (State Air Transportation) [Transportation - 5/90
- 12/06]
7. Bolivia - Corporacion de las Fuerzas Armadas Para el Desarrallo Nacional (Co-
fadena) [Defense - 5/90 - 5/95]
8. Bolivia - YPFB (State Oil & Gas Company) [Energy - 2/92 - 2/06]
9. Brazil - Compania Usinas Sidergicas de Minas Gerais S.A. (Steel Company) [Min-
ing - 5/91 - 5/99]
10. Brazil - Telebras [Post & Telecommunications - 8/91 - 5/06]
11. Brazil - Petrobras [Energy - 3/92 - 12/05]
12. Canada - Teleglobe [Post & Telecommunications - 1/87 - 5/02]
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13. Canada - Canadian Arsenals [Defense - 7/85 - 9/02]
14. Canada - CN Rail [Transportation - 7/85 - 12/02]
15. Canada - Air Canada [Transportation - 6/87 - 1/06]
16. Colombia - ETB [Post & Telecommunications - 8/96 - 1/99]
17. Costa Rica - Costa Rica Electricity [Energy - 5/95 - 10/05]
18. El Salvador - 5 Power Distribution Companies [Energy - 1/98 - 1/06]
19. El Salvador - 3 Thermal Generating Plants & 2 Geothermal Fields [Energy -
11/89 - 7/99]
20. El Salvador - Antel (Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones) [Post &
Telecommunications - 3/96 - 12/98]
21. Ecuador - Petroecuador [Energy - 4/92 - 7/93]
22. Ecuador - Emetel [Post & Telecommunications - 7/93 - 1/98]
23. Guyana - Guyana Electricity Corporacion (GEC) [Energy - 10/92 - 6/98]
24. Guyana - Guyana Telephone and Telegraph Company [Energy - 10/92 - 1/00]
25. Mexico - Mexicana Airlines [Transportation - 11/89 - 12/06]
26. Mexico - Sidermex (Steel) [Mining - 6/88 - 12/92]
27. Mexico - Telmex [Post & Telecommunications - 9/89 - 12/02]
28. Mexico - Cananea Copper Mines [Mining - 10/89 - 10/06]
29. Honduras - Cohdetel & Hondutel [Post & Telecommunications - 5/99 - 12/00]
30. Uruguay - Antel [Post & Telecommunications - 3/85 - 4/03]
31. Uruguay - Ancap (Oil Monopoly) [Energy - 3/85 - 1/06]
32. Peru - Petroperu [Energy - 10/68 - 6/93]
33. Paraguay - Petropar Paraguayan Petroleum [Energy - 11/97 - 11/99]
34. Paraguay - Antelco [Post & Telecommunications - 10/99 - 3/06]
35. Panama - Tocumen International Airport [Transportation - 3/98 - 2/00]
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36. Panama - Intel [Post & Telecommunications - 1/98 - 12/99]
37. Venezuela - Petrolas de Venezuelas SA [Energy - 12/58 -3/00]
38. Venezuela - Corporacion Venezolanas de Guayan [Mining - 12/58 - 4/90]
39. Venezuela - CVG (Iron & Aluminum) [Mining - 12/58 - 8/06]
40. Venezuela - Cantv & Telephone [Post & Telecommunications - 12/58 -12/91]
41. Venezuela - Viasa (State Airline) [Transportation - 2/88 - 9/91]
42. Venezuela - PdVSA (Venezuelan Oil Fields) [Energy - 12/58 - 10/06]
Asia
1. Armenia - Land [Agriculture - 9/91 - 2/06]
2. Armenia - Power Distribution Company [Energy - 3/00 - 2/06]
3. Bangladesh - BJMC (Bangladesh Jute Mills Corp) [Mining - 4/72- 3/95]
4. Bangladesh - Dhaka Electric Supply Authority [Energy - 4/72 - 7/95]
5. Bangladesh - Bangladesh Telephone & Telegraph Board [Post & Telecommunica-
tions - 4/72 - 2/89]
6. Georgia - 2 Electric Distribution Companies [Energy - 4/91 - 5/05]
7. Georgia - Ports [Transportation - 4/91 - 11/98]
8. Georgia - Gas Network [Energy - 4/91 - 1/01]
9. Cambodia - State Rubber Industry [Agriculture - 12/94 - 2/06]
10. China - CNOOC, Petrochina, Sinopec [Energy - 1/01 - 2/06]
11. China - China Telecom, China Sinocom [Post & Telecommunications - 8/01 -
12/06]
12. China - China Steel [Mining - 10/96 - 2/06]
13. Indonesia - PT Krakatau Steel [Mining - 10/99 - 10/96 - 6/98]
14. Indonesia - PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia [Post & Telecommunications - 10/99 -
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4/95]
15. Indonesia - PT Cemen Gresik [Infrastructure - 10/99 - 4/95]
16. India - Indian Iron & Steel Company (IISCO) [Mining - 1/50 - 9/93]
17. India - Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRA) [Post & Telecommunica-
tions - 1/50 - 9/01]
18. India - Air India & Indian Airlines [Transportation - 1/50 - 1/94]
19. India - Hindustan & Baharat Petroleum [Energy - 1/50 - 3/96]
20. Malaysia - Syarikat Telekoms Malaysia (STM) [Post & Telecommunications -
8/57 - 2/97]
21. Malaysia - Sabah Electricity Board (SEB) [Energy - 8/57 - 3/98]
22. Malaysia - Malaysian Airlines [Transportation - 8/57 - 10/00]
23. New Zealand - Air New Zealand [Transportation - 8/80 - 12/91]
24. New Zealand - Telecom Corp [Post & Telecommunications - 1/80 - 12/90]
25. New Zealand - Petrocorp [Energy - 1/80 - 3/88]
26. New Zealand - NZ Steel [Mining - 1/80 - 10/98]
27. Pakistan - Pakistan Telekom Corp (PTC) [Post & Telecommunications - 3/49 -
8/94 - 12/95]
28. Pakistan - Oil & Gas Development Corp (OGDC) [Energy - 3/49 - 8/94]
29. Pakistan - Karachi Electric Supply Corp (KESC) [Energy - 3/94 - 3/01]
30. Philippines - PNOC (Philippine National Oil Company) [Energy - 7/50 - 2/06]
31. Singapore - Singapore Airlines [Transportation - 7/50 - 11/95]
32. Singapore - Singapore Telecom [Post & Telecommunications - 7/50 - 11/98]
33. Singapore - Defense Production Company [Infrastructure - 11/99 - 12/06]
34. Singapore - Singapore Power (SP) [Energy - 10/95 - 3/96]
35. Sri Linka - Sri Lanka Telekom [Post & Telecommunications - 6/59 - 9/98]
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36. Sri Linka - 22 Regional Plantation Companies [Agriculture - 10/93 - 2/06]
37. Sri Linka - Colomba Gas Company [Energy - 6/59 - 1/95 - 12/96]
38. Sri Lanka - Air Lanka [Transportation - 6/59 - 6/95 - 2/98]
39. Taiwan - Taiwan Power Corporation [Energy - 10/93 - 2/06]
40. Taiwan - CSBC (PORT) [Transportation - 12/92 - 12/06]
41. Thailand - PTTEP (Petroleum Authority of Thailand and Production) [Energy
- 9/92 - 1/00]
42. Thailand - EGAT (Electric Generating Authority of Thailand) [Energy - 9/92 -
9/94]
43. Thailand - Thai Airways International Ltd. [Transportation - 9/92 - 4/00]
44. Thailand - TOT (Telephone Organization of Thailand) [Post & Telecommunica-
tions - 9/92 - 4/00]
45. Vietnam - Rubber Industry [Agriculture - 9/94 - 3/02]
46. Vietnam - Railways [Transportation - 1/95 - 12/96]
Europe
1. Albania - Albtelecom [Post & Telecommunications - 9/92 - 7/06]
2. Albania - KESH (Power Utility) [Energy - 9/92 - 6/05]
3. Austria - OeMV (State Oil Company) [Energy - 6.87 - 7/06]
4. Austria - EAG (electricity) [Energy - 7/99 - 7/06]
5. Austria - Voest-Alpine (Steel & Engineering) [Mining - 1/88 - 7/06]
6. Belarus - Mozyr and Novopolotsk OIL REFINERIES [Energy - 1/94 - 7/06]
7. Belarus - Beltransgaz (Gas Transportation) [Energy - 9/98 - 2/06]
8. Belgium - RTT into BELTUG and BELGACOM [Post & Telecommunications -
1/84 - 2/94]
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9. Belgium - ASLK/CGER, Societe generale de Belgique, NMKN-SNCI]
10. Belgium - Sabena [Transportation - 9/44 - 2/87]
11. Bulgaria - Balkan Air [Transportation - 8/91 - 2/06]
12. Bulgaria - Petrol AD [Energy - 7/93 - 1/05]
13. Bulgaria - Navibulgar [Transportation - 12/93 - 5/06]
14. Bulgaria - BTC [Post & Telecommunications - 3/90 - 1/06]
15. Cyprus - Cyprus Airways [Transportation - 5/92 - 2/06]
16. Cyprus - CYTA [Post & Telecommunications - 7/99 - 2/06]
17. Czechoslovakia - Tesla-Liptovski, Tesla-Karin [Post & Telecommunications -
11/84 - 9/06]
18. Czechoslovakia - CSA [Transportation - 4/97 - 2/06]
19. Czech Republic - Czech PTT/Telecom [Post & Telecommunications - 10/99 -
2/06]
20. Czech Republic - Czech Energy Works (CEZ) [Energy - 4/92 - 5/00]
21. Czech Republic - Czech Radio Communication (CRC) & Czech Television (CZ)
[Post & Telecommunications - 4/92 - 9/00]
22. Denmark - Teledenmark [Post & Telecommunications - 12/94 - 4/02]
23. Denmark - DONG A/S [Energy - 6/82 - 1/93]
24. Denmark - Copenhagen International Airport, 2/7 of SAS [Transportation - 3/92
- 12/02]
25. France - Thomson CSF [Energy/Defense - 4/86 - 2/06]
26. Greece - Olympics Airways [Transportation - 12/55 - 12/92]
27. Greece - DEPA [Energy - 12/44 - 11/07]
28. Greece - Telecoms Monopoly [Post & Telecommunications - 12/44 - 12/92 -
11/99]
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29. Hungary - Hungarian (Magyar) State Airlines [Transportation - 1/48 - 4/91]
30. Hungary - OKGT [Energy - 1/48 - 1/91]
31. Iceland - Karahnjukar Hydropower Project [Energy 2/02 - ?]
32. Italy - STET/Telecom Italia [Post & Telecommunications - 1/48 - 94 - 97]
33. Italy - Alitalia [Transportation - 1/48 - 89 - 98]
34. Italy - ENEL [Energy - 1/48 - 12/99]
35. Italy - ENI [Energy - 1/48 - 12/95]
36. Lithuania - Mazeikiu Nafta Oil [Energy - 5/97 - 8/99]
37. Latvia - Latvenergo Electricity Utility [Energy - 7/00 - 9/02]
38. Poland - Roads & Polish State Railways [Transportation - 5/89 - 3/03 - 2/06]
39. Poland - Polish Oil Company [Energy -5/89 - 3/93]
40. Portugal - Galp Energia [Energy - 1/91 - 8/06]
41. Portugal - EDP (Electricidade de Portugal and other power plants) [Energy -
5/97 - 8/06]
42. Russian Federation - State Farms/Land [Agriculture - 1/92 - 5/94]
43. Russian Federation - Rostelecom [Post & Telecommunications - 2/92 - 5/94]
44. Russian Federation - Moscow City Tel [Post & Telecommunication - 6/12/99]
45. Russian Federation - Sidanko [Defense - 1/92 - 6/95]
46. Slovak Republic - Reconstruction of Bratislava Airport [Transportation - 2/94 -
2/06]
47. Slovak Republic - Slovak Telecom [Post & Telecommunications - 1/96 - 2/06]
48. Slovak Republic - Slovak Electrarne [Energy - 11/94 - 2/06]
49. Sweden - SAS (Scandinavian Airline System) [Transportation - 12/98 - 9/01]
50. Sweden - LKAB [Mining - 2/92 - 9/02]
51. Sweden - Vattenfall (hydroelectric) [Energy - 2/92 - 2/05]
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52. Sweden - Celsius Industries [Defense - 2/92 - 2/05]
53. Turkey - Teletas [Post & Telecommunications - 4/88 - 12/93]
54. Turkey - Bergama Gold Mine [Mining - 3/97 - 10/00]
55. Turkey - Tuprathorn (TUPRAS) [Energy - 7/90 - 2/06]
56. Turkey - Turk Telecom [Post & Telecommunications - 1/95 - 3/06]
57. Turkey - Turkish Aircraft Industry Corporation [Transportation - 12/88 - 9/99]
58. United Kingdom - British Telekom [Post & Telecommunications - 5/84 - 12/90]
59. United Kingdom - British Petroleum [Energy - 5/84 - 12/90]
60. United Kingdom - British Rail [Transportation - 10/84 - 2/06]
61. United Kingdom - British Airways [Transportation - 10/84 - 2/06]
62. United Kingdom - British Coal [Mining - 10/84 - 2/06]
63. United Kingdom - British Steel [Mining - 10/84 - 2/06]
64. Ukraine - Ukricchflot (River Shipping) [Transportation - 5/93 - 2/05]
Middle East
1. Iran - 9 Petrochemical Plants [Energy - 5/91 - 6/06]
2. Iran - Arak Petrochemical Complex [Energy - 2/92 - 2/06]
3. Iran - National Copper Industries Of Iran (NCII) [Mining - 5/98 - 5/00]
4. Iraq - Iraqi Airways [Transportation - 12/88 - 2/06]
5. Israel - EL AL [Transportation - 5/48 - 4/89]
6. Israel - Bezeq [Post & Telecommunications - 5/48 - 10/96]
7. Israel - IMI (Israel Military Industries) [Infrastructure - 5/48 - 10/96]
8. Israel - IEC (Israeli Electric Corp) [Energy - 5/48 - 2/97]
9. Jordan - Royal Jordanian [Transportation - 1/90 - 2/06]
10. Jordan - The Telecommunications CORP (TCC) [Post & Telecommunications -
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1/95 - 2/06]
11. Kuwait - KAC [Transportation - 5/92 - 2/06]
12. Kuwait - 77 Petrol Station (OF KNPC) [Energy - 5/92 - 2/06]
13. Lebanon - Liban Telecom (OGERO) [Post & Telecommunications - 2/94 - 2/06]
14. Lebanon - Electricite Du Liban (EdL) [Energy - 5/00 - 2/06]
15. UAE - Taweelah Power & Desalinization Complex [Energy - 9/96 - 12/98]
16. UAE - Gulf Air [Transportation - 9/95 - 2/06]
17. Qatar - Qatar Airways [Transportation - 8/95 - 2/06]
Dropped because of Missing Data:
1. Austria - Girozentrale (Second Largest Bank) [Mining - 10/87 - 7/06]
2. Austria - Verbundgeselshaft) [Energy - 5/87 - 7/06]
3. Bangladesh - Bangladesh Railways [Transportation - 4/72 - 7/03 or 05]
4. Belgium - Distrigaz [Energy - 8/87 - 2/00]
5. Chile - Codelco (Copper) [Mining -]
6. Colombia/Venezuela - Cristobal Colon [Energy - 11/95 - 5/06]
7. Denmark - Denmark State Agricultural Farms [Agriculture - ? - ?]
8. Georgia - 2 Hydroelectric & 1 Thermal Electricity [Energy - 4/91 - 5/05]
9. Ghana - GCDO (Ghana Consolidated Diamonds Ltd.) [Mining - 1/79 - 10/99]
10. Ghana - GWCL (Ghana Water Company) [Mining - 1/79 - 9/01]
11. Guyana - Linden Mining Enterprises Ltd. & Barbice Mining Company (Bermine)
[Mining - 10/92 - 4/98]
12. Honduras - Cohdefor (State Forestry) [Agriculture - 1/84 - 12/90]
13. Hungary - Railway Carriage Corp [Transportation - 1/48 - 4/91]
14. Indonesia - PT Indonesian Satellite Corporation [Post & Telecommunications -
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10/99 - ?]
15. Iran - Sangan, Golgohar and Ghadormalu (iron ore) Mines [Mining - 5/90 -
10/06]
16. Iran - 5 State Banks [Finance - 2/91 - 2/06]
18. Israel - Jerusalem Economic Corp (JEC) [Finance - 5/48 - 9/89]
17. Kenya - Kenya Postal Corp, Kenya Posts & Telecommunications Corp, Commu-
nications Commission of Kenya, National Communications
Secretariat [Post & Telecommunications - ? - 3/97]
18. Lesotho - Lesotho Electricity Corp [Energy - ? - 4/01]
19. Lesotho - Lesotho Telecom Corp [Post & Telecommunications - ? - 4/01]
20. Liberia - Liberia Electricity Corp [Energy - 5/83 - 1/06]
21. Liberia - Liberia Timber and Plywood Corp (LTPC) [Agriculture - 5/83 - 4/06]
22. Mali - Mali Company for Textile Development (CMDT) [Agriculture - 5/97 -
5/06]
23. Malaysia - National Electricity Board (NEB) [Energy - 8/57 - 1/90]
24. Madagascar - Hasyma (Cotton Company) [Agriculture - 11/92 - ]
25. Malawi - Sugar Corp of Malawi (Sucoma) [Agriculture - 5/94 - ]
26. Malawi - Wood Industries Corp [Agriculture - 5/94 - ]
27. Niger - Bank of Africa, Afribank International, First Bank, Union Bank [Finance
- 10/60 - 9/92]
28. Niger - Sonided (Niger Petroleum Company) [Energy - 12/92 - 12/06]
29. Pakistan - Drinking Water Utility [Infrastructure - 3/49 - 3/95]
30. Peru - Cerro Verde Copper Mine [Mining - 10/68 - 8/93]
31. Paraguay - Paraguayan Iron & Steel Corp (Cosipar) & Paraguayan Steel Inc.
(Acepar) [Mining - 1/95 - 11/97]
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32. Poland - Polish State Farm [Agriculture - 5/89 - 2/06]
33. Russian Federation - Baltic Shipping Company Murmansk [Transportation -
5/94]
34. Russian Federation - Severao - Ostokzoloto [Mining - 1/92 - 6/95]
35. Russian Federation - Rostneft, Transneft, Soyuzneft [Energy - 1/92 - 6/12/99]
36. Russian Federation - RAO United Energy Systems (UES) [Energy - 2/92- 5/94]
37. South Africa - Iscor (Iron & Steel) [Mining - 2/90 - ]
38. South Africa - SAT (SA Transport Services) [Transportation - 2/90 - ]
39. South Africa - Kafue Mining Consortium [Mining - 2/90 - ]
40. Sweden - Nordbanken [Finance - 1/92 - 1/00]
41. Taiwan - ADIC (Defense Industry) [Energy - 12/92 - 6/98]
42. Trinidad & Tobago - Caroni Sugar Company [Agriculture - 3/87 - 9/06]
43. Vietnam - Land [Agriculture - 1/86 - 8/06]
A.3 Sovereign Debt Cases
Africa
1. Algeria (6/94 - 7/95)
2. Angola (7/89 - )
3. Benin (6/89 - 3/03)
4. Burkina Faso (3/91 - 6/02)
5. Burundi (3/04 - )
6. Cameroon (5/89 - 1/01)
7. Central African Republic (6/81 - 9/98)
8. Chad (10/89 - 6/01)
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9. Congo (6/86 - 12/04)
10. Congo, DR (6/76 - 11/03)
11. Cote D’Ivoire (5/84 - 4/02)
12. Djibouti (5/00 - )
13. Egypt (5/87 - 5/91)
14. Ethiopia (12/92 - 5/04)
15. Gabon (1/87 - 6/04)
16. Gambia (9/86 - 1/03)
17. Ghana (4/96 - 7/04)
18. Guinea-Bissau (10/87 - 1/01)
19. Kenya (1/94 - 1/04)
20. Liberia (12/80 - 12/84)
21. Madagascar (4/81 - 11/04)
22. Malawi (9/82 -1/01)
23. Mali (10/88 - 3/03)
24. Mauritania (4/85 - 7/02)
25. Morocco (10/83 - 2/92)
26. Mozambique (10/84 - 11/01)
27. Niger (11/83 - 5/04)
28. Nigeria (12/86 - 12/00)
29. Rwanda (7/98 - 5/05)
30. Senegal (10/81 - 6/04)
31. Sierra Leone (9/77 - 7/02)
32. Somalia (3/85 - 7/87)
33. Sudan (11/79 - 5/84)
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34. Tanzania, United Republic of (9/86 - 1/02)
35. Togo (6/79 - 2/95)
36. Uganda (11/81 - 9/00)
37. Zambia (5/83 - 5/05)
Americas
1. Argentina (5/56 - 6/92)
2. Bolivia (7/86 - 7/01)
3. Brazil (5/61 - 2/92)
4. Chile (2/65 - 3/87)
5. Costa Rica (1/93 - 6/93)
6. Dominican Republic (5/85 - 4/04)
7. Ecuador (7/83 - 6/03)
8. El Salvador (9/90 - )
9. Equatorial Guinea (7/85 - 12/94)
10. Guatemala (4/86 - 5/01)
11. Guyana (5/89 - 1/04)
12. Haiti (5/95 - )
13. Honduras (9/90 - 5/05)
14. Jamaica (6/84 - 1/93)
15. Mexico (5/89 - 6/93)
16. Nicaragua (12/91 - 3/04)
17. Panama (9/85 - 11/90)
18. Peru (9/68 - 7/96)
19. Trinidad & Tobago (1/89 - 4/90)
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Asia
1. Cambodia (1/72 - 1/95)
2. Indonesia (12/66 - 4/02)
3. Kyrgyzstan (3/02 - 3/05)
4. Pakistan (5/72 - 12/01)
5. Philippines (12/84 - 7/94)
6. Vietnam (12/93 - )
Europe
1. Albania (12/93 - 1/00)
2. Bosnia & Herzegovina (5/84 - 6/00)
3. Bulgaria (3/91 - 3/94)
4. Croatia (5/84 - 3/95)
5. Macedonia, FYR (5/84 - 11/00)
6. Poland (4/81 - 4/91)
7. Romania (7/82 - 5/83)
8. Russian Federation (4/93 - 8/99)
9. Serbia and Montenegro (5/84 - 11/01)
10. Slovenia 5/84 - 7/88)
11. Ukraine (7/01 - )
Middle East
1. Iraq (11/04 - )
2. Jordan (7/89 - 7/02)
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3. Turkey (5/78 - 7/80)




This Appendix presents the formal treatment of the parts/proofs that are omitted
in the analysis of the Referendum Game introduced in Chapter 2. The organization
of the chapter is as follows. I derive the functions gr(x), gbri(x), gref (x), gdn(x),
and discuss their shapes and important properties in §B.1. §B.2 is dedicated to the
analysis of the dominance relationship between L’s actions for ratification in case of
x < r. In §B.3, I derive some important properties of A1, A2 and A3. The equality
relationships between the functions gr(x), gbri(x) and gref (x) are discussed in §B.4.
Finally, I conclude with the formal proofs of L’s actions at the equilibrium in §B.5.
B.1 Analysis of gr(x), gdn(x), gbri(x) and gref (x)
The sketches of the expected utility functions gr(x), gbri(x), gref (x) and gdn(x)
are given in Figure 2.3. I start with the analysis of gr(x). From (2.13),
gr(x) = −x2 + x
(
1− c + A1
)
+ pω + c− A1.
The first and the second derivatives of the function given above are
g′r(x) = −2x + 1− c + A1
and
g′′r (x) = −2,
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respectively. I conclude gr(x) is concave because the second order derivative is neg-
ative. This implies that the value of x that maximizes gr(x) is the one that satisfies
the first order condition g′r(x) = 0, which implies that −2x + 1− c + A1 = 0. Let xr
maximize the expected utility of L when x ≥ r. Hence,
g′(xr) = 0
−2xr + 1− c + A1 = 0
xr =
1− c + A1
2
. (B.1)
Substituting (B.1) into gr(x) gives the maximum utility L obtains by offering xr
gr(xr) = −
(





1− c + A1
2
) (
1− c + A1
)
+ pω + c− A1




(1− c + A1)2
2
+ pω + c− A1
=
(1− c + A1)2
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+ c− A1 + pω
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For the derivation of gdn(x), I write the expected utility function of a leader who
proposes x < r and chooses to do nothing for the ratification:
gdn(x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
]
, +Pr{NP rejects x}(pω), (B.2)
where
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E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r]
= E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r, E is type FE]Pr{E is type FE}
+E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r, E is type UFE]Pr{E is type UFE}
= (pω)pL + (pω)(1− pL)
= pω. (B.3)
Substituting (2.6), (2.7) and (B.3) into (B.2) leads to
gdn(x) = (1− x)(pω) + x(pω)
= pω. (B.4)
Recall that gbri(x) is the expected utility function of L if x < r and L decides to
bribe. In this case,
gbri(x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
]
+Pr{NP rejects x}(pω), (B.5)
where
E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r]
= E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r, E is type FE]Pr{E is type FE}
+E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r, E is type UFE]Pr{E is type UFE}
=
(



















= x− c + pω + θ1pωpL − θ2pω(1− pL)
= x− c + pω
(





c− pω(pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2)
)
+ pω.
= x− A1 + pω. (B.7)
The last equality above follows from the substitution of A1 in (2.8). Next, I substitute
(2.6), (2.7) and (B.7) into (B.5), and rearrange the terms:
gbri(x) = (1− x)(x− A1 + pω) + x(pω)
= x− A1 + pω − x2 + xA1 − xpω + xpω
= −x2 + xA1 + x− A1 + pω
= −x2 + x(1 + A1)− A1 + pω. (B.8)
The first and the second derivatives of gbri(x) are
g′bri(x) = −2x + 1 + A1
and
g′′bri(x) = −2,
respectively. Due to the fact that second order derivative is negative, gbri(x) is
concave. Hence, the first order condition, g′bri(x) = 0, gives xbri that maximizes the
expected utility of L.
g′bri(xbri) = 0

















(1 + A1)− A1 + pω












− A1 + pω
=




















gref (x) = Pr{NP accepts x}E
[
uL((k = 1))|x < r
]
+Pr{NP rejects x}(pω), (B.10)
where
E[uL(k = 1)|x < r]
= E[uL((k = 1))|x < r, E is type FE]Pr{E is type FE}
+E[uL((k = 1))|x < r, E is type UFE]Pr{E is type UFE}
=
(













− (1− pL)m2 − (1− pL)R + (1− pL)pω
)
= pLx− pLR + pLpω + pLθ1pω −m2 + pLm2 −R + pLR + pω − pLpω
= pLx + pLθ1pω −m2 + pLm2 −R + pω
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= pω + pLx−
(
R + m2 − pLm2 − pLθ1pω
)
= pω + pLx−
(
R + (1− pL)m2 − pLθ1pω
)
= pω + pLx− pL
pL
(
R + (1− pL)m2 − pLθ1pω
)










= pω + pLx− pLA2
= pL(x− A2) + pω. (B.12)
The second equality follows from the substitution of the payoffs in Figure 2.2 into
the first equality. The ninth equality is the result of substituting A2 in (2.8) into the
expression in the paranthesis. Further substitution of (2.6), (2.7) and (B.12) into
(B.10) gives
gref (x) = (1− x)(pL(x− A2) + pω) + x(pω)
= pLx− pLA2 + pω − pLx2 + pLA2x− xpω + xpω
= −pLx2 + pLx(1 + A2)− pLA2 + pω. (B.13)
Taking the derivatives of gref (x) leads to
g′ref (x) = −2pLx + pL(1 + A2)
and
g′′ref (x) = −2pL.
The second order derivative being negative implies the concavity of gref (x). Thus,
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the first order condition gives the optimal offer of L:
g′ref (xref ) = 0
−2pLxref + pL(1 + A2) = 0





I substitute (B.14) into (B.13) in order to derive the maximum utility L obtains by
offering xref :










(1 + A2)− pLA2 + pω














































which concludes this subsection.
B.2 Dominance Relationships if x < r
In this subsection, I analyze the dominance relationships between ratification
actions of L under the condition that he/she decides to offer x that is less than the
resistance at the legislature. I determine the conditions when one action dominates
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another. Action (k = 0, b = 0) strictly dominates1 (k = 0, b = 1) if gdn(x) is greater
than or equal to gbri(x). Instead of the simplified expressions for the expected utility
functions, I use (B.2) and (B.5) for comparison:
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
≥
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω).
The inequality above reduces to
E
[
uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
] ≥ E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
]
pω ≥ x− c + pω
(
1 + pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)
pω + c− pω
(





pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)
≥ x, (B.15)
where the second inequality follows from the substitution of (B.6). The definition
of A1 follows from the inequality above. The threshold for x equal or below which
(k = 0, b = 0) strictly dominates (k = 0, b = 1) is defined as A1.
Similarly, if gdn(x) is greater than or equal to gref (x), then (k = 0, b = 0) strictly
dominates (k = 1):
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
≥
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 1))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω),





uL((k = 0, b = 0))|x < r
] ≥ E[uL((k = 1))|x < r
]

























m2 − θ1pω ≥ x,
where the second inequality follows from the substitution of (B.11). I define left
hand side of the inequality above as A2, which is a threshold for x that determines
the dominance relationship between (k = 0, b = 0) and (k = 1). If x > A2 then
(k = 1) strictly dominates (k = 0, b = 1); otherwise, x ≤ A2, action (k = 1) is
strictly dominated by (k = 0, b = 1).
Next, I identify the condition on x leading to (k = 0, b = 1) dominating (k = 1).
Following the same line of thought, if (B.5) is greater than or equal to (B.10), then
(k = 0, b = 1) strictly dominates (k = 1):
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
]
+ Pr{NP rejects x}(pω)
≥
Pr{NP accepts x}E[uL((k = 1))|x < r
]




uL((k = 0, b = 1))|x < r
] ≥ E[uL((k = 1))|x < r
]
x− c + pω
(
1 + pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)











x− pLx ≥ pω −R− (1− pL)m2 + pLθ1pω
+c− pω − pLθ1pω + (1− pL)θ2pω
(1− pL)x ≥ c−R− (1− pL)m2 + (1− pL)θ2pω
x ≥ c−R
1− pL + θ2pω −m2.
where the second inequality follows from the substitution of (B.6) and (B.11). The
right hand side of the inequality is the threshold for the dominance relationship
between actions (k = 0, b = 1) and (k = 1) and I define it as A3. If x ≥ A3
then (k = 0, b = 1) strictly dominates (k = 1). Otherwise, (k = 1) dominates
(k = 0, b = 1).
The conditions for all the pairwise dominance relationships between the actions
are summarized in Table 2.3.5.
B.3 Relationship between A1, A2 and A3
In this subsection, I show some important relationships between A1, A2 and A3,
which are heavily used in the analysis of the game. First, I show that A1 can be
written as a function of pL, A2 and A3:
A1 = pLA2 + (1− pL)A3. (B.16)
In order to prove the claim, I substitute A2 and A3 into the right hand side of (B.16)
and rearrange the terms, which reduces the expression to A1:












1− pL + θ2pω −m2
)
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= R + (1− pL)m2 − pLθ1pω
+
(
c−R + (1− pL)θ2pω − (1− pL)m2
)
= c− pω(pLθ1 − (1− pL)θ2
)
= A1.
This is a very important observation because it simply states that A1 is between
A2 and A3 in terms of value. To be more precise, the following properties hold for
A1, A2 and A3:
(i) if A1 ≥ A2 then A1 ≤ A3,
(ii) if A1 ≥ A3 then A1 ≤ A2.
For part (i), assume that A1 ≥ A2 and A1 > A3. Multiply both sides of A1 ≥ A2 by
pL and both sides of A1 > A3 by 1− pL, which leads to
pLA1 ≥ pLA2
(1− pL)A1 > (1− pL)A3.
Adding both inequalities results in
pLA1 + (1− pL)A1 > pLA2 + (1− pL)A3
A1 > pLA2 + (1− pL)A3.
The right-hand-side of the equality is equal to A1 due to (B.16), which is a contra-
diction. Hence, if A1 ≥ A2 then A1 ≤ A3. Following the same line of thought, part
(ii) can also be shown to be true.
B.4 Relationship between gr(x), gbri(x) and gref (x)
This subsection is dedicated to the analysis of the equality relationships between
the expected utility functions gr(x), gbri(x) and gref (x). Recall that 0 < Ai < 1
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for i = 1, 2, 3, see (2.15). Consider gr(x) and gbri(x). In order to identify the
segments when one function is larger than the other, I determine the shape of function
gr(x)− gbri(x). From (2.13) and (B.8), gr(x)− gbri(x) is
gr(x)− gbri(x) =
(
− x2 + x(1− c + A1
)




− x2 + x(1 + A1)− A1 + pω
)
= −xc(r) + c
= (1− x)c
≥ 0.
When x = 0, gr(0)− gbri(0) = c. As x increases, the function decreases reaching zero
when x = 1, see Figure B.1. Hence, I conclude
gr(x) ≥ gbri(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1]. (B.17)
Next, I consider the function gr(x)− gref (x):
gr(x)− gref (x) =
(
− x2 + x(1− c + A1
)




− pLx2 + pLx(1 + A2)− pLA2 + pω
)
= −(1− pL)x2 +
(





c− A1 + pLA2
)
= −(1− pL)x2 +
(





c− A1 + pLA2
)
, (B.18)
where the first equality follows from the substitution of (2.13) and (B.13). The first
and second derivatives of gr(x)− gref (x) are
∂(gr(x)− gref (x))
∂x
= −2(1− pL)x +
(






= −2(1− pL) ≤ 0,
The second derivative being negative shows that gr(x)−gref (x) is concave. Equating







1− pL − (c− A1 + pLA2)
)
= 0
−2(1− pL)x = −
(
1− pL − (c− A1 + pLA2)
)
2(1− pL)x = 1− pL − c + A1 − pLA2
2(1− pL)x = 1− pL − c + pLA2
+(1− pL)A3 − pLA2
2(1− pL)x = (1− pL)(1 + A3)− c










where the fifth equality follows from substituting pLA2 + (1 − pL)A3 into A1, see
(B.16).
Next, I factorize the expression in (B.18) for the purpose of finding the points
where gr(x)− gref (x) cuts the x-axis. These points satisfy gr(x)− gref (x) = 0. First,
I equate (B.18) to zero,
−(1− pL)x2 +
(








Dividing both sides of the equality by −(1− pL) leads to
x2 − 1− pL − (c− A1 + pLA2)
1− pL x−
c− A1 + pLA2
1− pL = 0
x2 −
(
1− c− A1 + pLA2
1− pL
)
x− c− A1 + pLA2
1− pL = 0.
Note that c−A1+pLA2
1−pL is both in the term multiplied by x and in the scalar part of the
equation above. Therefore, the expression above can be factorized as
(
x +
c− A1 + pLA2
1− pL
)
(x− 1) = 0.
The solution for the equation above is x = 1 or x = − c−A1+pLA2
1−pL . Hence, it can
be concluded that x = 1 or x = A1−c−pLA2
1−pL are the two points that gr(x) − gref (x)
intersect the x-axis. Substituting pLA2 +(1−pL)A3 into A1 in the second point gives
A1 − c− pLA2
1− pL =
pLA2 + (1− pL)A3 − c− pLA2
1− pL
=
(1− pL)A3 − c
1− pL
= A3 − c
1− pL .
The shape of gr(x)− gref (x) is as follows (see Figure B.1): the function increases









then it starts decreasing and becomes zero at 1. Therefore,
gr(x) ≥ gref (x) if A3 − c
1− pL ≤ x ≤ 1 (B.19)
and
gr(x) < gref (x) if x < A3 − c
1− pL or x > 1. (B.20)
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Finally, I consider gbri(x)− gref (x). Substitute (B.8) and (B.13):
gbri(x)− gref (x) =
(




− pLx2 + pLx(1 + A2)− pLA2 + pω
)
= −(1− pL)x2 + [(1 + A1)− pL(1 + A2)]x + (pLA2 − A1)
= −(1− pL)x2 + [1− pL + (A1 − pLA2)]x− (A1 − pLA2).
From (B.16), A1 − pLA2 = (1− pL)A3. Substituting this relationship into the right
hand side of the equation above leads to
gbri(x)− gref (x)
= −(1− pL)x2 + [(1− pL) + (1− pL)A3]x− (1− pL)A3
= −(1− pL)x2 + (1− pL)(1 + A3)x− (1− pL)A3. (B.21)
The first and the second derivatives are
∂(gbri(x)− gref (x))
∂x




= −2(1− pL) ≤ 0.




= 0 gives the x value that maximizes gbri(x)− gref (x):
−2(1− pL)x + (1− pL)(1 + A3) = 0
−2(1− pL)x = −(1− pL)(1 + A3)
x =







Next, I show the values of x at which gbri(x) and gref (x) intersect, i.e., when
gbri(x)− gref (x) = 0 holds. From (B.21)
−(1− pL)x2 + (1− pL)(1 + A3)x− (1− pL)A3 = 0
x2 − (1 + A3)x + A3 = 0
(x− 1)(x− A3) = 0,
where the second equality follows from dividing both sides by −(1−pL). The equality
above simply says that gbri(x)− gref (x) intersects the x axis at A3 and 1. The shape
of gbri(x)−gref (x) is as follows: the function increases and intersects the x axis at A3,
continues increasing until 1+A3
2
where it reaches its maximum, then starts decreasing,
intersecting the x axis at 1, keeps decreasing there after. The shape implies that (see
Figure B.1)
gbri(x) ≥ gref (x) if A3 ≤ x ≤ 1 (B.22)
and





In this section, I derive L’s actions at the equilibrium. Two cases based on the
values of A1, A2 and A3 are treated in two separate subsections: (i) A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2,
(ii) A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3.
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Figure B.1: An Illustration of Functions (a) gr(x)−gref (x), (b) gbri(x)−gref (x), (c) gr(x)−gbri(x).
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B.5.1 Case (i): A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2
Recall that xr > 0, see (2.18). Given the condition A3 ≤ A1,
A3 ≤ A1 ≤ 1
A3 + A3 ≤ A1 + A1 ≤ A1 + 1
2A3 ≤ 2A1 ≤ A1 + 1
A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A1+12 = xbri.
Similarly, since A3 ≤ A2,
A3 ≤ A2 ≤ 1
A3 + A3 ≤ A2 + A2 ≤ A2 + 1
2A3 ≤ 2A2 ≤ A2 + 1
A3 ≤ A2 ≤ A2+12 = xref .
It can be concluded that A3 ≤ xbri ≤ xref .
Depending on r, L selects x∗ and a∗L differently. Next, I divide [0, 1] into three
segments and analyze each segment based on r being in that segment. Figure B.2
depicts the arguments used for each segment.
Segment I: r ∈ [0, xr]
By (B.17), it is known that gr(x) ≥ gbri(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1], see Figure B.1. The
assumption (2.16) and (B.19) implies that gr(x) ≥ gref (x) for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
it can be concluded that for any given x ∈ [0, 1], gr(x) ≥ gbri(x) and gr(x) ≥ gref (x)




2.3 and Table 2.1. Hence, if r ≤ xr then x∗ = xr. The action that corresponds to the
function gr(x) is (k = 0, b = 0), so L chooses to send the agreement to the legislature
for ratification.
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Segment II: r ∈ (xr, xbri]
Given the condition A1 ≤ A2, xbri = 1+A12 ≤ xref = 1+A22 . Hence, both gbri(x) and
gref (x) increase in the region (xr, xbri], see Figure 2.3. Although gr(x) decreases,
gr(x) ≥ gref (x) and gr(x) ≥ gbri(x). Since gr(x) is decreasing, the maximum L can
obtain is gr(r) by setting x
∗ = r. If L decides to offer an agreement that is less than
r (x < r) and select the bribery option or the referendum option, then L gets gbri(x)
or gref (x). Note that
gr(r) ≥ gbri(r) ≥ gbri(x) for all x ∈ [0, r),
gr(r) ≥ gref (r) ≥ gref (x) for all x ∈ [0, r).
Therefore, L plays x∗ = r and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0).
Segment III: r ∈ (xbri, 1]
Note that xbri =
1+A1
2
> A3, so gbri(x) ≥ gref (x) due to (B.22), see also Figure B.1.
In this segment, both gr(x) and gbri(x) decrease. On the one hand, L may set x
∗ = r
and obtain an expected utility of gr(r). On the other hand, L may offer x < r and











+ pω = gref (xref ),
which follows from A2 ≥ A1. Hence, if L decides to offer an agreement less than r,
then L sets x to xbri and plays ((k = 0, b = 1)).
Let x̄ be the point at which gr(x̄) = gbri(xbri) in the region (xbri, 1]. In other words,
x̄ is the point in (xbri, 1] that the value of the function gr(x) is equal to the maximum
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expected value L may obtain by bribery option. Next, I derive an expression for x̄:
gr(x̄) = gbri(xbri)
−x̄2 + x̄(1− c + A1
)






−x̄2 + x̄(1− c + A1
)






Recall that xr =
1−c+A1
2
, so 1− c+A1 = 2xr and c−A1 = 1− 2xr. Substituting this
into the equation above leads to







































































where ∆ = b2 − 4ac.
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where the fourth equality follows from the substitution of gr(xr) and gref (xref ), see









On the one hand, gr(x) ≥ gbri(xbri) for any x ∈ (xbri, x̄], where x̄ is defined in
(B.26). The following follows immediately:
gr(r) ≥ gbri(xbri) for all r ∈ (xbri, x̄].
Therefore, if xbri < r ≤ x̄, then L sets x∗ = r and plays (k = 0, b = 0). Combining
this with the result of segment II, L plays x∗ = r and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0) if
r ∈ (xr, x̄].
On the other hand, in the region (x̄, 1], gbri(xbri) > gr(x), so L bribes the legisla-
ture, a∗L = (k = 0, b = 1), and plays x
∗ = xbri = 1+A12 .
The results so far can be summarized as follows. The following actions constitute
3The term in the square root in the expression for x̄ is equal to the difference in the possible maximum utilities














, (k = 0, b = 0)
)
if r ≤ xr
(
r, (k = 0, b = 0)
)





, (k = 0, b = 1)
)
if x̄ < r ≤ 1,
(B.25)
where








B.5.2 Case (ii): A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3
This case is analyzed under three conditions: (a) xref ≥ A3; (b) xref < A3 and
gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ); (c) xref < A3 and gbri(xbri) < gref (xref ). I analyze this case
under each condition separately.
(a) The given condition xref ≥ A3 allows me to conclude that gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ).
Recall that gbri(x) ≥ gref (x) in [A3, 1], see Figure B.1 and (B.22). In other
words, for any offer between A3 and 1, bribery option yields more utility to the
leader than the referendum option. Since xref ≥ A3, the maximum utility of
the bribery option, gbri(xbri), should be greater than or equal to the maximum
utility that is achievable under the referendum option, gref (xref ).
The main line of thought used in the derivation of the equilibrium in Case (i)
in §B.5.1 is also applicable for this case. If the resistance is in the region [0, xr]
then L can achieve the maximum possible utility he/she can get by offering xr
and doing nothing, i.e., x∗ = xr and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0). As pictured in Figure
B.2,
gr(r) ≥ gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ),
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in the region r ∈ [xr, x̄], so the leader is better off compared to the bribery or
the referendum option by making an offer satisfying the minimum requirements
dictated by the legislature (r). Hence, x∗ = r and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0). For
r ∈ (x̄, 1], offering xbri and bribing the legislature for ratification brings more
utility, so x∗ = xref and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 1).
The equilibrium described is given in (B.27).
(b) The condition xref < A3 causes a deviation from the picture in Figure B.2.
Recall that gbri(x) ≥ gref (x) for x ∈ [A3, 1]. The point gref (x) reaches its max-
imum at a point on the left of A3, i.e., xref < A3. Hence, there is a possibility
that gbri(xbri) < gref (xref ). Depending on whether gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ) or
gbri(xbri) < gref (xref ), the equilibrium switches. If gbri(xbri) ≥ gref (xref ), the
line of argument used in (a) above also holds.
This equilibrium corresponds to the one in (B.27).
(c) As in Case (i) in §B.5.1, I analyze this case by dividing [0, 1] into three segments
and analyzing each segment based on r being in that segment. Figure B.3 depicts
the arguments used for each segment.
Segment I: r ∈ [0, xr]
The function gr(x) is maximized at xr =
1−c+A1
2
and gr(xr) is the maximum
possible utility that L may obtain, see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1. From (2.18),
xr > 0. Hence, if r ∈ [0, xr], L plays x∗ = xr and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0), and gets
the utility gr(xr).
Segment II: r ∈ (xr, xref ]
Given the condition A2 ≤ A1, xbri = 1+A12 ≥ xref = 1+A22 . Hence, both gbri(x)
and gref (x) increase in the region (xr, xref ], see Figure B.3. Although gr(x)
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decreases, gr(x) ≥ gref (x) and gr(x) ≥ gbri(x), which follows from (B.17), and
(2.16) and (B.19), respectively. Since gr(x) is decreasing, if L chooses to make
an offer no less than the resistance (x ≥ r), then he/she should offer r and
obtain a utility of gr(r). If L decides to offer an agreement that is less than the
resistance (x < r) and select the bribery or the referendum option, then L gets
gbri(x) or gref (x). Due to the fact that both gref (x) and gbri(x) increase in this
segment,
gbri(r) ≥ gbri(x) for all x ∈ [0, r),
gref (r) ≥ gref (x) for all x ∈ [0, r).
for any r ∈ (xr, xref ]. Further, gr(r) ≥ gbri(r) and gr(r) ≥ gref (r). Therefore, L
plays x∗ = r and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0).
Segment III: r ∈ (xref , 1]
In this segment, if L decides to make an offer less than the resistance (x <
r), then he/she should pick the referendum option for ratification because
gbri(xbri) < gref (xref ).
Let x̂ be the point at which gr(x̂) = gref (xref ) in the region (xref , 1]. In other
words, x̂ is a point at which the value of the function gr(x) is equal to the max-
imum expected value L may obtain by the referendum option. The expression
x̂ is derived as follows:
gr(x̂) = gbri(xbri)
−x̂2 + x̂(1− c + A1
)






−x̂2 + x̂(1− c + A1
)






Recall that xr =
1−c+A1
2
, so 1− c+A1 = 2xr and c−A1 = 1−2xr. Substituting
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this into the equation above leads to












































































Note that the term in the square root is the difference in the maximum utility
L obtains by playing (x ≥ r, (k = 0, b = 0)) and (x < r, (k = 0, b = 1)), so it is
nonnegative.
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= gr(xr)− gref (xref ).
Thus, x̂ value in the region (xref , 1] is
xr +
√






On the one hand
gr(r) ≥ gref (xref ) for all r ∈ (xref , x̂].
Hence, if xref < r ≤ x̂, then L sets x∗ = r and plays (k = 0, b = 0). Combining
this with the result of segment II, L plays x∗ = r and a∗L = (k = 0, b = 0) if
r ∈ (xr, x̂].
On the other hand, in the region (x̂, 1], gref (xref ) > gr(x), so L holds a referen-
dum a∗L = (k = 1), and plays x
∗ = xref = 1+A22 .
The results for this case are summarized as follows. Provided that A2 ≤ A1 ≤














, (k = 0, b = 0)
)
if r ≤ xr
(
r, (k = 0, b = 0)
)





, (k = 0, b = 1)
)
if x̂ < r < 1,
(B.27)
where
x̄ = xr +
√







Figure B.2: An Illustration of the Expected Cost Functions in case of A3 ≤ A1 ≤ A2.
Figure B.3: An Illustration of the Expected Cost Functions in case of A2 ≤ A1 ≤ A3, xref < A3






Country: Challenger state that is going to be negotiating with the Paris Club.
Month: Month of events.
Year: Year of events.
Date of Negotiation: Date for start of negotiations.
Type of Negotiation: Variable indicating whether the negotiations are for re-
payment, rescheduling or new debt.
Legislative Support for challenger government: Variable indicating ma-
jority support in parliament or the more important legislative house. Include the
variables allupp1, alllow1, leadup1, leadlow1, nparty1, mingovc1, mingovp1, maj-
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govc1, mingovp1, majgovc1, majgovp1 from Huth and Allee (2003).
Duration in months of negotiations: Total length in months of that round
of negotiations.
Beginning Date: Start date of that round of negotiations.
End Date: Ending date of that round of negotiations.
Electoral System DEM (dem states): Categorical variable indicating whether
the state has a Majoritarian or PR system.
Electoral System NONDEM (nondem states): Categorical variable indi-
cating whether the state excludes the opposition from government’s formal decision-
making, or includes the opposition in government’s formal decision-making.
Method of Approval: Ordinal variable specifying whether the measures were
passed through via Legislative approval, Legislative amendments,
referendum/interest groups, not (1-4).
PLMAJ: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system
qualifies as plurality or majoritarian (Source: IDEA).
PR: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system qualifies
as proportional representation (Source: IDEA).
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Net Dem Score of actor: Democracy minus the Autocracy score for the state.
(Source: POLITY data)
Net Dem Score of target: Democracy minus the Autocracy score for the state.
(Source: POLITY data)
Time since last election in challenger: Variable indicating number of months
since last election. Include the variables electnt1 and ele12m1 from Huth and Allee
(2003).
Time since last election in target: Variable indicating number of months since
last election.
International Variables:
Military Balance: (milcap, milbin) Include the variables milratio, expratio,
trpratio, sptraprat, milmaj, miladv, lgmiladv, pa1ndunc from Huth and Allee (2003).
They are dyadic variables that specify the balance between the militaries of the two
states; milbin is binary version of the military capabilities ratio (1 if challenger’s
capabilities are greater than 0.5 in ratio to that of the target, 0 if less than 0.5).
This is also the constraint variable.
Strategic Value of Territory: Dummy variable for the strategic value of the
disputed territory to the challenger (0-1).
Economic Value of Territory: Dummy variable for the economic value of the
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dispute territory to the challenger (0-1).
Common Security Interests: Include the variables alliance, biatall, odi, mul-
tiall, comopp, odiopp, comadv2, comadv5 from Huth and Allee
(2003). They are dyadic variables that specify whether the two states had common
security interests. (Source: MID and Alliances dataset from
EuGene).
Target involvement in other military dispute: Dummy variable for the in-
volvement of the state in another dispute at the same time as this
one (0-1). (Source: MID dataset from EuGene).
Challenger involvement in other military dispute: Dummy variable for the
involvement of the state in another dispute at the same time as
this one. (Source: MID dataset from EuGene).
Existence of Stalemate in the last 2 years, 5 years, 10 years: Dummy
variable for the existence of successful agreements signed within
the last 2, 5 and 10 years. This variable measures the existence of an agreement
between 24 months, 60, and 120 months prior.




C.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Explanatory Variables:
Country: State negotiating for privatization.
Month: Month of events.
Year: Year of events.
Date of Negotiation: Date for start of negotiations.
Type of Sale: Variable indicating whether the negotiations are for privatization,
auction or floats.
Duration in months of negotiations: Total length in months of that round
of negotiations.
Beginning Date: Start date of that round of negotiations.
End Date: Ending date of that round of negotiations.
Percentage of Foreign Ownership 1 (percentownf1): Specifies the foreign
ownership profile for the privatized entity.
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Percentage of Foreign Ownership 2 (percentownf2):Specifies the foreign
ownership profile for the privatized entity, if there is a secondary state involved in
the deal.
Dema: Democracy Score for Privatizing State. (Source:Polity III)
Auta: Autocracy Score for Privatizing State. (Source:Polity III)
Netdema: Net Democracy Score for Privatizing State.
Netdemb: Net Democracy Score for Buyer State.
PLMAJ: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system
qualifies as plurality or majoritarian. (Source: IDEA)
PR: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system qualifies
as proportional representation. (Source: IDEA)
Sinceleaderelecta: Number of Months since General Elections.
Sinceleaderelectb: Number of Months since General Elections.
Sincelecta: Number of Months since last Legislative Elections.
Sincelectb: Number of Months since last Legislative Elections.
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Signimf: Does an agreement with the IMF exist? (Y =1/ N=0)
Monthssinceimf: Number of Months since IMF agreement was signed.
Capital Account Balance: Measuring the flow of capital in and out of the
country via receipts minus payments for international transactions.
(Source: IFC Statistics 78b2d, 78bcd, 78 bbd).
Government Consumption: Variable specifying how much G contributes to
the macroeconomic well-being of the state in question. Spending by
the government indicates how much the government contributes to the GDP.
Economic Growth: Variable for percentage of GDP growth per year. (Source:
World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005)
Fdientry: (Source: IFC Statistics)
Fdiexit: (Source: IFC Statistics)
Netfdi: Total FDI inflows of foreign capital minus Total FDI outflows of domes-
tic capital. (Source: IFC Statistics)
Econgrowth: Variable for percentage of GDP growth per year (Source: World
Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005).
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Humancap: Nominal variable indicating quality of human capital (0-3) ranges
from poor to highly skilled as specified by Barro and Lee used by Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005).
Inflowctrl: Dichotomous Variable measuring openness of the state to foreign in-
vestment ranging from almost closed to open (0-3). If the state is privatizing then
obviously there is openness in the state this variable is to capture level of openness
(ie. is there privatization in more than one industry/region?). (Source: Brune, Gar-
rett, Guisinger 2003 variation on the FDI Openness Indicator by Quinn).
International Variables:
Strategic Value of Industry: Dummy variable for the strategic value of the
disputed territory to the privatizing state (0-1).
Social Value of Industry: Dummy variable for the economic value of the dis-
pute territory to the privatizing state (0-1).
Colonyb1: Was the Privatizing state a colony of the main Buyer State?
Colonyb2: Was the Privatizing state a colony of the second main Buyer State?
Meanegrowth2: (Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005)
Meanegrowth5: (Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005)
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Meanegrowth10: (Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 2005)
FDI inflows : Reconstructed from Jensen (2006).
Openness Index: Reconstructed from Dennis Quinn (1997).
BITexistb1: Is there a bilateral investment treaty with the first buyer state?
(Y/N)
BITexistb2: Is there a bilateral investment treaty with the second buyer state?
(Y/N)
Decolonyrs: Number of Years since Decolonization.
Ladum: Latin America Dummy.
Depend: Is the state dependent on the industry for its economy?




Country: Debtor state in question.
Month: Month of event.
Year: Year of event.
Date of Treatment: The date of signing of agreement with the Paris Club.
Type of Treatment: The treatments put forth for each individual case of debt
via consensus by all the creditors. Most of the treatments fall under the following
treatment terms Classic (standard), Houston (for middle income states), Naples (for
poor states) and Cologne (improved terms for poor states).
Status of Treatment: The status is defined as active or fully paid. Coded as a
binary variable (0-1).
Amount Treated: The total amount that the government is lent with that particular
agreement.
Duration in months of negotiations: Total duration in months of that round
of negotiations.
Beginning Date: Date for start of negotiations.
End Date: Date for end of negotiations.
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PLMAJ: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system
qualifies as plurality or majoritarian (Source: IDEA).
PR: dummy variable for democratic states (dem=1) & electoral system qualifies
as proportional representation (Source: IDEA).
Dema: Democracy Score for Borrower State. (Source: Polity)
Auta: Autocracy Score for Borrower State. (Source: Polity)
Netdema: Net Democracy Score for Borrower State
Time since last election in challenger: Variable indicating number of months
since last election.
Time since last election in target: Variable indicating number of months
since last election.
Signed with IMF?: Indicator variable for whether or not the state has a valid
agreement with the IMF (dummy 0-1, for an agreement within the last 3 years).
Monthssinceimf: Number of Months since IMF agreement was signed.
Capital Account Balance: Measuring the flow of capital in and out of the
country via receipts minus payments for international
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transactions. (Source: IFC Statistics 78b2d, 78bcd, 78 bbd).
Budget Deficit: Excess of expenditure over income, what the government spends
beyond its allocated budget for fiscal year; net borrowing
plus net decrease in govt cash, deposits, securities. (Source: IFC Statistics 80, 81,
81z, 82, 83)
Foreign Reserves: Ratio of international reserves to total debt. (Source: IFC
Statistics 1d, 88b)
Debt Service: How much of the debt the country has been able to pay or service.
(Source: IFC Statistics 84a, 85a, 88a, 88b)
Investment: The total amount of investment coming into the country. (Source:
World Development Indicators CD-Rom 2005)
Current Account Deficit/GDP: This ratio measures the quantity of invest-
ment financed by borrowing from abroad and is negatively related to rescheduling
probabilities. (Source: IFC Statistics 78 ald, 78 7aad, 78 abd)
Rate of Inflation / 10, /100, /1000: Percentage of increase in prices. (Source:
World Development Indicators CD-Rom 2005)
Successful Agreements 2 years ago, 5 years ago, 10 years ago: Dummy
variable for the existence of successful agreements signed within the last 2, 5 and 10
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years. This variable measures the existence of an agreement between 24 months, 60,
and 120 months prior.
Democratic Norms Variables: Control variable for the existence of democratic
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